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Abstract
Emotional Intelligence as a Mediating Variable 
in Astin's I-E-O Model of Higher Education
The statistical results of this study detected a tendency for undergraduates 
who know how to understand and manage emotions to have higher GPAs. Yet the 
instructional target in higher education has always and traditionally been the cognitive 
domain. This is an embedded tradition, tracing a long line back to Plato, the 
Aristotelian model of 'intellect/ and the Cartesian 'self' defined as a cognitive knower. 
Almost forty years ago, a group of educators from the University of Chicago recognized 
this as a problem. "Basically the question posed," they wrote, "...is whether a human 
being ever does thinking without feeling" (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964, p. 7). 
One way to probe this problem is with the test construct of 'emotional intelligence' 
(Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b).
An on-line instrument, the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso-Emotional-Intelligence- 
Test, Version 2 (the MSCEIT, V.2), was designed to allow emotions to participate in 
thinking (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 49) and then measure the results. This 
study used the MSCEIT, V.2 to test an undergraduate sample of academic high 
achievers at a nationally top-ranked university with high admission standards. Female 
participants in this study tended to score significantly higher than males on the 
MSCEIT, V.2 construct of Understanding and Managing Emotions, but only male 
participants in this study's focus group self-reported applying emotional intelligence to 
higher learning.
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Future research is needed to understand this gender difference, identify 
components of 'achievement' and track achievement behaviors of emotionally 
intelligent undergraduates who are high achievers. The results of this study suggest 
that emotional intelligence may be a neglected learning resource.
Betsy Ross Edison, Ph.D.
Education Policy, Planning and Leadership (EPPL) 
Graduate School of Education 
The College of William and Mary in Virginia
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Chapter One 
Statement of the Problem
1
"Basically the question posed...is whether a human being 
ever does thinking without feeling"
(Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964, p. 7)
The Problem
The problem is the continuing historical separation of the cognitive and 
affective domains in higher education.
Introduction to the Problem
The instructional target in higher education has always and traditionally 
been the cognitive domain (Plato, 428-347 B.C. in Jowett, 1946; Day and Kingsley, 1828 
in Conrad and Haworth, 1990; James, 1890; Bloom, Englehart, Furst, Hill and 
Krathwohl, 1956; Rudolph, 1962/1990; Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964; Wolff, 1969; 
Astin, 1970 in Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991; Astin, 1977/1983,1993; Petry, Mouton and 
Reigeluth, 1987; Salovey and Mayer, 1990; Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991; Chickering 
and Reisser, 1993; Solomon, 1993; Damasio, 1994; Kerr, 1963/1995; Terenzini, 1997; 
Salovey and Mayer, 1990; Mayer and Salovey, 1997; Mayer, Caruso and Salovey, 
2000a). Almost forty years ago, a group of educators formally recognized this as a 
problem (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964).
The problem, posed by a committee of professors at the University of 
Chicago and published in 1964, basically asks: Is the academic exclusion of the affective 
domain an instructional mistake? (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964). This question 
has languised for decades because it is going upstream, against historical precedent.
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2The intellectual development of the cognitive domain is being discussed in 
Plato's Republic—as an educational objective (Plato, 428-347 B.C. in Jowett, 1946)—not 
for masses of undergraduates but for the well-being of "the liberal state which is 
founded on law and universal education and dedicated to the achievement of 
knowledge and virtue by its citizens"(Buchanan in Jowett, 1946, pp. 8-9). The 
educational objective was also a political objective, of great importance to the state. 
'"Better to be the poor servant of a poor master' and to endure anything, rather than 
think as they do..." Plato said about irrational people who live in caves and refuse to 
learn how to reason (Plato, 428-347 B.C. in Jowett, 1946, p. 251).
Plato was using a devastating teaching metaphor that placed the self­
defensive emotions of non-rational thinking in a dark and lower domain of ignorance 
and danger (Plato, 428-347 B.C. in Jowett, 1946) where they have epistemologically 
remained (Solomon, 1993; Mayer and Salovey, 1997; Mayer, Caruso and Salovey,
2000a) ever since.
One century after Plato, his follower Aristotle is describing extremes of 
emotion as "vice and wickedness" whose bad influence can cause even wisdom to be 
used unwisely (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982, p. 173). In the Eudemian Ethics. 
Aristotle advises his students to "...be aware as little as possible of the non-rational" 
(Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982, p. 46).
Aristotle's definitions are part of the historical problem. The historical 
problem is that ancient definitions of emotion as a threat to cognitive development 
(Solomon, 1993; Salovey and Mayer, 1990) are embedded in the curriculum of early 
American higher education (Rudolph, 1962/1990). Throughout the 17th, 18th and 
early- to mid-19th centuries in America, a college education required reading Plato and 
Aristotle in the original Greek (Rudolph, 1962/1990). It was Aristotle who wrote that 
"...desire does not imply the deliberative faculty. But sometimes it overpowers rational 
wish and moves to action; at other times the latter, rational wish, overpowers the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3former, desire" (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Dennett, 1993, p. 70). Aristotle and Plato thus 
laid the ancient trenches for the academic battlefield that was imported to colonial 
America and exists today, where emotional development as an educational objective is 
excluded from the academic classroom as an opposing force to the development of 
intellect—as it was in Plato's day (Plato, 428-347 B.C. in Jowett, 1946).
Contemporary thinkers may inherit this historical precedent that 
"...emotion as such is...more primitive, less intelligent...and more dangerous than 
reason, and thus needs to be controlled by reason..." (Solomon, 1993, p. 3). 
Contemporary thinkers may have "...a sense that...when affect plays a role in their 
decision processes, such influences are seen to be disruptive and tend to make their 
decisions 'irrational' and less appropriate" (Isen, 1993, p. 261).
It should therefore not be surprising that the contemporary university 
has been defined as a city of intellect (Kerr, 1963/1995). This definition echoes a 19th- 
century desire that the university be a walled fortress that "...maps out the territory of 
the intellect...and sees that...there is neither encroachment nor surrender on any side" 
(Newman in Kerr, 1963/1995, p. 2).
The Affective Domain Since 1964
Since 1964 the educational problem of domain separation identified by 
Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, has been addressed by 'student development' 
(Chickering and Reisser, 1993; Astin, 1977/1983,1993; Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991; 
Astin, 1970 in Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991), and updated by recent research findings 
in neuropsychology and neurophysiology (Damasio, 1994,1999) and a research concept 
called 'emotional intelligence' (Salovey and Mayer, 1990; Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 
2000a, 2000b). To date, however, the domains of cognition and affect remain separated 
in the academic development of intellect.
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Even after visionary educators in the 1970s won an academic place in 
American colleges and universities for the affective domain with 'student development/ 
taxonomies of educational objectives place affective development in the residence halls 
and campus social interaction (Terenzini, 1997; Astin, 1970 in Pascarella and Terenzini, 
1991; Astin, 1977/1983,1993; Chickering and Reisser, 1993). Cardinal Newman's 
fortress of intellect has not surrendered. The Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia question of 
1964 is still academically unanswered.
This unanswered question may also be an educational outcomes 
problem. The academic exclusion of emotion from cognitive development in the 
classroom may be making subtle, negative inroads into the desired outcomes of the 
undergraduate college experience (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964; Wolff, 1969; 
Astin, 1970 in Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991; Astin, 1977/1983,1993; Pascarella and 
Terenzini, 1991; Bandura, 1997; Chickering and Reisser, 1993; Ormrod, 1995; Ifert and 
Roloff, 1997; Guerrero and Miller, 1998; Levine and Cureton, 1998; Los Angeles Times, 
1999; Counseling Services, 2002). Undesired and unintended outcomes of the 
undergraduate experience are documented year after year and include, for example, 
prolonged time-to-degree-completion and a phenomenon called stopping-out 
(Chickering and Reisser, 1993). Other unintended outcomes of the college years are 
affective or stress-related, as reported by students to counselling services (Counseling 
Services, 2002; Los Angeles Times, 1999) and listed in books and journals by educational 
psychologists (Levine and Cureton, 1998; Chickering and Reisser, 1993; Pascarella and 
Terenzini, 1991; Astin, 1970 in Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991; Astin, 1977/1983,1993)—all 
duly reporting but not suggesting how to mediate the persistent unintended outcomes 
of higher education.
Reported undesired outcomes of the undergraduate experience today 
(Counseling Services, 2002; Levine and Cureton, 1998; Chickering and Reisser, 1993; 
Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991; Astin, 1970 in Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991; Astin,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
51977/1983,1993) include statistics on gender-specific stress (Counseling Services, 2002; 
Los Angeles Times, 1999), flunking out, dropping out, stopping out, chronic 
oversleeping, cutting classes, prolonged procrastination, chronic binge drinking, eating 
disorders, insomnia, self-isolation in the dorms, verbal aggression in class, mood 
swings, chronic headaches, depression, anxiety, low self-esteem, interpersonal peer 
problems, body image distorton, suicide attempts, the escapism of 'undergraduate 
hedonism' recently described by Chickering (Chickering and Reisser, 1993), but 
undergraduate behaviors have also been historically reported (Rudolph, 1962/1990) as 
outright student rebellions and extreme disciplinary problems including assault and 
battery that permeate the history of early American higher education (Rudolph, 
1962/1990; Chickering and Reisser, 1993). Some of the reported undesired outcomes 
today and "traditional" undergraduate misbehaviors in the historical past may be 
symptomatic of the research problem being probed here: the isolation of affective 
development from the traditional instructional target, the cognitive domain.
For the 1,250 students who requested ongoing therapy at a top-ranked 
U.S. university during 1999-2000 and 2000-2001, the top three reported affective 
problems were depression, anxiety and low self-esteem (see Appendix A) (Counseling 
Services, 2002). Of the 597 students requesting ongoing therapy during the academic 
year 1999-2000,72.5% were female; 19% were graduate students, 80% were 
undergraduates. During the academic year 1999-2000, a pattern of increasing use of 
counseling services per class year is shown: 7.5% of freshmen requested therapy, 
compared to 16.1% sophomores, 22.8% juniors, 28.8% seniors; this may indicate a 
cumulative negative impact of the college experience on undergraduates (Pascarella and 
Terenzini, 1991; Counseling Services, 2002) during the four-year undergraduate 
experience.
In fact, a large "....body of research offers few opportunities for claims of 
significant benefits of college attendance in students' self-systems: their sense of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
personal identity, their ego functioning, and their self-evaluation" (Pascarella and 
Terenzini, 1991, p. 208). The low impact of college on these affective outcomes— 
identify, ego formation and self-esteem—may be reflected in statistics from one of the 
leading universities in the United States during the academic year 1999-2000: of the 597 
students requesting ongoing therapy that year, 1.7 % reported self-mutilation 
behaviors, 3.2% were suicidal, 7.0% reported body image distortion behaviors, 2.7% 
reported anger control problems, 14.9% reported difficulty expressing affect, 12.7% 
reported sleep problems, 34.5% reported interpersonal peer problems, 43.4% reported 
low self-esteem, 57.1% reported anxiety, and 56.3% reported depression (Counseling 
Services, 2002).
During the academic year 2000-2001 at the same university, 653 students 
requested ongoing therapy, with 70.4% being female, 17.8% graduate students, and 
82% undergraduates: of these 653 students, there is a pattern of increasing use of 
counseling services per class year during the four-year undergraduate period, with 
8.6% being freshmen, 14.2% sophomores, 21.7% juniors, 33.8% seniors (Counseling 
Services, 2002). During 2000-2001,1.8% reported self-mutilation behaviors, 3.7% were 
suicidal, 6.4% reported body image distortion behaviors, 3.2% reported anger control 
problems, 6.0% reported difficulty expressing affect, 11.8% reported sleep problems, 
23.7% reported interpersonal peer problems, 34.6% reported low self-esteem, 41.0% 
reported anxiety, and 46.1% reported depression (Counseling Services, 2002).
What can account for the annual reporting (Counseling Services, 2002; 
Levine and Cureton, 1998; Chickering and Reisser, 1993; Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991; 
Astin, 1970 in Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991; Astin, 1977/1983,1993; Los Angeles Times, 
1999) of such statistics from the affective domain? What is the role of the college 
experience itself in relation to these statistics? What is the impact of low self-esteem, 
depression and anxiety on achievement efforts and outcomes?
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7With research indicating that college has a measurably low to moderate 
impact on development of self-systems (Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991, pp. 168-209), the 
question becomes why the college experience is not more involved in mediating these 
persistent and undesired outcomes.
"First, and particularly in the areas of identity formation and ego 
development, these are relatively new fields of inquiry, and theoretical foundations are 
still being laid and explored....Methodological constraints in the literature as a whole 
constitute a second reason (for the research findings)...that it may be unrealistic to 
expect the college experience to have an effect much greater than that revealed by the 
available research. Self-systems are complex, poorly understood, and generally 
believed to reach deeply into an individual's being. As such, they are not likely to be 
easily touched, changed, or measured....If this is so, then we ought not to be too 
surprised by the apparently modest effects of college in these areas" (Pascarella and 
terenzini, 1991, pp. 208-209).
Since 1991 when the available research methodology showed a low 
impact of college on development of self-systems (Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991, pp. 
168-209), the research concept of emotional intelligence has emerged as a new 
methodology (Mayer and Salovey, 1997) for testing affective development. The self­
systems of undergraduates may be more measureable today than in previous decades, 
but the central affective problem remains unaddressed and unmeasured. The problem 
is the continuing isolation of affective development from the mainstram of intellectual 
activity that is the focus of the undergradute experience in the classroom. The effects 
of college on self-esteem, self-concept and identity formation "...appear to be more 
indirect than direct, being mediated largely by the academic and social interactions 
students have with one another and with faculty members" (Pascarella and Terenzini, 
1991, p. 209). But this is just the problem.
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8The problem is how to design new teaching and learning strategies, or 
how to upgrade existing teaching and learning strategies, to be academically inclusive 
of the affective domain, based on current research showing the role of emotion in 
cognitive achievement (Bandura, 1997; Schutte, et al., 1997; Francis, et al., 1997; Salovey 
and Mayer, 1990; Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000a; Damasio, 1994,1999) and the 
taxonomies of educational objectives for each domains that exist today (Bloom, et al., 
1956; Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964; Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991; Astin, 1970 in 
Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991; Astin, 1977/1983,1993; Chickering and Reisser, 1993; 
Terenzini, 1997).
The problem of the affective domain, however, is not a simple problem.
It is deeply rooted in the traditions of higher education, tracing a history back to the so- 
called Oxbridge model (Kerr, 1963/1995; Rudolph, 1962/1990) of higher education, 
which in England was first fashioned in the 13th century at Oxford.
Undergraduates Seeking Emotion
Twentieth-century undergraduates, not unlike their medieval 
predecessors, were recently described in this way: "Students come to college loaded 
with emotional baggage. In varying degrees, they come with...self-doubts, old 
resentments, unmet needs...(and) must face the anxieties of new instructors, new 
subjects, new challenges. For some, excessive anger, anxiety, or depression become 
overwhelming. Many struggle with frustration, fear, boredom, or desire, without ever 
exploring the sources of these feelings or learning how to shift out of them. Others 
suppress their feelings and divert attention to what others want...." (Chickering and 
Reisser, 1993, p. 83). As the following paragraphs show, the affective domain has 
historically been a problem area, and undergraduates across the ages have sought to 
make its excluded presence known in the college experience.
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The first colleges at Oxford were small "self-governing religious 
foundations" (Chickering and Reisser, 1993, p. 428) patterned after the older European 
universities' ecclesiastical curriculum for the education of priests (Rudolph, 1962/1990; 
Kerr, 1963/1995; Chickering and Reisser, 1993). Residential life placed students "in 
close quarters with authorities deeply concerned about their students' moral character" 
and behavior (Chickering and Reisser, 1993, p. 428).
As history suggests (Rudolph, 1962/1990), the medieval educational 
objectives of cognitive control and exclusion of emotion, as anciently advised by Plato 
and Aristotle, became a problem.
"The prototype (in 13th-century Oxford), Merton College, had sixteen 
names on its admissions rolls in 1285 and twelve books, including Aquinas, Aristotle, 
Augustine, the Book of Job, and 'Half the psalter, glossed'... Scholars devoted to the 
study of letters, or Arts and Philosophy, the Canons, or Theology were to obey the 
Warden—a man of circumspection in spiritual and temporal affairs. They were to dress 
as nearly alike as possible and dine in silence at their common table while listening to a 
reader. When in their chambers, they were expected to speak in Latin and live meekly 
in fellowship, without burdening each other, but sharing all things fairly" (Chickering 
and Reisser, 1993, p. 428).
Later in 1636 "the jumbled mass of rules and statutes" governing student 
behavior was gathered by the Oxford University chancellor, William Laud, into one 
code, called Laud's Code, which included the barring of students from idling about, 
from going anywhere where wine was sold....(from being) stage players (students 
being actors in plays), rope dancers, or fencers (who if caught so doing) were to be 
confined to their rooms, and under no condition was football to be played" (Chickering 
and Reisser, 1993, p. 429). In America, Harvard College adopted similar codes of 
conduct from the colleges at Cambridge which directed students to read the scriptures 
two times per day, to publicly repeat sermons whenever called upon to do so, to honor
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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their parents, elders and tutors by being silent in their presence, to spend their time 
studying and praying, and to never speak in oaths, lies and uncertain rumors as well as 
avoiding all idle, foolish scoffing, frothy and wanton words and offensive gestures 
(Chickering and Reisser, 1993, p. 430).
The 13th-century Merton College students, however, studied to be priests 
"while acting like adolescents" (Chickering and Reisser, 1993, p. 428). They went into 
town dressed in fur-trimmed gowns, argued heatedly in public places 
about the number of angels on the tip of a pin, did arithmetic using Roman numerals, 
and legend has it that the undergraduate mortarboard (worn ever since at college 
graduations) was devised at Merton when "students stuffed their writing slates into 
their knit caps, freeing their hands to defend themselves from hostile townspeople" 
(Chickering and Reiser, 1993, p. 428). A fuller account of the student-priests' 
misbehavior at Merton College was written by a surprised visitor to the college in 1507. 
He listed various student misconduct such as "Stokysley baptized a cat and practiced 
witchcraft; Gregory climbed the gate at the tower and brought a Stranger into College; 
Pots and cups are seldom washed and are kept in such a dirty state that one sometimes 
shudders to drink out of them; Gunne has had cooked eggs at the Taberd (Tavern) in 
the middle of the night; Kyftyll played cards with the butler at Christmas time for 
money...and Smith stole and killed a calf in the garden of one master..." (Chickering 
and Reisser, 1993, p. 429).
From the story this history tells, the medieval moral behavior codes and 
the college authorities were apparently being challenged. Were the students having an 
identity crisis (Erikson and Loevinger in Santrock, 1997; Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991)?
In later centuries, college authorites still lived with the students in the 
same building in which they taught them, for example, at 18th-century William and 
Mary College in Virginia. For some 200 years, William and Mary College held classes 
and housed sudents and professors in one big brick building, horn which big building
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the wealthy and elite 18th-century college boys would slip away at night to meet the 
town's apprentice boys for a brawling fight (Rudolph, 1962/1990).
Thus the classical European curriculum with its strict behavioral codes and 
misbehaviors, brought to medieval England from Paris and Bologna, and later to 
colonial America, presented, apparently from the start, an opportunity for identity- 
seeking undergraduates to wrest emotional autonomy from in loco parentis authorities, 
and be rebellious in the affective domain. Yet excluding emotion and teaching to the 
cognitive domain continued to dominate 18th-century, 19th-century, and 20th-century 
higher education in America—although there were some notable exceptions. In the 17th 
century the English philosopher, Francis Bacon, complained that in higher education 
there was "...a kind of adoration of the mind...by means whereof men have withdrawn 
themselves too much...and have tumbled up and down in their own reason and 
conceits" (Bacon in Kerr, 1963/1995, p.2).
Francis Bacon may have perceived the steady devolution of the ancient, 
idealistic and elevated cognitive objectives of higher education, objectives paved with 
the philosophical abstractions for which Cardinal Newman must have been yearning 
when he wrote that the outcomes of a college education should be gentlemen with "...a 
cultivated intellect, a delicate taste, a candid, equitable, dispassionate mind, a noble and 
courteous bearing in the conduct of life" (Newman in Levine, 1978, p. 255). But by the 
mid-19th century in America, before Newman's The Idea of a University saw print in 
1873 (Levine, 1978), blatant student disobedience on elite American campuses (Rudolph, 
1962/1990) was perhaps proving Bacon's point.
Disobedience occurred as student rebellions, "...a concerted strike of a 
majority of the undergraduates, protesting against some real or imagined wrong, 
threatening to withdraw from the college and to abandon it to the uncertainties of 
enrollment and finance that were bound to follow" (Rudolph, 1962/1990, p. 97).
For example, at Princeton University, there were six rebellions between 1800 and 1830
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whose "true cause" Princeton President Ashbel Green said was undergraduate 
"hostility...to the whole system...of diligent study, of guarded moral conduct, and of 
reasonable attention to religious duty" (Rudolph, 1962/1990, p. 106). Other than at 
Princeton, undergraduate students staged rebellions from 1800 to 1875 at Harvard,
Yale, Dartmouth, Amherst, Brown, Williams, Georgetown, the University of South 
Carolina, Bowdoin, Lafayette, the University of North Carolina, City College of New 
York, Dickinson, DePauw—rebellions based in the residence dorms which "documented 
the failure of the colleges to provide altogether suitable 'rites of adolescence/ (and) 
satisfactory outlets for quite normal animal energy and human imagination" (Rudolph, 
1962/1990, p. 98).
Other forms of undergraduate misbehaviors in the 19th century are well- 
documented (Rudolph, 1962/1990), from the comical (taking a professor's turkey) 
(Rudolph, 1962/1990, p. 106) to the criminal (stabbings of fellow students, even death in 
a duel over which student got the platter of trout at dinner), and there is even the 
report of a student stoning the president and a professor at the University of Georgia 
(Rudolph, 1962/1990, p. 97).
In addition to the blatant disobedience of student rebellions and other 
misbehaviors, outspoken student demands for an extra-curriculum (of debate dubs for 
the reading of literature and other subjects exduded from the dassical Greek and Latin- 
based curriculum) were also negating Newman's desired educational outcomes of 
courteous gentlemen with dispassionate minds (Levine, 1978, p. 253). Newman's 19th- 
century idealism when seen in the light of the extreme student disobedience and 
misbehaviors of the same era, however, remains useful for a reassessment of the 
"satisfactory" development of the affective as well as the cognitive domain in the 
college experience of today.
Were the widespread student uprisings, and extremes of misbehaviors, on 
19th-century college campuses evidence of the undergraduate need to seek and express
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emotion? "One tradition in Western thought has viewed emotions as disorganized 
interruptions of mental activity" (Salovey and Meyer, 1990, p. 185). "A second tradition 
views emotion as an organizing response...primary motivating forces...processes which 
'arouse, sustain, and direct activity.' The full expression of emotions seems to be a 
primary human motive" (Salovey and Mayer, 1990, p. 186).
Student misbehaviors, demands and disobedience, then, were perhaps 
really, as Rudolph suggests (Rudolph, 1962/1990, p. 98), a way to express emotions and 
negate the old medieval-based Idea of a University (Newman, 1873 in Levine, 1978; 
Kerr, 1963/1995) as a walled fortress of intellect that was more or less imprisoning the 
19th-century undergraduate in an unhappy, cheerless place (as some letters home 
described) (Rudolph, 1962/1990). Undergraduates may need to express emotion 
because undergraduates are developmentally driven to do so (Erikson and Loevinger, 
in Santrock, 1997). Undergraduate disobedience may be only a natural eruption of the 
late-adolescent developmental drive to establish autonomy, self-concept and a young 
adult identity (Chickering and Reisser, 1993).
In fact the historical misbehaviors of undergraduates have been called 
"youthful rites of passage" (Rudolph, 1962/1990, p. 98) and developmental vectors in 
the affective domain—Establishing Autonomy and Identity—(Chickering and Reisser, 
1993; Chickering in Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991) that are included in contemporary 
taxonomies of educational objectives under 'psychosocial' development (Terenzini, 
1997; Astin, 1977,1993).
The Taxonomies
Existing taxonomies of educational ojectives (Terenzini, 1997; Astin, 
1977/1983,1993; Chickering and Reisser, 1993; Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991; Astin, 
1970 in Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991) built on the suggestions of Bloom's Taxonomy 
for the two domains (Bloom, et al., 1956; Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964) of affect 
versus cognition. Taxonomies today do provide for the development of the affective
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domain, but as a separate 'psychosocial' domain which remains historically isolated in 
the residence halls and campus social interaction, and thereby remains historically 
separated from the development of intellect (Plato, 428-347 B.C. in Jowett, 1946).
When Handbook II. Affective Domain was finally published, the authors 
explained with much academic breastbeating and an eloquent mea culpa (Krathwohl, et 
al., 1964, pp. 12-13) that the committee of professors at the University of Chicago had 
reluctantly decided to go ahead and define a taxonomy of educational objectives for the 
affective domain (Krathwohl, et al., 1964, p. 7).
Krathwohl blamed the delay on his committee's prolonged period of 
collective doubt and intellectual confusion as they wrestled with the questions of 1) 
whether they should and 2) how they could identify (as promised in Handbook I. The 
Cognitive Domain) specific educational objectives in the affective domain to be 
addressed in the classroom (Krathwohl, et al., 1964). In the end, it was educators who 
convinced Krathwohl and his colleagues "by the many letters we received from 
teachers, specialists in measurement and evaluation, and educational research workers, 
asking when the second Handbook would be published" (Krathwohl, et al., 1964, p. 13) 
to go ahead and publish Handbook II. The committee's eventual decision was 
grounded in their conviction that, "Basically the question posed...is whether a human 
being ever does thinking without feeling" (Krathwohl, et al., 1964, p. 7).
After the introductory pages, Handbook II states that the book's 
"usefulness to teachers, evaluators, and curriculum workers" is to "...help educators 
redress the erosion in the meaning and substance of affective objectives which has 
resulted from the greater emphasis on cognitive objectives. What is missing is a 
systematic effort to collect evidence of growth in affective objectives which is in any 
way parallel to the very great and systematic efforts to evaluate cognitive 
achievement" (Krathwohl, et al, 1964, pp. 14-16).
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At the end of the 20th century, leading higher education theorists 
(Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991; Terenzini, 1997; Astin, 1977/1993; Chickering and 
Reisser, 1993; Astin, 1970 in Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991) identified the separate 
functions and outcomes of the two domains: "In determining what types of outcomes 
to consider in our synthesis, we were guided by the thinking of various scholars 
concerned with taxonomies of the outcomes of college (for example, Astin, 1973; Brown 
and DeCoster, 1982; Ewell, 1984,1985,1988; Hanson, 1982; Jacobi, Astin and Ayala,
1987; Lenning, Lee, Mieck, and Service, 1977; Parker and Schmidt, 1982)....Cognitive 
outcomes have to do with the utilization of higher-order intellectual processes such as 
knowledge acquisition, decision making, synthesis, and reasoning. Affective outcomes 
are attitudes, values, self-concepts, aspirations, and personality dispositions" (Pascarella 
and Terenzini, 1991, p.5; above cites referenced in Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991).
A leading taxonomy that recently built on previous taxonomies by Astin 
and Ewell (Terenzini, 1997) retains the historical separation of cognitive and affective 
domains (Terenzini, 1997). This separation is what Professor Benjamin Bloom and his 
committees at the University of Chicago in the early 1960s advised educators to address 
as one inseparable learning domain in the classroom, in order to achieve specifically 
defined educational objectives in both the affective and cognitive domains (Bloom, et al., 
1956; Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964). Bloom's committees concluded that cognitive 
achievement begins in the affective domain as emotional "willingness" to pay attention 
to the learning task (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964). This is not a new concept: 
affective willingness to begin learning goes back to Aristotle's ancient idea that every 
movement of intellect begins with wanting or desire (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 
1982). But how to test the theory?
The designing of "eduationally powerful" learning environments has 
been suggested (Chickering and Reisser, 1993). As tin's I-E-O model of higher 
education presents a potentially powerful model with which to imagine a new
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paradigm for learning and simultaneous teaching to both domains. The Astin model is 
not just a cognitive environment with an affective appeal. Its dynamic is an inclusive 
learning environment which gives and receives in both domains. In the Astin model, 
personal incoming variables (I) are received into an educational environment (E) that 
eventually produces educational outcomes (O). The incoming variables and the 
educational environment must include and reflect the affective emotional self, a self 
which the American psychologist, William James, one hundred years ago, and 
contemporary neuropsychology (Damasio, 1994,1999), have identified as being 
involved in the reasoning process (James, 1884,1890; Damasio, 1994,1999).
Developing the critical thinking skills required for abstract reasoning is a desired 
outcome of higher education; research can show that reasoning requires both the 
cognitive and affective domains (Damasio, 1994,1999).
Astin's model presents a structure with which to begin to imagine ways to 
engage both domains during the undergraduate development of intellect and self. 
Astin's model is powerful because it offers an open-ended, multi-factored environment 
(E) that absorbs both the cognitive and affective inputs (I) brought by undergraduates 
to the higher education table. The inputs component (I) "includes a wide variety of 
personal, family, and educational background characteristics that students bring with 
them to their postsecondary experience. These traits include such things as academic 
and intellectual abilities, precollege achievements (academic and otherwise), goals and 
motivation levels, degree and career aspirations, and a range of demographic, personal, 
and family characteristics, such as gender, race/ethnicity, socioeconomic status, age, 
marital status and citizenship. Inputs' also refers to a variety of other obligations 
students may have, including those to family and /o r work" (Terenzini, 1997, Figure 1 
of his report).
In the Astin model, then, there is ample room in the college environment 
(E) for the incoming (I) emotional 'self' of the undergraduate whose self-concept
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formation, and self-efficacy beliefs, are a crucial part of the process of intellectual 
achievement in the classroom, and inseparable from educational outcomes (O), whether 
academically recognized in the classroom or not (Bandura, 1997; Skaalvik, 1997; 
Damasio, 1994,1999; Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964; Chickering and Reisser, 1993; 
Garcia and Pintrich, 1996; Guerrero and Miller, 1998; Ifert and Roloff, 1997; Fuchs, et al., 
1997; Isen, 1993; James, 1890; Lang, Bradley and Cuthbert, 1997; Levine and Cureton, 
1998; Lewis, 1992; Matthews, 1993; Mayer and Salovey, 1990; Mayer, Caruso and 
Salovey, 2000; Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000a; Ohman, 1993; Pascarella and 
Terenzini, 1991; Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Richardson, 1992; Slipp, 1975; Travers, 1973; 
Petry, Mouton and Reigeluth, 1987).
The question is how to academically evoke and support the affective 
domain in ways that assist learning in the classroom, so that an instructional challenge 
to achieve intellectually is also a challenge or 'crisis' opportunity (Erikson and Kohlberg 
in Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991; Erikson and Kohlberg in Santrock, 1997) for the 
developing emotional 'self' of the undergraduate.
The experience of an identity 'crisis' (Marcia, 1965/1966 in Pascarella and 
Terenzini, 1991; Erikson and Kohlberg in Santrock, 1997) is a developmental challenge 
that theoretically occurs between late adolescence and young adulthood, but not all 
psychologists agree that an actual crisis is required (Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991, p. 
209). The theoretical identity 'crisis' that can lead to young-adult autonomy does not 
have to be a psychological emergency but instead can be "...engagement of and choice 
among meaningful but competing altematives...(in) the making of personal 
commitments" (Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991, p. 164). The challenge is making a 
commitment, or not, which ties in with Astin's theory that personal psychological 
involvement (Astin, 1984 in Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991) is necessary in order to 
grow developmentally by "...the investment of psychological energy" (Pascarella and 
Terenzini, 1991, p. 50). How to academically present and encourage such challenges?
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An educationally powerful environment, and the teachers in it, would 
seek to evoke both intellectual and affective "involvement" (Astin, 1977,1993; Astin, 
1984 in Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991) in order to give structured opportunities to 
undergraduates as they seek to identify self-concept and achieve the outcome of 
"satisfaction" (Chickering and Reisser, 1993) with the college experience.
Satisfaction intersects the two domains, as both an affective feeling (such 
as a feeling of contentment) and a cognitive assessment. An existing "Taxonomy of 
Student Outcomes" (Terenzini, 1997) that still separates affective from cognitive 
development, suggests a desired outcomes category called "Educational Success" which 
lists "retention/persistence, degree completion, time-to-degree, satisfaction" (Terenzini, 
1997). These are the very outcomes that are being negatively impacted by self- 
reported problems in the affective domain (Counseling Services, 2002; Bandura, 1997; 
Astin, 1977/1983,1993; Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991; Chickering and Reisser, 1993; 
Levine and Cureton, 1998).
Even after completion of the college experience, the educational outcome 
of satisfaction is a lasting affective outcome because linked to a cognitive assessment of 
self-concept and self-efficacy that can influence future achievement. A taxonomy of 
desired student outcomes lists "Quality of Life" (Terenzini, 1997) which includes a 
"sense of well-being" (Terenzini, 1997, Table 2 in his report). The sense of well-being is 
an affective feeling based on a cognitive assessment of achievement. Yet even with 
such obviously linked outcomes across both domains, separate outcomes for the 
cognitive domain are still being separately described (Terenzini, 1997) as, for example, 
"...a set of general intellectual and cognitive competencies and skills. These skills 
constitute ...complex mental functions...the effective processing and utilization of 
information and include such activities as critical thinking, problem-solving, the analysis 
and utilization of information, creative thinking, and both formal (i.e., Piagetian) and 
postformal reasoning (the analysis of problems for which there is no verifiably-correct
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answer, sometimes called "ill-structured" or "wicked" problems requiring choices 
involving questions of crime, poverty, abortion). This category also includes moral 
reasoning, which refers to the processes by which judgments of right and wrong are 
made..." (Terenzini, 1997, Appendix C of his report). But how, exactly, to guide 
undergraduates to achieve these desired educational outcomes in only one domain 
when contemporary research using neuroimaging and case studies of individuals with 
brain damage to the emotion centers show that "judgments of right and wrong" 
(Terenzini, 1997, Appendix C of his report) as well as "critical thinking, problem­
solving, the analysis and utilization of information, creative thinking, and both formal 
(i.e., Piagetian) and postformal reasoning"(Terenzini, 1997, Appendix C of his report) 
cannot be concluded without the involvement of emotions (Damasio, 1994,1999). This 
research indicates a new direction for higher education in the cognitive development of 
intellect. Yet it also remains an area of new research, which needs to be explored.
The research concept of 'emotional intelligence' is an exploratory concept 
that intersects the two domains (Mayer and Salovey, 1990; Salovey and Mayer, 1997; 
Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000a, 2000b). Emotional intelligence is a set of abilities 
that can be learned and thus could become a pilot concept to help future research 
bridge the psychosocial gap in the undergraduate development of 'thought' and 'self/ 
Educational applications of the research concept of emotional intelligence, however, 
have yet to emerge. "There are few ready-made real-life criteria with which to 
correlate emotional intelligence at present. Questions such as, What is an effective 
emotional life? or, What is an effective successful life? have only begun to be 
addressed" (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000a, p. 416).
Existing taxonomies such as Chickering's Seven Vectors of affective 
development, dted in his book, Education and Identity, are already geared toward 
satisfaction as an undergraduate affective goal, and include managing emotions 
(Chickering in Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991; Chickering and Reisser, 1993). Managing
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emotions is also one of the four objectives of the original and current research concept 
of 'emotional intelligence' (Mayer and Salovey, 1990; Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 
2000a, 2000b) and could be central to forming self-efficacy beliefs that direct 
achievement behaviors (Bandura, 1997). Emotional intelligence is a concept that can 
trace a long line back to Plato and Aristotle as the ability to perceive and mediate 
extremes of emotional expressions and behaviors (Mayer and Salovey, 1990; Mayer, 
Salovey and Caruso, 2000a, 2000b). For Aristotle, emotion management was the 
golden mean (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982).
In the future, emotional intelligence may become an important new 
mediating variable within the broad scope of the undergraduate experience, in an all- 
inclusive learning environment such as Astin's model of higher education describes, 
where an undergraduate could learn how to access and generate the personal emotions 
that facilitate formation of positive self-efficacy beliefs, achievement behaviors, and 
complex thinking and abstract reasoning, in other words how to use emotions to 
engage an optimal cognitive mode for learning and achievement (Mayer, Salovey and 
Caruso, 2000; Mayer and Salovery, 1990,1999; Damasio, 1994,1999; Bandura, 1997). 
Emotional intelligence may be only one mediating variable in the college learning 
environment, but it has the potential to mediate both undergraduate self-system 
development and academic achievement effort.
Finding correlations between emotional intelligence and academic 
achievement is the conceptual point of departure for this study, in order to look for an 
interface of the two domains in learning, and probe the feasibility of a new inclusive 
taxonomy of educational objectives for both domains in the academic classroom, 
modeled after the two domain taxonomies that Bloom and his colleagues have already 
written (see Appendix B) (Bloom, et al., 1956; Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964).
Yet there is difficulty today in conceiving how to academically integrate the two 
domains.
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After all, the domain of psychosocial development is the emotional 
domain. The emotional or affective domain is impacted not just in residence life and 
campus social interaction, but in the academic classroom where stressors in the 
educational experience may be negatively impacting the outcomes of college 
(Counseling Services, 2002; Levine and Cureton, 1998; Astin, 1993; Chickering and 
Reisser, 1993; Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991).
This impact, historically apparent in the widespread 19th-century 
misbehaviors of undergraduates, was referred to even in the lofty Yale Report of 1828 
(when it reaffirms the in loco parentis role of colleges) (Day annd Kingsley, 1828, in 
Conrad and Haworth, 1990). Were the rebellions that threatened to close down the 
campus (Rudolph, 1962/1990) caused by an "unmet emotional need" (Wolff, 1969) of 
undergraduates to test values and experience a crisis? Undergraduate behaviors are 
just as perplexing today and as well-documented as they were at Merton College in 
1507 (Chickering and Reisser, 1993). For many years, longitudinal four-year tracking 
of undergraduate behaviors from freshman year through senior-year graduation has 
been done (Astin, 1977/1983,1993; (Astin in Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991).
One longitudinal study shows a significant-percentage decrease in church- 
going by senior year in college (-34.7) and in other religious activities such as praying (- 
15.6) and a significant-percentage increase in beer drinking (+27.9), wine drinking 
(+35.3), and oversleeping, resulting in missing class or appointment (+26.7) (Astin, 1977, 
pp. 74-76). "Students undergo...marked increases in hedonism after entering 
college...which appears to increase gradually ...the patterns of change in...drinking, 
sleeping habits, and use of tranquillizers and sleeping pills suggest that college 
attendance is often accompanied by substantially increased stress" (Astin, 1977/1983, 
pp. 76-77).
Astin's early efforts at designing a taxonomy for the affective domain 
aimed for the inclusion of "affective-psychological outcomes" to mediate the stress
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symptoms being reported in the college experience. The data gathered in Astin's 
Cooperative Institutional Research Program (CIRP) questionnaires "over the years 
have incorporated fifty-seven different affective-psychological (scale) items...(and)... 
another category of affective-psychological outcomes, student satisfaction with the 
college environment...." (Astin, 1977/1983, pp. 31-32).
The 58 variables investigated by CIRP were organized into four 
categories. Astin has documented in all four categories affective self-concept 
applications to higher education, and it is there that emotional intelligence might be 
applied as a mediating variable: 1) the CIRP questionnaire area of interpersonal self­
esteem which includes leadership ability and self-confidence; 2) the CIRP questionnaire 
area of intellectual self-esteem which includes intellectual self-confidence; 3) the CIRP 
questionnaire area of self-criticism which includes sensitivity to criticism and 
defensiveness; and 4) the CIRP questionnaire area of understanding of self and others. 
which includes cheerfulness and desire to achieve (Astin, 1977/1983, p. 33).
The CIRP results are more optimistic than previous research (Pascarella 
and Terenzini, 1991) has resported, and suggests that "positive changes...in both 
(interpersonal and intellectual) measures of self-esteem suggest that college attendance 
may increase the individual's sense of competence and self-worth. Similar (positive) 
changes have been reported by other investigators (Chickering, 1969,1974b; 
Constantinople, 1969; Madison, 1971; McConnell, 1972; Schmidt, 1970)" (Astin, 
1977/1983, p. 34; all dtes referenced in Astin, 1977/1983, pp. 273-283).
The self-report method of data gathering used by Astin in the CIRP 
questionnaire, however, has certain inherent flaws and statistical gaps in the perception 
of how youthful self-concept affectively develops. Astin, however, explains: "In 
response to the question, 'How does college affect students?' one can legitimately ask, 
'In relation to what?"'
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Astin points out that for many contemporary students 'going to college' 
may mean little more than driving to campus for a class and then driving home, so that 
the arena for affective social interaction with others is confined to the academic 
classroom. There in the classroom, as history shows, the affective domain is excluded 
from the cognitive development of intellect. Hence in the 1983 revision of his earlier 
1977 effort at defining the affective impact of college on students, Astin enlarged the 
sphere of influence of the affective domain, and recommended a more inclusive 
educational environment offering psychological "involvement" as the dynamic for 
achieving such educational outcomes as "satisfaction" (Chickering and Reisser, 1993; 
Astin, 1977/1983; Astin, 1984 in Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991) with the undergraduate 
experience. Satisfaction is an educational objective that involves both domains. Hence 
a new inclusive taxonomy of educational objectives for the 21st century could be 
housed in the Astin model, because an emotionally intelligent educational environment 
is needed to academically involve and challenge the emotional self as well as the 
cognitive self in college.
The historical importance of designing educational objectives that are 
inclusive of both domains may have been pointed out rather harshly in American 
higher education when classical Greek and Latin were being pointedly called dead 
languages (Rudolph, 1962/1990). Using the Greek and Latin classics to teach 
undergraduates discipline instead of poetry may have exacerbated the unrest arising 
from the "unmet emotional need" (Wolff, 1969, p. 15) for poetry as well as furniture 
(Day and Kingsley, 1828 in Conrad and Haworth, 1990; Rudolph, 1962/1990) of the 
mind. As one educator explained that emotional need, "...between the accumulation of 
knowledge and skills...there ought to occur an...emotional experience, which is neither a 
mere continuation of what went before nor a mere foretaste of what is to follow (Wolff, 
1969, p. 15).
Why exactly do undergraduates need an emotional challenge?
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Undergraduates in the traditional college-age range of 18 to 22 are 
developmentally preorganized (Santrock, 1997; Erikson and Loevinger in Pascarella and 
Terenzini, 1991; Chickering and Reisser, 1993) to actively seek to establish an emotional 
self that is an autonomous young adult, independent horn his or her parents' control 
and from the control of other adult authority-figures as well.
"Somewhere in late adolescence...(is) an extended period during which 
(undergraduates) make the difficult transition from childhood to the adult world... 
(and)...the disinctive phase which Erikson calls the 'identity crisis'" (Wolff, 1969, p. 15). 
The college undergraduate is developmentally driven to seek a new emotional identity 
after losing the identity of high school (Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991; Chickering and 
Reisser, 1993). The new college identity is an indicator of personal growth, and further 
stage-development (Kohlberg, Erikson and Loevinger in Santrock, 1997; Kohlberg, 
Erikson and Leovinger in Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991) of what William James called 
the ego or emotional self (James, 1884).
But even with today's understanding that expressing emotion is one of 
the primary developmental motivations (Mayer and Salovey, 1990) during the 
undergraduate years, and that emotions regulate self-efficacy beliefs and achievement 
behaviors (Bandura, 1997) and can assist cognitive development (Damasio, 1994,1999; 
Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000a, 2000b), the undergraduate's historical emotion- 
seeking and developmental drive for emotional crisis in order to grow into an 
autonomous young adult (Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991; Chickering and Reisser, 1993; 
Erikson and Kohlberg in Santrock, 1997) is still isolated as an in loco parentis concern in 
the college experience (Chickering and Reisser, 1993; Terenzini, 1997). The college 
experience in the classroom does not include intellectual challenges for the affective 
identity-seeking and self-concept formation (Astin, 1977,1993; Pascarella and Terenzini, 
1991; Chickering and Reisser, 1993; Terenzini, 1997) that undergraduaes are 
developmentally driven to seek.
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The personal self in any case will be gradually identified, with or without a 
college education, through natural maturation and life experiences as the individual 
grows older, by traditional and possibly dangerous youthful misbehaviors that may 
break the rules of authority to establish youthful autonomy, by social interactions with 
others in the late-adolescent period of the life-span (Santrock, 1997). Yet, self-concept 
formation does not have to be left to chance.
Self-concept formation could be enlightened within the college learning 
environment with knowledge of emotional intelligence abilities, such as recognizing 
and understanding emotions in self and others. Understanding how to recognize and 
manage emotions could provide self-guidance and self-regulation during the 
undergraduate years (Chickering and Reisser, 1993; Bandura, 1997) and because self- 
concept formation includes self-efficacy beliefs (Bandura, 1997), it may become 
educationally important-even an educational objective—to instructionally include 
development of the self-concept/self-efficacy of the hidden emotional self during the 
academic experience.
Research indicates that students with positive self-concept but moderate 
ability can achieve higher than students with high ability but low self-concept (Mayer, 
Salovey, and Caruso, 2000a). Self-concept is an emotional feeling based on a cognitive 
assessment. Thus self-concept has one foot in the affective domain and is demonstrably 
related to the traditional objective of higher education, academic high achievement 
(Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000; Bandura, 1992; Damasio, 1994; James, 1890). The 
formation of emotional self-concept is crucial for optimal learning (Mayer, Salovey and 
Caruso, 2000; Damasio, 1994,1999; Bandura, 1992), but self-concept formation is not an 
instructional target in higher education today. Self-concept is educationally left to 
chance. Today as in Plato's day, development of the affective domain remains isolated 
from academic intellectual development.
Is this historical separation justified?
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Plato who seems to have started the tradition can give an imaginative 
answer, using images of: "...composite creations of ancient mythology, such as the Chimera or
Scylla or Cerberus...in which two or more different natures are said to grow into one now
model the form of a multitudinous, many-headed monster, having a ring of heads of all manner of 
beasts, tame and wild, which he is able to generate and metamorphone at will.
"..Suppose now that you make a second form as of a lion, and a third of a man, the 
second smaller than the first, and the third smaller than the second....And now join them, and let 
the three grow into one...Next fashion the outside of them into a single image, as of a man, so that 
he who is not able to look within, and sees only the outer hull, may believe the beast to be a single 
human creature...
"(A man) should ever so speak and act as to ...watch over the many-headed 
monster like a good husbandman, fostering and cultivating the gentle qualities, and preventing 
the wild ones from growing; he should be making the lion-heart his ally, and...uniting the 
several parts with one another and with himself...
"...men are blamed for pride and bad temper when the lion and serpent in them 
disproportionately grow and gain strength....And is not a man reproached for flattery and 
meanness who subordinates the spirited animal to the unruly monster, and...habituates him in 
the days of his youth to be trampled in the mire, and from being a lion to become a monkey?
....(The) whole soul is perfected and ennobled by the acquirement of 
...temperance and wisdom....To this nobler purpose the man of understanding will devote the 
energies of his life" (Plato, 428-347 B.C. in Jowett, 1946, pp. 343-346).
Inside Plato's mythic images is the picture of the 21st-century 
undergraduate 'self' who is expected to be in rational control of the inner emotional 
archetypes. Plato's images suggest the hidden emotional complexity of the cognitive 
thinking self, and the true instructional target of higher education.
Our 21st-century 'self' is a culturally and educationally divided 'self' who 
has been socially conditioned and taught to isolate and control the affective domain
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(Damasio, 1994,1999). Existing taxonomies of educational objectives have made a place 
within the undergraduate experience for the emotional complexity of undergraduate 
identity-seeking and self-concept formation, but not in relation to academic 
achievement.
Chickering's Seven Vectors (Chickering, 1969 in Pascarella and Terenzini, 
1991; Chickering and Reisser, 1993) have for the past several decades described 
important affective development objectives that could be used to design a new inclusive 
taxonomy to academically engage the two domains (Chickering and Reisser, 1993). 
Terenzini's taxonomy re-emphasizes but separates the affective importance of 
Chickering's developmental vectors (Terenzini, 1997), but Astin's I-E-O model provides 
an inclusive environment with unlimited room for challenging affective development 
and autonomous self-concept formation with a more complex instructional approach to 
development of 'intellect' in relation to 'self' than is being offered today (Counseling 
Services, 2002; Los Angeles Times, 1999; Bandura, 1997; Terenzini, 1997; Levine and 
Cureton, 1997; Astin, 1977/1983,1993; Chickering and Reisser, 1993; Pascarella and 
Terenzini, 1991).
Meanwhile today as in Jeremiah Day's era when the curriculum wars 
erupted (Rudolph, 1962/1990), the shunned, non-elevated non-cognitive domain 
remains an affective problem area "lurking in the background" (Solomon, 1993, p. 3) of 
higher education. This is precisely the problem, the continuing historical exclusion of 
the affective domain from the academic development of intellect in higher education 
today.
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Review of the Literature
"You will not misapprehend me if you 
interpret the journey upwards 
to be the ascent of the (self) into the intellectual world''
(Plato, 4th century B.C. in Jowett, 1946, p. 252).
Introduction to the Literature 
The instructional target in American higher education has always and 
traditionally been the cognitive domain (Day and Kingsley, 1828 in Conrad and 
Haworth, 1990; Newman, 1873 in Levine, 1978; Newman, 1873 in Kerr, 1963/1995; 
James, 1890; Bloom, Englehart, Furst, Hill and Krathwohl, 1956; Rudolph, 1962/1990; 
Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964; Wolff, 1969; Petry, Mouton and Reigeluth, 1987; 
Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991; Chickering and Reisser, 1993; Damasio, 1994; Kerr, 
1963/1995; Mayer and Salovey, 1990; Mayer, Caruso and Salovey, 2000a). The 
American psychologist and philosopher, William James, put it bluntly, "When we teach 
children to repress their emotional talk and display, it is not that they may feel more— 
quite the reverse. It is that they may think more..." (James, 1890, p. 466).
Jeremiah Day and James Kingsley said the same for American higher 
education in The Yale Report of 1828. if with more eloquence. They defined the 
cognitive objectives of the classical Greek and Latin curriculum as "...the art of fixing the 
attention, directing the train of thought, analyzing a subject proposed for investigation; 
following, with accurate discrimination, the course of argument; balancing nicely the 
evidence presented to the judgment...and elevating and controlling the imagination" 
(Day and Kingsley, 1828 in Conrad and Haworth, 1990, p. 57).
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The Yale Report of 1828 is defending the exclusive roots of the cognitive 
tradition which are set very deep in the history of Western philosophy and education.
Intellectual history today still traces a long line back to Plato (428-347 B.C.) 
for the traditional belief that non-rational thinking is "a threat to reason" and "a danger 
to philosophy and philosophers" (Solomon, 1993, p. 3). In fact, in the Republic Plato 
teaches that reasoning is "the very light of the body" (Plato, 428-347 B.C. in Jowett, 
1946, p. 271) while non-rational thinking occurs, metaphorically, in an absence of light.
'"Better to be the poor servant of a poor master' and to endure anything, 
rather than think as they do..." Plato said, about metaphorical people who live in caves 
and will not leam how to reason (Plato, 428-347 B.C. in Jowett, 1946, p. 251).
With this metaphorical statement in mind, one must wonder if history has 
missed the humorous overstatement of Plato's Socratic teaching metaphors, and the 
way ideas were presented for debate—not just one point of view but its counterpoint as 
well. It has been said of Plato's Republic that "...his comic art runs high and delivers his 
secret in dialectical statement and counter-statement and finally in luminous myths.... 
Let (the reader) stretch his imagination...so that he may catch some glimpse of the 
principle of the liberal state which is founded on law and universal education and 
dedicated to the achievment of knowledge and virtue by its citizens" (Buchanan in 
Jowett, 1946, pp. 8-9). Thus when Plato asks, with some humor: "And surely...you 
would not allow the future rulers to be like posts (the starting posts of a race course) 
having no reason in them, and yet to be set in authority over the highest matters?" 
(Plato, 428-347 B.C. in Jowett, 1946, p. 273), his amusing metaphor is persuading the 
need for the first known educational objective.
Educating government officials, and priests of the church, who as late as 
the 18th century in colonial America were still being sent to college to leam how to 
reason, is a most ancient educational objective, as discussed and debated with the 
Socratic method in Plato's Republic. Learning how to reason, then as now, is a desired
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and serious educational objective. Humor and melodrama, however, were the great 
teachers of a serious and virtuous subject.
Plato's attack on non-rational thinking was presented with a flair for dark 
humor, perhaps to drive home the point. The melodramatic metaphor Plato used to 
describe the non-rational domain was a cave. In Plato's day, caves represented a 
mythical past (Daniel and Renfrew, 1988). Inside Plato's cave are people who are 
chained to their own ignorance. Their source of information are shadows cast by 
firelight, dancing in flickering illusions of reality, on the cave walls. Their intellectual 
captivity is by choice, and the dark cave of non-rational thinking is pictured by Plato as 
a place where self-defensive emotions of rage and denial threaten to murder the 
rational thinker who has learned how to reason and dares to come back (Plato, 428-347 
B.C. in Jowett, 1946, pp. 249-255).
"Imagine once more...such an one coming suddenly out of the sun to be replaced 
in his old situation; would he not be certain to have his eyes full of darkness?....Men (back in the 
cave) would say of him that up he went and down he came without his eyes; and that it was 
better not even to think of ascending; and if any one tried to loose another and lead him up to the 
light, let them only catch the offender, and they would put him to death" (Plato, 428-347 B.C. in 
Jowett, 1946, p. 252).
It is a very striking thought, then, when Plato advises "...not to remain in 
the upper world: but...descend again among the prisoners in the den, and partake of 
their labours and honors, whether they are worth having or not" (Plato, 428-347 B.C. in 
Jowett, 1946, p. 255). Plato explains that it is the duty of the rational thinker not to 
abandon the thinkers in the lower domain, but to periodically return, because each 
domain "...can be beneficial one to another..." (Plato, 428-347 B.C. in Jowett, 1946, p. 
252). The Socratic dialogues seem deliberately self-contradicting and thought- 
provoking, not at all a dictation of what is true or not true, but a thorough exploration 
of "knowing that one doesn't know" (Buchanan in Jowett, 1946, pp. 7-8).
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Building on the point-counterpoint embedded in Plato's metaphors,
Plato's devoted follower, Aristotle, one hundred years later, would even theorize that 
the two domains of thought—non-rational and rational—interact during ethical 
reasoning (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Durr ant, 1993; Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 
1982). So, when viewed with intellectual hindsight today, the historical sole pursuit of 
the reasoning intellect by higher education since Plato's cave down through the 
centuries, may have been an instructional error, one that springs anciently from missed 
cues in the melodramatic statements and counter-statements of the teaching metaphors 
of the 5th and 4th centuries B.C., and the later Cartesian epistemology that defined a 
cognitive self modelled upon Platonist and Aristotelian philosophy (Descartes, 1596- 
1650 in Markie, 1997).
Imported in the 17th century to America from the medieval universities of 
Europe and England (Rudolph, 1962/1990), and successfully defended by The Yale 
Report of 1828 (Day and Kingsley, 1828 in Conrad and Haworth, 1990), the discipline of 
the classical Greek, and ancient Latin curriculum survived to the end of the 19th century 
in America (Rudolph, 1962), but its exclusive pursuit of the cognitive domain still retains 
its instructional grip on American higher education (Mayer and Salovey, 1999,2000; 
Terenzini, 1997; Astin, 1993; Damasio, 1994; Kerr, 1963/1995; Day and Kingsley, 1828 in 
Conrad and Haworth, 1990; Newman, 1873 in Levine, 1978; Newman, 1873 in Kerr, 
1963/1995; James, 1890; Bloom, Englehart, Furst, Hill and Krathwohl, 1956; Krathwohl, 
Bloom and Masia, 1964; Rudolph, 1962/1990; Wolff, 1969; Petry, Mouton and Reigeluth, 
1987; Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991; Chickering and Reisser, 1993).
In The Yale Report of 1828. Jeremiah Day and his co-author, Yale 
professor James Kingsley, reaffirmed the ancient cognitive tradition when they advised, 
"Familiarity with the Greek and Roman writers is especially adapted to...disdpline the 
mind, both in thought and diction, to the relish of what is elevated, chaste, and 
simple..." (Day, 1828 in ASHE, p. 63). Day and Kingsley were reiterating the ancient
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classical division between an 'elevated'-that is to say, a 'higher'—domain of disciplined 
rational thought versus a 'lower' domain needing rational control, what intellectual 
history had always and traditionally interpreted as an ancient and necessary exclusion.
The Historical Exclusion of Emotion
Plato's discussions in the Republic offer an old way to look at a new
problem. The problem is whether to engage the affective domain as an educational 
objective in the classroom, as has been suggested (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964). 
Academically including the affective domain, thanks to a narrow reading of intellectual 
history, is an idea going upstream, struggling against the sweep of tradition and 
precedent.
A 1946 introduction to Plato's Republic explains that "The Republic is the 
country of the human mind, and it is on its highways that you and I meet Plato coming 
back" (Buchanan in Jowett, 1946, p. 9). In the Republic. Plato describes a subterranean 
(i.e., lower) cave domain (Plato in Jowett, 1946, pp. 249-255) that is ignorant, non- 
rational and not good (Plato in Jowett, 1946). This lower domain is being compared to 
the dazzling, bright light of the higher domain of rational thinking. This famous 
metaphor carved an ancient philosophical schism in stone which has not yet been 
bridged, not even today, an enduring exclusion of emotion horn intellect that has 
persisted in Western thought (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Durrant, 1993; Aristotle, 384-322 
B.C. in Richardson, 1992; Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982; Plato, 428-347 B.C. in 
Jowett, 1946; Solomon, 1993) although "the emotions have always lurked in the 
background" (Solomon, 1993, p. 3).
"Behold!" Plato writes, "human beings living in an underground den, which 
has a mouth open towards light and reaching all along the den; here they have been from their 
childhood, and have their legs and necks chained so that they cannot move, and can only see 
before them, being prevented by the chains from turning round their heads. Above and behind
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them a fire is blazing at a distance, and between the fire and the prisoners there is a raised way; 
and you will see, if you look, a low wall built along the way, like the screen which marionette 
players have in front of them, over which they show the puppets....And do you see...men passing 
along the wall carrying all sorts of vessels, and statues and figures of animals made of wood and 
stone and various materials, which appear over the wall? Some of them are talking, others silent. 
"You have shown me a strange image, and they are strange prisoners.
"Like ourselves, I replied; and they see only their own shadows, or the shadows 
of one another, which the fire throws on the opposite wall of the cave?
“True, he said; how could they see anything but the shadows if they were never 
allowed to move their heads?
"And of the objects which are being carried in like manner, they would see only
the shadows?
"Yes, he said.
"And if they were able to converse with one another, would they not suppose that 
they were naming what was actually before them?
"Very true.
"To them, I said, the truth would be literally nothing but the shadows of the
images.
"That is certain.
"And now, look again, and see what will naturally follow if the prisoners are 
released and disabused of their error. At first when any of them is liberated, and compelled 
suddenly to stand up and turn his neck round and walk and look towards the light, he will suffer 
sharp pains; the glare will distress him, and he will be unable to see the realities of which in his 
former state he had seen the shadows; and then conceive some one saying to him, that what he 
saw before was an illusion...
"...but that now, when...his eye is turned toward more real existence, he has a 
clearer vision,—what will be his reply? And you may further imagine that his instructor is
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pointing to objects as they pass and requiring him to name them, —will he not be perplexed?
Will he not fancy that the shadows that he formerly saw are truer than the objects which are now 
shown to him?
"...My opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all, 
and is seen only with an effort; and, when seen, is inferred to be the universal author of all 
things beautiful and right...in this visible world, and the immediate source of reason and truth in 
the intellectual; and that this is the power upon which he who would act rationally either in 
public or private life must have his eye fixed. You will not misapprehend me if you interpret the 
journey upwards to be the ascent of the soul (the contemporary 'self') into the intellectual 
world" (Plato, 428-347 B.C. in Jowett, 1946, pp. 249-252).
After Plato's devastating cave metaphor and with the growing cultural 
acceptance of rational thinking in the 5th and 4th centuries B.C., the non-rational 
domain never regained its former place (Daniel and Renfrew, 1988) of reverence, 
importance and usefulness (Neumann, 1955/1963) that it had once held in the mythical 
cave culture described in The Power of Myth by Joseph Campbell (Campbell, 1988), 
extolled by the andent Greek historians (Herodotus and Thucydides in Hobbes/Grene, 
1959), and by the Greek traveller, Pausanias, who lived in 120-180 A.D. and documented 
the extant monuments and cave places of an andent way of thinking that had depended 
on gods and goddesses and was gradually being replaced by science and reasoning. 
After Plato (428-347 B.C.) for the next 2000 years, the history of Western philosophy 
became "the history of the development of reason" (Solomon, 1993, p. 4).
One hundred years after Plato, the Greek philosopher, Aristotle, 
contributed greatly to the bad reputation which Plato had heaped on the non-rational 
domain. Although dting its other, nobler attributes, Aristotle described the non- 
rational domain as a realm of "vice and wickedness" whose bad influence could lead to 
using even wisdom unwisely (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, p. 173). It must be 
remembered that American higher education was classically designed upon this
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philosophical Greek foundation, which Aristotle helped define when he wrote: "...desire 
does not imply the deliberative faculty. But sometimes it overpowers rational wish and 
moves to action; at other times the latter, rational wish, overpowers the former, desire" 
(Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Dennett, 1993, p. 70). Perhaps without intending to do so, 
Plato and Aristotle anciently dug the trenches for an academic battlefield where 
emotion was traditionally perceived to be a threat to reason, an opposing force to the 
development of intellect, and "...the idea that emotion as such is...more primitive, less 
intelligent...and more dangerous than reason, and thus needs to be controlled by 
reason" (Solomon, 1993, p. 3).
Contemporary thinkers may unknowingly inherit this ancient dominance 
of the cognitive domain and perhaps "a sense that affect (feelings, emotion) can 
influence their decisions, at least under certain circumstances. However, it is usually 
assumed that such influence is something irregular or unusual, that only strong and 
infrequent feelings would have such effects; and that most often only negative feelings 
such as anger, sadness, or fear would have an impact on thinking processes...(and that) 
such influences are disruptive and tend to make their decisions 'irrational' and less 
appropriate than otherwise" (Isen, 1993, p. 261).
One of Plato's main teaching points, embedded within the overstated 
melodrama of the cave metaphor, might come forward again and shed new light on 
the old historical schism that still yawns between the cognitive and affective domains. 
Plato's point was that some emotions do threaten the rational thinker. Plato is pointing 
out that a person has to be xvilling to leave behind the intriguing shadows cast by 
firelight, the dark emotions caused by being self-defensive, the self-delusion and 
ignorance caused by fearing the sharp climb up out of the comfortable darkness and 
into the bright light of reasoning. This was the 'danger' of emotions: emotional 
unwillingness to climb out of the cave. Note historically, that emotional willingness to 
begin learning is step one in Bloom's taxonomy of educational objectives, Handbook II:
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Affective D om ain  (see Appendix B for a synopsis of Bloom's taxonomies) (Krathwohl, 
Bloom and Masia, 1964).
A closer study now of part of the classical curriculum that built early 
American higher education reveals a strong positive role for emotions embedded in the 
earliest philosophical definitions of 'thought7 and 'self.' Why else would Plato advise a 
rational thinker to periodically revisit the dangers of the dark cave, if not to stay in 
touch with the emotional self?
The Role of Emotion in the Development of 'Thought' and 'Self'
Aristotle himself connects both a cognitive part and an emotional part to 
the development of 'thought' when he defines 'intellect' as a phenomenon of multiple 
parts animated by 'soul.' Some contemporary philosophers interpret the Aristotelian 
'soul' as actually meaning 'mind' (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Wilkes, 1992), but Aristotle's 
thinking about 'soul' appears to be much larger than 'mind' because in 'soul' Aristotle 
includes all animated movement of the physical body ('soul' is what causes the body to 
grow) and theorizes that 'soul' also animates an 'intellect' with multiple functions. (The 
consciousness of an individual 'self' was yet to appear) (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Wilkes, 
1992, p. 115).
According to Aristotle, one function of 'intellect' is active and rational; 
another function of intellect is passive and non-rational but it can inspire the rational 
intellect. The perishable part of intellect thinks; the deathless part inspires thinking 
(Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982).
Intellect, then, is a complex phenomenon of multiple parts, for Aristotle, 
and is not a single cognitive domain. Note historically, that centuries after Aristotle, 
toward the end of the 20th century A.D., the concept of "multiple intelligences" 
(Gardner in Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000a) caused quite a stir in the academic 
world. One outcome of this "new idea" about intellect was the research concept of
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emotional intelligence (Mayer and Salovey, 1990), as one of many possible kinds of 
intelligences that may be involved in cognition and achievement (Mayer, Salovey and 
Camso, 2000a).
Aristotle remained true to Plato's teachings about the good and 'higher' 
rational domain by defining the rational part of 'intellect' as having virtues "whose 
function is finding the truth concerning how things are or how they came about" 
(Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982, p. 20). However, in the Eudemian Ethics, both 
rational and non-rational domains of 'intellect' are not entirely virtuous; both domains 
have only an 'inclination' to be virtuous, or to seek vice. Aristotle theorizes that "it 
follows that (a person's) 'character' is virtuous or bad by pursuing or avoiding 
pleasures and pains" (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982, p. 20) and notes the 
complexity of various mediating variables that, for any individual, interact to determine 
how the extreme feelings of pleasure and pain become balanced, or not. The extremes 
of virtue and vice are defined by Aristotle as the parameters set by "feelings of pleasure 
or pain" (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982). Aristotle thus brings in the emotions 
of the affective domain that are evoked by feelings of pleasure or pain as the very basis 
for ethical reasoning. This is parallel to the emotional intelligence construct of 
'emotional reasoning' (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b) which suggests that feelings 
can be used to assist rational thinking in making ethical decisions and solving problems.
To further complicate the matter of ethical reasoning, some rational 
intellects are underdeveloped, ignorant or stupid (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods,
1982, p. 173). Even virtue can be used unwisely by an ignorant, or stupid, rational 
thinker (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982, p. 173).
The opposite may also occur. Ignorance or stupidity in the rational part of 
intellect may be influenced by virtuous feelings from the non-rational part of intellect, 
resulting in judging wisely (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982). Aristotle's rational 
and non-rational functions of intellect are today's cognitive and affective domains
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(Bloom, et al., 1956; Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964; Mayer and Salovey, 1990).
Note historically, that the meaning and function o f ' intellect'—hundreds of years after 
Aristotle—came to be equated with a cognitive self that thinks, because of the irrefutable 
logic of a self-proclaimed devotee of Aristotle and Plato—the 17th-century French 
mathematician and philosopher, Rene Descartes.
In 17th-century philosophy, Descartes' philosophical assertion, Cogito ergo 
sum, effectively stripped the affective domain from its cognitive other half, two halves 
of a whole 'intellect' as defined by Aristotle (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982), as 
well as by emotion research (Damasio, 1994,1999) and emotional intelligence research 
today (Mayer and Salovey, 1990; Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000a, 2000b). Even 
though Aristotle described 'intellect' as being both rational and non-rational, Aristotle 
also advised, "...be aware as little as possible of the non-rational" (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. 
in Woods, 1982, p. 46).
In sometimes contradictory ways, then, the work of Plato and Aristotle 
consistently presented both sides—point and counterpoint—to the rational versus non- 
rational debate. Although a generous defender of the sometimes important presence 
of non-rational feelings during ethical reasoning, Aristotle also emphasized that non- 
rational feelings need to be controlled by reasoning: "...if virtue belongs to a human 
being...it necessarily includes reasoning, as a starting point of action; reasoning controls 
inclination and the affections...." (Aristotle. 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982, p. 15).
Yet it is not to control, but to connect the two domains that Aristotle talks 
about ethics (from the Greek ethos which means character). The ethics connection is the 
interaction of choosing: vice or virtue, emotional desires or a reasonable wish.
"Now 'character' (ethos), as the word itself indicates, is that which is 
developed from habit...(and)...Virtue...is the sort of disposition...from which are done 
the best functions of the soul, and its best affections...So let character be thus defined: a 
quality of the part of the soul that is non-rational, but capable of following reason..."
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Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982, p. 17). As if anticipating future emotion 
research, Aristotle teaches that virtue in both the domains becomes "...an instrument of 
intelligence...." (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982, p. 43). In fact, by connecting 
ethics to feelings of pleasure or pain, and by using Plato's idea that love of the good is 
the basis for rational thinking (Solomon, 1993), Aristotle appears to have intersected the 
two domains. Perhaps Aristotle devised a pilot concept of emotional intelligence.
If Aristotle could take the MSCEIT V.2 test used in this study today, he 
would be tested on his understanding and defining of emotions, and management of 
extremes of emotions.
As if studying for the test, Aristotle lists in the left and middle columns 
emotional behaviors in their extremes, and, in the far right column, the golden mean or 
balance:
irascibility impassivity gentle temper
foolhardiness cowardice bravery
shamelessness thin-skinnedness shame
intemperance insensibility temperance
envy (unnamed) fair-mindedness
prodigality meanness liberality
boastfulness mock-modesty truthfulness
flattery churlishness friendliness
servility unaccommodating dignity
softness imperviousness endurance
vanity meanness of spirit pride
unscrupulousness unworldliness practical wisdom
(Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982, p. 18).
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"These affections, and others like them...are so described because of 
excess, in some cases, or deficiency, in others. Thus the man who gets angry more than 
he should, and more quickly, and at more things than he should, is irascible, while the 
man who falls short in what he is angry at, and when, and how, is impassive; again, the 
man who does not fear the things he should, and neither when nor as he should, is 
foolhardy, the man who fears things he should not, and when he should not, and in a 
manner he should not, is cowardly. Similarly, the man who desires what he should not, 
and goes to excess in every possible way is intemperant, the man who falls short and 
does not desire even the better and the natural, but is unsusceptible of feeling, like a 
stone, is insensible....The man who thinks more highly of himself than he should is vain, 
the man who thinks less highly is mean in spirit....A man is envious through being 
distressed at good fortune in more cases than he should. (Even those who deserve to 
do well upset the envious when they do.) ...but there is the man who goes too far in 
not being distressed even when people do well undeservedly; he is easy-going, like 
gluttons when food is concerned, while the other (envious) man is hard and grudging" 
(Aristotle in Woods, pp. 18-19).
"Perhaps the most important single point to make about Aristotle's view 
of emotion is the fact that his analyses make sense only in the context of a broader 
ethical concern. Anger was of interest to him because it is a natural reaction to offense, 
and a moral force which can be cultivated by reason and rhetoric...he discussed in some 
detail those circumstances in which it is appropriate to get angry, those in which it is 
not, and what amount of intensity of anger is justified....He also insisted that only fools 
don't get angry, and that although overly angry people may be 'unbearable,' the 
absence of anger (aimed at the right offenses) is a vice rather than a virtue. In (ethics) 
as in all else, Aristotle defended moderation, the 'mean between the extremes.' So too, 
Aristotle discussed fear at length in the Ethics with regard to courage, which is not 
'fearlessness' or 'overcoming' fear so much as it is having just the right amount of fear—
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not to be foolhardy or a coward either.... (analyses of) the emotions, in other words, are 
central and essential to the good life, and the analysis of their nature is part and parcel 
of ethical analysis" (Solomon, 1993, p. 5).
"I mean, a man is called sharp-tempered for being affected more quickly 
than he should, bad-tempered and choleric for being so (angry) more than he should, 
bitter for being prone to maintain his anger, violent and truculent for the retaliation 
resulting horn the anger. Men are classified as gourmets or gluttons...according to 
which form of nourishment they have an affectible capacity to enjoy against reason" 
(Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982, p. 20).
Note historically, the necessary discipline to control the emotions by the 
reasoning intellect, as described by Aristotle—this was the instructional target of the 
classical Greek curriculum (Plato, 438-327 B.C. in Jowett, 1946). Note historially, that 
Jeremiah Day's defense of the classical curriculum was to remind critics about the 
classical objectives: discipline of the mind and control of the imagination (Day and 
Kingsley, 1828 in Conrad and Haworth, 1990).
Into the Aristotelian historical context, Descartes' 17th-century hypothesis, 
Cogito ergo sum, appeared with irrefutable logic. Descartes reasoned about what, if 
anything, a person can know with certainty about incoming sense perceptions. 
Descartes often references Aristotle's early philosophy on 'thought' and 'soul' and 
Aristotle, in turn, references Plato (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982). Thus in the 
first half of the 1600s, Descartes begins to question and reason his way via the Socratic 
method, to answer an epistemological challenge by the Skeptics (Solomon, 1993), and in 
so doing "...goes on to define the central problem of epistemology for the next three 
hundred years" (Descartes, 1596-1690 in Markie, 1997, p. 34).
"In the first place, then, I considered myself as having a face, arms, and all 
that system of bones and flesh as seen in a corpse which I designated by the name of 
body....(Descartes, 1596-1690 in Wilkes, 1992, p. 114). Descartes perceived this body as
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having length, depth and breadth in space. "Next I examined attentively what I was. I 
saw that while I could pretend that I had no body and that there was no world and no 
place for me to be in it, I could not for all that pretend that I do not exist. I saw on the 
contrary that horn the mere fact that I thought of doubting the truth of other things, it 
followed quite evidently and certainly that I existed, whereas if I had merely ceased 
thinking, even if everything else I had ever imagined had been true, I should have had 
no reason to believe that I existed. From this I knew that I was a substance whose 
whole essence or nature is simply to think..." (Descartes, 1596-1650 in Markie, 1997, p. 
35-36).
Descartes set our contemporary parameters for the idea of 'consciousness' 
of a cognitive self, and the epistemological model for teaching and learning strategies.
The idea of consciousness before Descartes may not have too different 
from Plato's and Aristotle's day (Wilkes, 1992).
"The verb 'being conscious of', in its present (range of) sense(s), dates in 
English from around 1620, and the noun 'consciousness' does not appear until 1678; 
'self-consciousness' does not crop up until 1690. The term existed, of course, before 
then; but it still retained its etymological meaning of 'shared knowledge' (cum + sciere). 
French and German display the same pattern. It took the challenge of skepticism to 
hoist consciousness—as we know it today—to the pedestal it still occupies" (Wilkes, 1992, 
p. 115).
Descartes' Cogito separated Aristotle's large idea of 'soul' from 'intellect' 
and helped turn 'being conscious of' into the contemporary idea of 'self.' Descartes 
writes in a letter to one of his critics, "...men in earliest times did not distinguish in us 
that principle in virtue of which we are nourished, grow, and perform all those 
operations which are common to us with the brutes, apart from any thought...(this was 
part of Aristotle's definition of 'soul')...But I, perceiving that the principle by which we 
are nourished is wholly distinct from that by means of which we think, have decided
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that the name 'soul' when used for both is equivocal...and I have called (the principle by 
which we think) by the name 'mind'...." (Descartes, 1596-1650 in Wilkes, 1992, p. 115).
Descartes' connection between thinking, mind, and the consciousness of 
an individual thinker, evolved into the 'self' of contemporary culture. The ancient 
duality (rational/non-rational) of 'intellect' as defined by Aristotle, and the upper vs. 
lower, good vs. not-good, domains of thought, as defined by Plato, were narrowed into 
a single 'condous self'—a cognitive, thinking self—by their 17th-century student, Rene 
Descartes, in the Cogito (Descartes, 1596-1650 in Markie, 1997). The cognitive thinking 
self is still the target of traditional higher education and psychology.
The business of contemporary psychology has been to make the cognitive 
self aware of the desires and presence of the emotional self. The business of higher 
education has been to educate the cognitive self, and, in recent years, to make that 
cognitive self more aware of the desires and presence of the psychosodal domain 
where the emotional self has been sent to reside on campus (Chickering and Reisser, 
1993; Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991; Terenzini, 1997). Education and psychology have 
yet to recover from the adoration of cognition (Bacon in Kerr, 1963/1995) that some 
have called Descartes' error (Damasio, 1994,1999).
Descartes' assertion that "I am thinking, therefore I must exist" (Descartes, 
1596-1650 in Markie, 1997, p. 36) laid the epistemological groundwork for teaching to a 
cognitive self. Even intuition for Descrates was bom from reasoning: "...intuition is the 
indubitable conception of a dear and attentive mind which proceeds horn the light of 
reason" (Descartes, 1596-1650 in Markie, 1997, p. 37). Descartes redefined the ancient 
idea of consdousness as "shared knowledge" (Wilkes, 1992, p. 115)-shared with the 
goddesses and gods—and replaced it with an independent self who knows that it thinks.
Descartes defined 'self' as "the thing that thinks" (Descartes, 1596-1650 in 
Wilkes, 1992, p. 114). The Cartesian self is a cognitive self because it knows it is 
thinking, and that whether its thoughts are true or false, it knows that as long as it is
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thinking, it has nQt ceased to exist. As long as the self knows it is thinking, then it 
knows that it does indeed exist. (Otherwise, how could it know it was thinking?) But 
Descartes did not entirely exclude the affective domain from the rational development 
of 'thought' and 'self' in his existential conumdrum.
In contemporary psychology, consciousness still retains its Cartesian 
cognitive dimensions. Today's 'self' is the T  or ego of consciousness that appears to be 
continuous in time (Cortright, 1997, p. 54). The T  of consciousness is a personal 
construct built by a set of values, beliefs and choices (compare to Aristotle's ethical 
reasoning 'intellect' which rationally and emotionally chooses between virtue and vice). 
Like Aristotle's emotional-rational intellect, today's T  consciousness is a cognitive self 
with a complex existence.
"Our fundamental identity is consciousness, but we identify with and cling 
to certain contents of consciousness. That is, we normally believe, "I am this 
experience...of sensing...feeling...thinking" (Cortright, 1997, p. 54). (Has anything 
changed since Descartes?)
Among the new thinking about 'self' today is the idea that 
"...consciousness is modified and conditioned by the structures of the self. It is 
consciousness that frees us from our unconscious conditioning. Consciousness 
becomes engaged in its own transformation" (Cortright, 1997, pp. 56,59). Each 
conscious decision and choice among values and beliefs, then, for the late-adolescent 
/young-adult in college becomes an opportunity for a conscious transformation of 'self' 
by using situations that demand psychological involvement in decision making, as 
described in As tin's 1984 model of affective development (Pascarella and Terenzini, 
1991), situations requiring a choice or commitment. As Aristotle teaches, the values, 
beliefs and choices of any one individual are decided through both emotional feelings 
and rational thinking. Aristotle claimed that rational thinking can be guided by a 
feeling of which choice would be more virtuous, that is, which choice would feel best
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(less painful, more pleasurable)—a feeling for virtue which Aristotle called "the 
instrument of intelligence" (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982, p. 43). What are the 
educational implications of such an instrument? Why is its presence educationally 
ignored?
Some undergraduates, like their predecessors in the history of higher 
education, may have given the emotional self a bad name, by seeking emotional 
experiences that challenge traditional or inherited beliefs and values. How, then, to 
educationally understand this experimenting emotional 'self that may be actively 
exercising itself in adverse ways during the undergraduate years? Can the 
undergraduate 'self really be expected to be cognitive in the classroom, and only 
emotional in 'interpersonal' social relationships?
An answer is suggested by Plato and Aristotle: 'self' is not one domain or 
the other, but an interactive construct of at least two domains from which it receives 
both cognitive and emotional input; each domain can be beneficial to the other. Even 
Descartes made room within the cognitive self for an emotional self who feels and 
imagines:
"What is a thing that thinks?" Descarets wrote in a letter to a friend. "It is 
a thing which doubts, understands, conceives, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, and which 
also imagines and feels" (Descartes, 1596-1650 in Wilkes, 1992, p. 114).
Although the emotional part of the self, which William James equates with 
ego Qames, 1884,1890) plays a strong role in the willing ascent of the cognitive self into 
the intellectual world, the emotional self has been largely ignored and historically 
excluded from the instructional target of higher education, which has always and 
traditionally intellectually developed the cognitive domain.
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Higher Education and the Emotional Self
Experimental studies show that emotional self-concept is over-sensitized 
in depressed learners (Slipp, 1975). They are hypersensitive to feedback about 
performance. In one study, a depressed group of test participants was given a card- 
sorting task, along with a control group of subjects without depression. Performance 
of the card-sorting was deliberately interrupted by the researchers so that all subjects in 
both groups failed. The depressed group had actually performed no worse than the 
normal group (that is, everyone failed), but depressed subjects reacted to their failure 
with greater pessimism and far lowered expectations than the normal group (Slipp, 
1975). This indicates how depression cues attention to self-defeating interpretation of 
events. Emotion also determines the speed at which thinking is performed and the 
richness of multiple information cues that are perceived and attended. In the card 
sorting task, depression determined the cognitive mode (Damasio, 1994).
Conversely, a feeling of elation can cause rapid generation of multiple 
mental images and cognitive associations in response to a wide variety of information 
and meaning cues (Damasio, 1994). The wealth of imagery and associative cues causes 
ease of inference and inclusive thinking, resulting in bold exploratory behaviors 
(Travers, 1973). The opposite of this rapid and expansive cognitive mode is, for 
example, the feeling of sadness and the cognitive mode that is paired with it. Sadness is 
characterized by slowness of mental image formation, less association of meaning due 
to perception of fewer mental cues, a more narrow band of inferences, and over­
concentration on one or two images that will sustain the negative mood. The cognitive 
state caused by sadness exhibits psychomotor inhibition such as reduced or lost 
appetite, and a reduction of exploratory behaviors (Damasio, 1994).
The literature shows that sadness causes slow information processing 
with perception of few cues; happiness causes rapid processing and a wealth of 
information and meaning cues (Damasio, 1994; Francis, et al., 1998). Hence specific
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emotions are known to predictably generate a specific cognitive mode. For example, 
happiness generates heightened attention and rich, rapid perception that assist peak 
performance instead of mediocre or insignificant outcomes. Understanding that the 
educational role of emotions is to direct cognitive attention to similarities and other 
meaning cues in the environment "can potentially lead to a transformation" (Salovey 
and Mayer, 1990, p. 186) in teaching (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964) and thinking.
Depression and anxiety are the two emotions that have been studied 
most by psychology (Francis, et al., 1998). Symptoms relating to learning include loss 
of interest in activity, loss of pleasure in activity, chronic fatigue, a drop in energy, 
inability to concentrate, indecisiveness (Oadey and Jenkins, 1996). Appraisal and 
regulation of emotion to generate an optimal cognitive mode for achievement are 
demonstrably important (Salovey and Mayer, 1990; Francis, et al., 1998; Schutte, et al.,
1998). In fact, research indicates "that happier college students obtain higher grades in 
general" (Wessman and Ricks, 1966, p. 123 in Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000a, p. 410) 
although the originators of the emotional intelligence ability model (Mayer and 
Salovey, 1990; Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b) caution that emotional intelligence is 
not a cure-all but "...identifies a previously overlooked area of ability critical to certain 
human functioning. These emotionally intelligent skills lay hidden in the boundary area 
between mental ability and noncognitive dispositions..." (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 
2000a, p. 408). Emotional intelligence is an ability to understand and manage emotions 
to assist thought, across the two domains. How important is this to learning?
Self-concept is an important mediating variable for achievement in higher 
educaton because it can determine the speed, confidence and creativity with which 
people think. Self-concept involves an emotional measure of self-competence in the 
objective world—self-efficacy beliefs (Bandura, 1997)—a measure indexed daily by what 
William James called 'the emotional self' (James, 1884,1890).
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"Students with high self-efficacy tend to learn and achieve more than 
students with low self-efficacy, even when actual ability levels are the same" (Bandura, 
1986; Collins, 1982; Schunk, 1989; Spaulding, 1992; Zimmerman, Bandura and Martinez- 
Pons, 1992: all dtes referenced in Ormrod, 1995, p. 151).
What is the mechanism of self-efficacy in learning?
Self-efficacy beliefs straddle the line between affect and cognition. Self- 
efficacy is both an emotional feeling about ability and a cognitive assessment of ability 
to perform a course of action. "Efficacy beliefs create attentional biases and influence 
whether life events are construed...in ways that are benign or emotionally
perturbing efficacy beliefs regulate emotional states by supporting effective courses
of action to transform the environment in ways that alter its (emotional) potential..." 
(Bandura, 1997, p. 137). In relation to learning and achievement, then, emotional- 
cognitive self-efficacy beliefs can transform the learning experience by determining 
attitude and motivation to achieve, and persistence, "whereas those of low self-efficacy 
are quick to conclude that additional efforts would be futile" (Bandura, 1997, p. 137).
"If people believe they have no power to produce results, they will not 
attempt to make things happen" (Bandura, 1997, p. 3). Understanding and managing 
emotions is central to the formation of self-concept/self-efficacy. Emotional intelligence 
can therefore lead the way and make it possible for consciousness to become engaged 
in its own transformation (Cartright, 1992, p. 57).
However, the complexity of self-concept/self-efficacy is a personal 
construct whose childhood formation must be sought out. Self-concept is constructed 
across the lifespan by the outcomes of life experiences and relationships with others 
(Slipp, 1975; Santrock, 1997; Damasio, 1994). Thus, it is not just the responsibility of 
students to cultivate positive self-concept (as an Aristotelian "instrument of 
intelligence") but also a job for higher education to encourage self-concept/self-efficacy 
in relation to learning, for undergraduates sitting in the academic classroom.
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Self-concept covers a lot of emotional territory. The emotional self is a 
very important thinker, because deeply involved but hidden in the learning process 
and, in the academic classroom, instructionally excluded or even repressed.
The repressed or excluded emotional self may be developmentally driven 
to redirect cognitive attention away from achievement efforts, delaying or avoiding the 
risk of failure, or simply retaining the comfortable status quo (Skaalvik, 1997) of not 
trying. Personal emotions by late-adolescence may be conditioned to respond to 
challenges in the personal environment in self-defensive, preorganized ways (Darwin, 
1872/1955; James, 1890; Damasio, 1994; Erikson and Weathersby in Santrock, 1997; 
Skaalvik, 1997). Is there, then, a reason to teach understanding and managing of 
personal emotions, to the emotional self, in the academic development of rational 
thinking? "Much of our thinking consists of trains of images suggested one by 
another, " William James wrote,"of a sort of spontaneous revery of which it seems 
likely enough that the higher brutes are capable. This sort of thinking leads 
nevertheless to rational conclusions, both practical and theoretical. The links between 
the terms are either 'contiguity' or 'similarity'....Having been thinking of one, we find 
later that we are thinking of another, to which we have been lifted along, we hardly 
know how" (James, 1890, p. 325).
The Educational Role of the Emotional Self
What Is an Emotion?
"Every object that excites an instinct excites an emotion as well"
(James, 1890, p. 442).
William James was concerned with abstract reasoning, whose set of critical 
thinking skills is one of today's most desired outcomes of higher education (Bloom, et 
al., 1956; Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964; Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991; Terenzini, 
1997). James asked a question that concerns higher education today:
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"Why cannot anyone reason as well as anyone else?"(James/ 1890, p. 241). 
The answer to this question requires a definition of the hidden role of emotion in the 
abstract process of reasoning (James, 1884,1890; Damasio, 1994,1999).
James benefitted from the research of his predecessors and con­
temporaries in physiology, including Darwin, Freud and Pavlov (Ormrod, 1995).
When James wrote that "Every object that excites an instinct excites an emotion as 
well" (James, 1890, p. 442), he was reiterating Darwin's and Pavlov's great findings 
(Darwin, 1872/1955). The connection between human emotions and human instincts 
that categorize new experience is William James' conceptual contribution to our 
contemporary understanding of the necessary role of emotion in cognitive reasoning 
and decision making Games, 1884,1890; Damasio, 1994,1999).
The problem with emotions is that an individual's past experiences 
beginning in childhood cause ad hoc pairings of emotions with cognitive memory of the 
past. Across the lifespan there is an ongoing formation of personalized emotional 
associations Gaines, 1890; Damasio, 1994; Slipp, 1975; Matthews, 1993; Skaalvik, 1997; 
Santrock, 1997; Walsh and Vaughan, 1993) with new experiences and events. In William 
James' era at the end of the 19th century, Pavlov identified this phenomenon as a 
preorganized learning mechanism in animals and humans (Pavlov, 1872/1927).
Without interventions, emotional past associations may remain 
cognitively associated with past events occurring first in childhood within the family 
(Damasio, 1994; Slipp, 1975; Matthews, 1993; Skaalvik, 1997; Santrock, 1997; Walsh and 
Vaughan, 1993). The educational problem is that these past associations have created 
the late-adolescent/young-adult developmental identity and self-concept which are 
brought to the higher education table. The instructional challenge is that personalized 
past associations emotionally direct cognitive attention Games, 1890; Damasio, 1994; 
Slipp, 1975; Matthews, 1993; Skaalvik, 1997).
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An individual's set of past emotional associations are part of the "contents 
of consciousness" (Cortright, 1997, p. 54), that form the "I" construct of self. The "I" of 
cognitive consciousness can be mediated by natural maturation and life experiences 
across the lifespan (Santrock, 1997) and can also be personally mediated by a set of 
acquired abilities called emotional intelligence (Mayer and Salovey, 1990; Mayer,
Salovey and Caruso, 2000a, 2000b). William James contributed four definitions of how 
emotion may be related to learning in the contemporary research concept of emotional 
intelligence: 1. Emotion is a neuro-muscular reflex; 2. Emotion is an intellectual 
feeling; 3. The ego is the emotional self; 4. Emotions are commonly shared by 
everyone and can be named and defined.
lames' Four Definitions of Emotion
1. Emotion is a neuro-muscular reflex. James theorizes that the primal 
emotions are physical sensations caused by excitation of nerve cells and muscles.
James is insistent that the primal emotions follow, but do not precede, physical exertion of 
the body. This is James' primary definition of 'an emotion.' It cuts off emotion as an 
omnipresent potential (which Damasio calls somatic markers) and forecloses on the 
possibility that emotion is an ever-present conveyor of personalized survival 
information that arises to focus cognitive attention for the well-being of the perceiver.
Instead, in this definition, James gives an idea of the body as a 
preorganized container within which emotions may be occasioned to swirl.
James defines the standard emotions as physical sensations but the feeling 
of 'an emotion' occurs only after a physical response has been made. In the context of 
James' day, this concept makes perfect sense. Psychology was still in its infancy, 
predominated by anecdotal and observational research by the great physiologists of 
the time including Darwin, Pavlov and Freud.
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Looking at the physical body from their viewpoint, James was saying 
nothing new when he theorized that the body's physical-response network produces a 
preorganized and involuntary survival-reflex which arouses emotions and can include 
cognition. The reflex-survival sensation, or feeling, is always involuntary, instinctive, 
and animal-like. James then goes on a relentless search for "the mind stuff" of an 
emotion (James, 1884, p. 193)—that is to ask, what remains after the physical sensations 
of 'an emotion' have been felt?
Here James is using the core concept of Darwin's collection of anecdotal 
observations. James writes, "If we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to 
abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its characteristic bodily 
symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind, no "mind-stuff" out of which the 
emotion can be constituted, and that a cold and neutral state of intellectual perception is 
all that remains" (James, 1884, p. 193-194). Perhaps unintentionally in this definition, 
James has exposed the instinctive pairing of emotion with cognition which is the deep 
conceptual root of the modem concept of emotional intelligence—the dynamic when 
emotion-cognition pair or form a relation in preorganized, observable ways within the 
body state, in response to challenges to the well-being of the individual (Damasio, 1994,
1999). In his search to separate emotion from the body, and sounding like a page out of 
Darwin's 1872 book on the physical expressions of emotion, James asks in 1884: "What 
kind of an emotion of fear would be left, if the feelings neither of quickened heartbeat 
nor of shallow breathing, neither of trembling lips nor of weakened limbs, neither of 
goose flesh nor of visceral stirrings, were present, it is quite impossible to think. Can 
one fancy the state of rage and picture no ebullition of it in the chest, no flushing of the 
face, no dilation of the nostrils, no clenching of the teeth, no impulse to vigorous 
action....?" (James, 1884, p. 193).
But what if an emotion is not connected to a survival instinct? Here is 
where James begins to separate himself from the pack. The pack of 19th-century
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physiologists who paved the way for modem psychology—Darwin, Pavlov, Freud-did 
not anticipate in their published writings James' revolutionary idea that some emotions 
are non-physical. Thanks to their work, James could readily strip away the observable 
physical expressions and physiological sensations of an emotion, and what did he find?
At the bottom of 'an emotion' James found "intellectual perception" 
Games, 1884, p. 194) which may indicate that emotions have another half. James at the 
time, however, was determined that some emotions are non-physical.
2. Emotion is an intellectual feeling. James' radical concept of "intellectual 
feelings" Games, 1884, p. 201)—radical for his time-causes some initial confusion even 
today because his definition includes the brain but not the rest of the body!
In this definition, James is careful to separate out what he calls "pure 
cerebral emotion" Games, 1884, p. 201) from the rest of the body where the instinctive 
emotions occur—James calls instinctive emotions "the standard emotions" such as 
anger, joy or fear—involuntarily generated by the neuro-muscular pathways of the 
body in response to environmental cues of danger or well-being. Pure cerebral 
emotion, when compared to instinctive standard emotion, is a pleasurable and 
voluntary perception generated by refined sensibilities, both moral and aesthetic 
Games, 1884, p. 201), and occurs only in the brain.
"Concords of sounds, of colours, of lines, logical consistencies, teleological 
fitnesses, affect us with a pleasure that seems ingrained in the very form of the 
representation itself, and to borrow nothing from any reverberation surging up from 
the parts below the brain....We have then, or some of us seem to have, genuinely 
cerebral forms of pleasure and displeasure, apparently not agreeing in their mode of
production with the so-called standard emotions we have been analysing But a sober
scrutiny of the cases of pure cerebral emotion....Unless in them there actually be 
coupled with die intellectual feeling a bodily reverberation of some kind, unless we 
actually laugh at the neatness of the mechanical device, thrill at the justice of the act, or
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tingle at the perfection of the musical form, our mental condition is more allied to a 
judgment of right than to anything else...it is a cognitive act.
"And the dryness of it, the paleness, the absence of all glow, as it (the 
intellectual feeling) may exist in an expert critic's mind, not only shows us what an 
altogether different thing it is from the standard emotions we considered first, but 
makes us suspect that almost the entire difference lies in the fact that the bodily 
sounding-board, vibrating in the one case, is in the other mute" Games, 1884, pp. 201- 
201). This radical thinking is where James separates himself from the physiologists, 
whose research James uses extensively, but who may have indeed been unable to 
understand James' idea that intellectual feelings do not activate, nor are activated by, 
the rest of the body's inseparable neuro-muscular network.
3. Ego is the emotional self. James' great conceptual contribution is not 
physiological but a psychological definition of an emotional self. In so doing, he makes 
a great contribution to the field of educational psychology as it has evolved today. 
James veers off in a visionary direction by bringing the body back into this definition of 
emotion. James does this by relying on the physical body in this definition as a great 
sounding board of consciousness.
James theorized that the physiological changes that accompany emotions, 
which his predecessors took great pains to delineate, also create "mental moods" 
Games, 1884) so that "....the entire organism may be called a sounding-board, which 
every change in consciousness, however slight, may make reverberate...(so) that no 
shade of emotion, however slight, should be without a bodily reverberation as unique, 
when taken in its totality, as the mental mood itself" Games, 1890, p. 450).
The important connecting point in James' entire conceptual structure is 
that each physical sounding board is personalized by past emotional associations which 
may or may not be accurate reflections of a present event or challenge (intellectually 
unraveling the personalized collection of past emotional associations was the point-of-
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departure for Freudian analysis). It seems to be William James who begins to forge the 
current concept that emotion-cognition is an inseparable physical dynamic whose 
creation is the personalized self. Understanding and managing the emotional part of 
the cognitive-emotional self of today is the target of contemporary psychology, 
particularly transpersonal psychology whose goal is to open up past emotional wounds 
(Walsh and Vaughan, 1993) to cause healing and new growth.
James explains that: "The fans et origo of all reality...is...subjective, is 
ourselves....The world of living realities...is thus anchored in the Ego, considered as an 
active and emotional term.... Reality, starting from our Ego, thus sheds itself from point 
to point—first, upon all objects which have an immediate sting of interest for our 
Ego...and next, upon the objects most continuously related with these. It only fails 
when the connecting thread is lost" (James, 1890, pp. 296-297).
James' 'connecting thread' Games, 1890, p. 297) is the attention-directing 
role of personalized past associations. These associations are emotional and as 
instinctive as Pavlov's dogs, who would salivate even to misleading feeding cues that 
were associated with similar past feeding events in the same environment 
(Pavlov, 1927). Personalized past associations can direct and bias the learning activity 
of the emotional self (Damasio, 1994,1999). James suggests that perception of 
objective reality depends on the personalized biases of the emotional self. James even 
introduces subjective-objective Cartesian duality into his definition of self, by saying 
that reality includes "the self as knower and the self as that which is known" (Matthews, 
1993, p. 37).
This duality means that the cognitive self is able to perceive itself both 
subjectively and objectively—and this duality is what permits the ever-shifting 
measurement of the effectiveness of 'self' in the world, and that daily measurement is 
self-esteem Qames in Matthews, 1993). This duality greatly expands James' definition of 
emotion. Part of the self's dichotomy is its subjective effort to gauge how effective its
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objective self is in the real world of external reality (external to the subjective self). 
James theorizes that self-esteem is a subjective-objective barometer which "rises and 
falls from one day to the other" (James in Matthews, 1993, p. 37). But lest one begins to 
feel uncomfortable with the essential fuzziness of James' theories of an emotional self, it 
is fortunate that neuroimages and case studies are available today (Damasio, 1994) that 
support James' intuitive assertions. The emotions of self-esteem, however, should be 
familiar to everyone because, as James and his predecessors theorize, emotions and 
emotional expressions are commonly shared by everyone and can be named and 
defined.
4- Emotions are commonly shared by everyone and can be named 
and defined. Faces showing emotions are a major part of the shared knowledge-base 
being tested by emotional intelligence instruments such as the MSCEIT V.2 (Mayer, 
Salovey, and Caruso, 2000b) today. Darwin did the same thing in his 1872 publication- 
presenting photographs of people's faces to point out certain physiological expressions 
of emotions that can be named and defined by everyone, and also scientifically 
identifying the facial muscles that make those expressions possible (Darwin, 1872/1955). 
The theory then as now is that certain standard or primary emotions are commonly 
expressed and can be commonly named and defined. James like Darwin contributes 
greatly to the modem knowledge base when he describes and defines some of the 
physical expressions of the primary emotions.
In his classic two-volume publication in 1890, James writes: "The chief 
feature of the physiognomy of grief is perhaps its paralyzing effect on the voluntary 
movements. This effect is by no means as extreme as that which fright produces, being 
seldom more than that degree of weakening which makes it cost an effort to perform 
actions usually done with ease. It is, in other words, a feeling of weariness; and (as in all 
weariness) movements are made slowly, heavily, without strength, unwillingly, and 
with exertion, and are limited to the fewest possible. By this the grieving person gets
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
57
his outward stamp: he walks slowly, unsteadily, dragging his feet and hanging his 
arms. His voice is weak and without resonance, in consequence of the feeble activity of 
the muscles of expiration and of the larynx. He prefers to sit still, sunk in himself and 
silent. ...With this condition of weakness of the voluntary nerve- and musde-apparatus 
of the whole body, there coexists, as aforesaid, just as in all states of similar motor 
weakness, a subjective feeling of weariness and heaviness, of something which weighs 
upon one; one feels 'downcast/ 'oppressed/ 'laden/ and one speaks of his 'weight of 
sorrow/ one must 'bear up ' under it...Many are there who 'succumb' to sorrow to such 
a degree that they literally cannot stand upright, but sink or lean against surrounding 
objects...this weakness...of the entire voluntary motor apparatus (is in addition to)...the 
involuntary or 'organic' musdes...found in the walls of the blood vessels....(which) act in 
grief...(to be) more strongly contracted than usual, so that the tissues and organs of the 
body become anemic. The immediate consequence of this bloodlessness is pallor and 
shrunkenness, and the pale color and collapsed features... (which) give to the victim of 
grief...a feeling of cold and shivering. A constant symptom of grief is sensitiveness to 
cold, and difficulty in keeping warm" (James, 1890, pp. 443-445).
James's discourse on the physical and subjective symptoms of grief, and 
the light it sheds on the related mood of sadness, and the related prolonged emotion- 
state of depression, is an important conceptual root that supports the current theory 
that emotion determines the cognitive mode (Damasio, 1994). 'Cognitive mode' means 
how new information is perceived in a learning situation (Pavlov might say here that all 
life is a learning situation): how quickly, how richly, how many cues from the 
environment are noticed, how problem-solving is approached within various primary 
emotion states such as fear vs. happiness.
"What kind of an emotion of fear would be left if the feeling neither of 
quickened heart-beats nor of shallow breathing, neither of trembling lips nor of 
weakened limbs, neither of goose-flesh nor of visceral stirrings, were present, it is quite
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impossible for me to think. Can one fancy the state of rage and picture no ebullition in 
the chest, no flushing of the face, no dilation of the nostrils, no clenching of the teeth, 
no impulse to vigorous action, but in their stead limp muscles, calm breathing, and a 
placid face?" (James, 1890, p. 452).
Defining_Emotion:_ Tames' Predecessors
James' anecdotal observations of emotional expressions that form his 
theories are based on the groundbreaking work of other researchers of his era. His 
research contemporaries were the 19th-century giants of physiology—Darwin, Pavlov 
and Freud—who in the last quarter of the 19th century laid the foundations for 20th- 
century psychology. James' theoretical orientation and work owe a great conceptual 
debt to Charles Darwin's Emotions of Man and Animals (the first manuscript of which 
was written in 1838) in which Darwin identifies and describes the physical "overflow of 
nerve-force" (Darwin, 1872/1955, p. 9) resulting in specific facial expressions shared by 
humankind in common, recognizable expressions of the various human emotions. As 
Darwin's many references make clear, James' publications (1884,1890) are not an 
original contribution to the study of emotion. James is more the crest of the wave of a 
host of scientists before him, going back to the 1660s in Europe. Darwin quotes from 
the pioneering work of his day on emotion, and dtes some but not all of the emotion 
researchers before him, most of whom were anatomists or physiologists.
"Many works have been written on Expression, but a greater number on 
Physiognomy....With this latter subject I am not here concerned. The older treatises,
which I have consulted, have been of little or no service to me The following works,
on the contrary, deserve the fullest consideration" (Darwin, 1872, p.l).
In the body of his 1872 publication, Darwin frequently dtes Herbert 
Spencer's Prindples of Psychology  published in 1855; Bain's The Senses and the Intellect
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published in 1864; Sir Charles Bell, in the 1806 first-edition and 1844 third-edition of 
Bell's Anatomy and Philosophy of Expression.
Darwin himself is building on previous conceptual physiological research 
dating back to Le Brun's 1667 work, "Conference on the Expression of the Different 
Characteristics of the Passions" ("Conferences sur l'espression des differents Caracteres 
des Passions") which Darwin remarks is "the best known ancient work, and contains 
some good remarks" (Darwin, 1872, p. 1). Darwin dtes the Dutch anatomist, Pierre 
Camper's 1774-1782 series of lectures entitled, "Discours par Pierre Camper sur le 
moyen de representer les diverses passions" and published in 1792 which "can hardly 
be considered as having made any marked advance in the subject" (Darwin, 1872, p. 1).
Other names of physiologists and anatomists whose works are cited by 
Darwin in his 1872 book indude Drs. Lavater, Duchenne, Moreau, Lemoine, Gratiolet, 
Piderit, Maudsley, Browne, and Burgess whose 1839 paper is on "The Physiology or 
Mechanism of Blushing." Darwin also draws on world literature for descriptions of 
expressions of emotion, induding Homer, Shakespeare and Dickens who in Oliver 
Twist writes about a furious mob surrounding a murderer as "jumping up one behind 
another, snarling with their teeth, and making at him like wild beasts" (Darwin, 1872, p. 
241). Darwin adds a line from Shakespeare's Henrv V. Act HI, Scene 1 to describe the 
emotion of rage, and determination: "In peace there’s nothing so becomes a man, As 
modest stillness and humility; But when the blast of war blows in our ears, Then imitate 
the action of the tiger: Stiffen the sinews, summon up the blood, Then lend the eye a 
terrible aspect; Now set the teeth, and stretch the nostrils wide, Hold hard the breath, 
and bend up every spirit To his full height!" (Darwin, 1872, pp. 240-241). Darwin also 
dtes a list of forty-one older authors listed in an appendix to a paper dated 1746, by 
J. Parsons, entitled "Philosophical Transactions"—all of these writers, to whom Darwin 
refers as "the older treatises...of little or no service to me" were writing about the 
observable expressions of human emotions.
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Darwin-like, James relies on describing the physical expressions of emotions, using 
anecdotal stories and commonly shared observations about animals and humans. In 
his 1872 publication, Darwin supplements his anecdotes and observations with 
photographs of human faces and drawings of dogs and other animals; William James 
later in his two-volume 1890 publication, will also present an assortment of dog stories 
to support his theory. It must be noted that the neurophysiologist and neurosurgeon, 
Antonio Damasio, one hundred years after both Darwin and James, also supplements 
his theories with photographs showing the emotional expressions of a human face.
Damasio's Definitions: The Somatic Marker Hypothesis
The neurosurgeon, Antonio Damasio, is a self-confirmed admirer of the 
work of William James (Damasio, 1994). Damasio's own work as a neurosurgeon using 
neuroimaging technology, reflects James' conceptual framework in defining how a 
personalized emotional bias, including self-concept and its daily measure of self-esteem, 
are all part of a continuous background feeling generated by the body, a source of 
feelings that directs cognitive attention toward or away from certain perceptions and 
guides cognitive reasoning in reaching a conclusion.
"The point I want to stress is that your mind is not a blank at the start of 
the reasoning process. Rather it is replete with a diverse repertoire of images, 
generated to the time of the situation you are facing, entering and exiting your 
consciousness in a show too rich for you to encompass fully. How do you sort out the 
questions inherent in the images before your mind's eye? ...imagine that before you 
apply any kind of cost/benefit analysis...before you reason toward the solution of the 
problem, something quite important happens. When the bad outcome connected with 
a given response option comes into mind, however fleetingly, you experience an 
unpleasant gut feeling. Because the feeling is about the body, I gave the phenomenon 
the technical term of somatic state ("soma" is Greek for body); and because it "marks"
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an image, I called it a marker What does the somatic marker achieve? It forces
attention on the negative outcome to which a given action may lead...and allows you to 
choose from among fewer options" (Damasio, 1994, p. 173).
If there is an inseparable dynamic of emotion-body-cognition, as 
Damasio's work suggests, this would mean that emotions are not just involved in 
personality and self-concept development, ego stage-development and successful or 
failed social relationships, but in every level of paying cognitive attention, 
understanding the meaning of cognitive perceptions, and completion of learning tasks. 
From involuntary survival-reflex thinking to higher abstract reasoning—cognitive 
attention and cognitive responses are 'driven' or 'selected' by personalized emotions 
and emotional associations (Dmasio, 1994,1999).
Damasio identifies this as "an internal preference system" (Damasio,
1994, p.179) and describes its physical, neural base as "mostly innate regulatory 
dispositions, posed to ensure survival of the organism" which is "inherently biased to 
avoid pain, seek potent pleasure, and is probably pretuned for achieving these goals in 
social situations" (Damasio, 1884, p. 179).
Damasio thus links the social conditioning of 'self' to his idea of somatic 
markers, which are not just emotion states generated by the body-brain interaction at 
any given time but "somatic pairings" (Damasio, 1994, p. 179). This means that 
emotion-cognition-body form a memory bank that automatically associates and 
compares incoming new perceptions with past emotional experiences, such as extreme 
exhaustion caused by writing an academic paper. Thus the somatic marker will tag 
"certain categories of entity or event with the enactment of a body state" (Damasio, 
1994, p.180) such that a student may feel negative and tired when thinking about 
writing the next paper, and embark on a series of delaying tactics (Skaalvik, 1997), or, in 
extreme cases of prolonged task-avoidance, may become depressed and emotionally 
unable to perform (Skaalvik, 1997; Slipp, 1975).
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Damasio's 'somatic marker hypothesis' links young adulthood thinking 
to past emotional associations that have "pretuned" the thinker, especially during the 
childhood development of a differentiated 'self' (Slipp, 1975) and the self-esteem that is 
a measure of self-concept (James in Matthews, 1993). Emotions associated with 
childhood and other past experiences are how a college student has been "pretuned" to 
achieve (or avoid achieving) undergraduate outcomes such as academic high 
achievement and satisfaction with the college experience.
Managing the Primary and Secondary Emotions
Damasio identifies the primary survival emotions—which James calls the 
standard emotions—and which Damasio lists as Happiness, Sadness, Anger, Fear, and 
Disgust. These emotions in turn "correspond to profiles of body state response which 
are largely preorganized in the James sense" (Damasio, 1994, p. 149). When Damasio 
says "profiles of body state response" he, like James before him, is referring back to the 
great 19th-century physiologists—Darwin, Pavlov, Freud—who with the help of 
anatomists were able to identify specific neural and muscular responses that are 
universally associated with specific emotions. Damasio agrees with James that the 
primary emotions are aroused by preorganized survival instincts, just as James 
described. "When the body conforms to the (physiological) profiles of one of those 
emotions, we feel happy, sad, angry, fearful, disgusted" (Damasio, 1994, p. 149).
Following James' lead, Damasio further theorizes that, aside from the 
primary survival emotions, there are secondary emotions which are "tuned by 
experience" (Damasio, 1994, p. 149). The secondary emotions, also described as 
universal by Damasio, are much more subtle than the five primary survival emotions 
of Happiness, Sadness, Anger, Fear, and Disgust.
The secondary emotions also occur only in adulthood. These emotions 
are the refined spin-offs of the strong survival emotions that children can be observed
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to experience, without benefit of mediation by life experience or cognitive adjustment. 
The secondary emotions are described more as feelings than actual emotions. For 
example, euphoria and ecstasy are the refined adult feelings of extreme Happiness. The 
secondary emotions of adulthood can occur when subtler cognition than children are 
capable of performing, connects to subtle variations in the emotional body state(s).
This kind of emotional feeling is tied directly to adult cognition, and is not preorganized 
and involuntary the way the primary survival emotions experienced in childhood are.
This definition is parallel to James' idea of the intellectual feeling but is far 
from being what James had in mind when he wanted to separate out the 'cerebral 
feeling' from the rest of the physical body. Damasio makes sure that the preorganized 
reflex emotions aroused by the physical body are included in the adulthood experience 
of the more subtle intellectual feelings, feelings which Damasio labels as universal.
James was trying to differentiate the survival reflex emotions from the 
more subtle feelings that can occur when cognition mediates emotional feelings (as 
directed by the re-tuning of past emotional associations and experiences across the 
lifespan). This definition makes the careful personal construction of an emotional life in 
young adulthood during the college years vitally important. According to Damasio's 
theory, emotional re-tuning can occur at any time across the lifespan, not just 
haphazardly, or by chance, but by a careful individual re-creation of ego, a conscious 
transformation of the "I" construct (Cortright, 1997) of personality and self-concept.
The pretuning to which Damasio refers is known in psychology as 'object 
relations' (Slipp, 1975; Matthews, 1993). Object relations are the first emotional 
relationships that are formed in childhood. If past object relationships with parents and 
siblings (parents and siblings are the 'objects' of the relationship) formed during 
childhood, get emotionally associated with an adult's similar new relationships, the 
intersection of past and present similarities may make or break an adult's effectiveness
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as a social self, as well as bias perception of self-concept and the daily measurement of 
self-esteem (James in Matthews, 1993). Again, emotion is the hidden thinker.
Self-esteem is emotion-biased, a subjective judgment, about one's 
objective self who is going through the external circumstances of life as a winner or 
loser. Damasio explains how emotions direct social behaviors upon which self-concept 
and self-esteem depend, behaviors which became so severely impaired in the strange 
19th-century case of Phineas Gage:
"We were bom with the neural machinery required to generate somatic 
states in response to certain classes of stimuli—the machinery of primary emotions.
Such machinery is inherently biased to process signals concerning personal and social 
behavior, and it incorporates at the outset dispositions to pair a large number of social 
situations with adaptive somatic markers....The critical neural system for the acquisition 
of somatic-marker signaling is in the prefrontal cortices...(which) receive signals from all 
the sensory regions in which the images constituting our thoughts are formed, 
including the somatosensory cortices in which past and current body states are 
represented continuously...(and) from the neurotransmitter nuclei in the brain stem 
(for instance, those which distribute dopamine, norepinephrine, and serotinin) and in 
the basal forebrain (those which distribute acetylcholine), as well as the amygdala, the 
anterior cyngulate, and the hypothalamus. The innate preferences of the organism 
related to its survival...are conveyed to the prefrontal cortices by such signals and are 
thus part and parcel of the decision-making apparatus...(and) the prefrontal cortices) 
themselves represent categorizations of the situations in which the organism has been 
involved" (Damasio, 1994, pp. 180-181).
Damasio unlike Darwin, James and Pavlov can look at neuroimages of 
these specific brain areas as they feed information and associated emotional preferences 
to the prefrontal cortices—such as the ventromedial areas of the frontal lobe which were 
obliterated in the freak accident that severely injured the left side of Phineas Gage's
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brain, and left him conscious and capable of all the cognitive functions such as speech 
and memory, but unable to make a decision (Damasio, 1994).
According to Damasio's hypothesis, "most somatic markers we use for 
rational decision-making probably were created in our brains during the process of 
education and sotialization....Early in development, punishment and reward are 
delivered not only by the entities themselves (external circumstances), but by parents 
and other elders and peers, who usually embody the social conventions and ethics of 
the culture to which the organism belongs....The critical, formative set of stimuli to 
somatic pairings is, no doubt, acquired in childhood and adolescence" (Damasio, 1994, 
p. 179).
Instead of backing away from emotions, because fearing that everyone is 
a pretuned and socialized robot, Damasio suggests that the same society which has 
socialized and repressed or marginalized emotions from thinking can also set thinking 
free. Thinking can become free when a thinker learns to recognize if his or her 
behavior is being directed by emotions from the past that are still "connecting specific 
classes of stimuli with specific classes of somatic state" (Damasio, 1994, p. 180). 
Understanding and managing personal emotions for intellectual and emotional growth 
remains a neglected part of the individual's education. "But the accrual of somatically 
marked stimuli ceases only when life ceases, and thus it is appropriate to describe that 
accrual as a process of continuous learning" (Damasio, 1994, p.179)
Self-concept formed by childhood emotion-markers may be a necessary 
condition for higher learning to occur, especially in achieving competence in traditional 
instructional targets of higher education: decision making and abstract reasoning. The 
necessary presence of emotion in decision making and abstract reasoning is shown in 
the tragic case of Phineas Gage, a once-popular young man before his left frontal lobe 
was physically damaged, in fact obliterated by a length of iron railing which entered his 
brain through the left eye in a bizarre accident (Damasio, 1994).
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Descartes' Error and the Strange Case of Phineas Gage
The following words by William James are strangely predictive of the 
Phineas Gage case, as if James is literally paving the way for Damasio's analysis of the 
strange 19th-century case.
"If our hypothesis is true, it makes us realize more deeply than ever how 
much our mental life is knit up with our corporeal frame..." (James, 1890, p. 467). "The 
only way to coercively disprove it, however, would be to take some emotion, and then 
exhibit qualities of feeling in it which should be demonstrably additional to all those 
which could possibly be derived from the organs affected at the time. But to detect 
with certainty such purely spiritual qualities of feeling would obviously be a task 
beyond human power....A positive proof of this theory would, on the other hand, be 
given if we could find a subject absolutely anaesthetic inside and out, but not paralytic, 
so that emotion-inspiring objects might evoke the usual bodily expressions from him, 
but who, on being consulted, should say that no subjective emotional affection was felt. 
Such a man would be like one who, because he eats, appears to bystanders to be 
hungry, but who afterwards confesses that he had no appetite at all" Games, 1890, p. 
454-455).
Enter Phineas Gage.
In 1848, Phineas Gage was a young foreman working for Rutland and 
Burlington Railroad to lay new rail and expand rail service in Vermont. He was only 
twenty-five years old but already a construction boss, described by his employers as 
"the most capable and efficient man" in their employ (Damasio, 1994).
Part of young Gage's job was exploding rocks to clear the ground. One 
afternoon at work, an accidental explosion blew an iron tamping rod sky high, leaving 
Gage and his men looking down at an intact rock but hearing a strange whistling sound 
overhead. It is the iron tamping rod which had been packing blasting power into a hole 
in the rock, but now comes hurtling through the air from the explosion and suddenly
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strikes young Gage in the head. "The iron enters Gage's left cheek, pierces the base of 
his skull, traverses the front of his brain, and exits at high speed through the top of the 
head. The rod has landed more than a hundred feet away, covered with blood and 
brains." Gage is thrown to the ground, and lays there silent but conscious! "Horrible 
Accident" was the headline reporting the accident in the Boston newspapers a week 
later on September 20, while in the 19th-century vernacular "Wonderful Accident" was 
the headline in the Vermont Mercury on September 22,1848. A Boston medical article 
entitled "Passage of an Iron Rod through the Head" reported that "his men (with 
whom he was a great favourite) took him in their arms and carried him to the 
road...and sat him into an ox cart, in which he rode, sitting erect, a full three quarters of 
a mile, to the hotel...Gage got out of the cart himself with a little assistance from his 
men" (Damasio, 1994, pp. 4-5).
Years later a young doctor named Edward Williams wrote the following 
account of attending young Gage that day: "He was at that time sitting in a chair upon 
the piazza...When I drove up, he said, 'Doctor, here is business enough for you.' I first 
noticed the wound upon the head before I alighted from my carriage, the pulsations of 
the brain being very distinct...the top of the head appeared like an inverted 
funnel...bone being fractured about the opening for a distance of about two inches in 
every direction...the opening through the skull and integuments was not far from one 
and a half inch in diameter...and the whole appeared as if some wedge-shaped body 
had passed from below upward. Mr. Gage, during the time I was examining this 
wound, was relating the manner in which he was injured to the bystanders; he talked 
so rationally and was so willing to answer questions that I directed my inquiries to him 
in preference to the men who were standing about at this time. I can safely say that 
neither at that time nor on any subsequent occasion, save once, did I consider him to be 
other than perfectly rational. The one time...was about a fortnight after the accident, 
and then he persisted in calling me John Kirwin..." (Damasio, 1994, p. 6.). In less than
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two months, Gage was pronounced cured, but Gage's behavior would begin to show 
an "extraordinary turn"—"Gage's disposition, his likes and dislikes, his dreams and 
aspirations are all to change. Gage's body may be alive and well, but there is a new 
(kind of) spirit animating it" (Damasio, 1994, p. 7).
A doctor in Vermont named John Harlow took over the long-term care of 
Gage and records that although Gage appeared fully recovered, was not paralyzed and 
could feel, hear and see though his remaining left eye, had no difficulty with speech or 
language, and walked firmly and used his hands with dexterity, his once-popular 
personality changed drastically. "Gage became "fitful, irreverent, indulging at times in 
the grossest profanity which was not previously his custom...impatient of restraint or 
advice when it conflicts with his desires, at times pertinaciously obstinate, yet capricious 
and vacillating, devising many plans of future operation which are no sooner arranged 
than they are abandoned...." (Damasio, 1994, p. 8).
Gage was never able to hold a steady job for the rest of his life and made 
extreme career moves such as moving to South America and becoming a side-show for 
Bamum and Bailey Circus, in which he would show his head wound and brandish the 
iron rod that had caused his tragic injury.
After he left the circus, Gage moved to San Frandsco where he "took to 
drinking and brawling in questionable districts" (Damasio, 1994, p. 10) even though 
his sister had married into a prominent family in San Frandsco. Gage experienced a 
series of seizures that increased in frequency until he died on May 21,1861 at age 38.
Using the preserved skull of Phineas Gage 150 years after Gage's death, 
Damasio holds up a telling neuroimage to the sad story of Phineas Gage with a 
computer-generated look at Gage's damaged brain. The neuroimage connects his 
irrational and non-sodal behaviors to the absence of the left frontal, anterior 
ventromedial lobe that was obliterated by the iron rod. Gage was the victim of the 
destruction of the brain-body regulator, the mediator between sodal expressions and
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primal ego desires generated in the lower centers of unrestrained animal instinct, 
unacceptable social behaviors which defined the course of Gage's adult life after the 
accident. In 1848 Gage's Vermont physician, Dr. Harlow, wrote that "...the equilibrium 
or balance, so to speak, between his intellectual faculty and animal propensities" had 
been destroyed (Damasio, 1994).
Gage's unrestrained and anti-social behaviors that did not appear until 
after his injury, give evidence of the role of emotion in regulating and developing a 
social ego, the 'emotional self' that William James describes. But more significantly, for 
higher education, Gage's inability to make decisions or carry out plans defines the 
hidden role of emotion in the expressions of 'thought' and 'self.'
"Whenever I call a decision advantageous, I refer to basic personal and 
social outcomes such as survival of the individual and its kin, the securing of shelter, the 
maintenance of...health, employment and financial solvency, and good standing in the 
social group. Gage's...new mind (after the accident) no longer permitted (him) to 
obtain any of these advantages" (Damasio, 1994, p. 170)
Before Gage was buried in 1861, the mortician opened Gage's coffin and 
removed the skull. He also removed the iron tamping rod that had caused Gage's 
injury and that had been placed beside Gage in the coffin. The iron rod was sent along 
with Gage's skull to Dr. Harlow in Vermont. Until Damasio recently received the skull 
and iron rod, they were at the Warren Medical Museum of the Harvard Medical School 
in Boston.
What did Damasio want with the skull and rod? He wanted to find out 
what brain areas had been damaged or obliterated, by the iron rod that would have 
accompanied Phineas Gage to his grave. The intriguing fact about Gage's severe injury 
was that his attention, memory, cognitive perception skills, language ability and motor 
skills were all left intact. What then had been damaged?
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Neuroanatomy and neuroimaging technology that can reconstruct brain 
area images in three dimensions, used computer manipulation of "the raw data 
obtained from high-resolution magnetic resonance scans" of Gage's skull (Damasio, 
1994, p. 31). The resulting neuroimages rendered pictures of what Gage's brain would 
have looked like in 1861 on the autopsy table.
Damasio's analysis of the computer-generated images of Gage's 
reconstructed brain found that the damage was intensive on the left hemisphere and 
anterior sectors of the frontal lobe. The iron rod did not touch the brain regions 
regulating motor function and language. The ventromedial prefrontal region of the left 
hemisphere was severely damaged—and this region had recently been identified by 
Damasio's research as "critical for normal decision making" (Damasio, 1994, p.32). It 
was damage to the prefrontal cortices of Phineas Gage's brain that stopped him from 
deciding on and carrying out reasonable plans for his future well-being, and behaving 
according to social rules which he had previously respected. To reinforce these 
conclusions about Gage's injury, Damasio was able to compare the similar post-injury 
behavior of some of his contemporary patients who had prefrontal brain damage 
similar to Gage's. Based on the comparative studies, Damasio concludes that "bilateral 
damage to prefrontal cortices is consistently associated with impairments of reasoning 
/ decision making and emotion/feeling" (Damasio, 1994, p. 61).
To explain this apparent necessary link between physical brain areas and 
behaviors including decision making, Damasio writes, "...I propose that human reason 
depends on several brain systems, working in concert across many levels of neuronal 
organization, rather than as a single brain center. Both "high-level" and "low-level" 
brain centers, from the prefrontal cortices to the hypothalamus and brain stem, 
cooperate in the making of reason. The lower levels in the neural edifice of reason are 
the same ones that regulate the processing of emotions and feelings, along with the 
body functions necessary for an organism's survival. In turn, these lower levels
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maintain direct and mutual relationships with virtually every bodily organ, thus placing 
the body directly within the chain of operations that generate the highest reaches of 
reasoning... Emotion, feeling, and biological regulation all play a role in human reason. 
The lower orders of our organism are in the loop of high reason" (Damasio, 1994, p. 
xiii.)
Descartes' error was leaving the body out of his famous equation. His 
error was an egocentric error. He equated 'self' with the cognitive "I" which performs 
thinking. His error was that he excluded the emotions of the body, which are 
generated by and inseparable from the body at all times, not just during an emotional 
crisis. Descartes separated conscious cognition from the non-consdous "lower orders 
of our organism" (Damasio, 1994, p. xiii).
Damasio illustrates the body-cognition-emotion conundrum with 
neuroimaging of the preserved skull of the brain-damaged Phineas Gage. Damasio 
again asks Descartes' question: "How is it that we are consdous of the world around 
us, that we know what we know, and that we know that we know?" Unlike Descartes, 
Damasio condudes that "....all is based on neural events within a brain, provided that 
brain has been and now is interacting with its body" (Damasio, 1994, p. xvii).
In his day, William James mused: "Cognition and emotion are parted— 
who can say that their antagonism may not just be one phase of the world-old struggle 
known as that between the spirit and the flesh?" (James, 1884, p. 203).
Pavlov's Contribution
In the late-19th and early-20th century, Pavlov's contribution to the 
emerging field of psychology was the chance discovery that preorganized and 
involuntary responses form emotional assodations that may condition future behavior. 
Today's psychology teaches that past emotional assodations across the lifespan impact 
development of personality, self-esteem, self-concept, and "pretune" an individual for
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success or failure (Damasio, 1994,1999). Pavlov perceived that the possibilities of such 
acquired associations are not robotic but fluid, infinite and individualized.
"So infinitely complex, so continuously in flux, are the conditions in the 
world around, that that complex animal system which is itself in living flux, and that 
system only, has a chance to establish dynamic equilibrium with the environment.
Thus we see that the fundamental and the most general function of the (cerebral) 
hemispheres is that of reacting to signals presented by innumerable stimuli of 
interchangeable signification" (Pavlov, 1927, p. 15).
James follows Pavlov in saying "that the nervous system of every living 
thing is but a bundle of predispositions" which "react in particular ways upon the 
contact of particular features of the environment" (James, 1884, p. 190). Pavlov's 
research findings can be used to understand that emotions are preorganized responses 
to the environment that, instinct-like, continue to direct future cognitive attention to 
"selected" cognitive perceptions. This hidden, emotional conditioning of cognitive 
consciousness is a challenge to learning and teaching.
Pavlov's dog salivation experiments presented to the world for the first 
time scientific evidence of the existence of an automatic learning-reflex, innate, 
associative, non-rational and instantaneous. In fact, the preorganized learning-reflex 
which Pavlov's dogs demonstrated, was shown by the dogs to be directed by the 
instinct of hunger and the reflex behavior to find food to eat. James stated that 
instincts arouse emotions, but Pavlov blurs the line between instinct and reflex. 
According to Pavlov, reflexes are just "smaller instincts" "like the driving-belts of 
machines..." (Pavlov, 1927, p. 8).
Pavlov adds that: "Between the simplest reflex and the instinct we can 
find numerous stages of transition, and among these we are puzzled to find any line of 
demarcation" and "It is pretty evident that under natural conditions the normal animal 
must respond not only to stimuli which themselves bring immediate benefit or harm,
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but also to other physical or chemical agencies—waves of sound, light, and the like— 
which in themselves only signal the approach of these stimuli" (Pavlov, 1927, pp. 9,14).
Pavlov's lab dogs consistently showed how a signal of approaching food 
produces physical responses by the body, but not just simple responses. The dogs 
responded not just to actual food approaching but to remembered past-assodations 
when food was approaching, induding anyone in a white lab coat. James interpreted 
Pavlov's great discovery of how assodative learning works to mean that Pavlov's 
animals simply paired or coupled similarities occurring contiguously into what might be 
called "feeding assodations." Hating is an obvious survival instinct, and James 
theorized that instincts arouse emotion. Instinctive learning occurs when emotions are 
evoked by an experience or event.
Pavlov's dogs showed how the survival instinct 'to eat' arouses instinctive 
or reflex-emotions that direct attention in a biased way to perceive similarities (some 
perceived similarities may be only imagined similarities)—assodated with previous 
arrivals of food.
In his theory about human reasoning, James differentiates simple 
assodation of events that occur together (as demonstrated by Pavlov's laboratory 
animals) from higher human reasoning. James notes the brute animal's inability to do 
any "thinking" more complex than simple coupling of similarities; James calls this 
contiguous thinking.
For example, ringing a bell had been an event that the dogs previously 
paired with the arrival of their food. Subsequently, simply ringing a bell would cause 
the dogs to salivate even when no food or feeder was in sight. Pavlov's dogs did not 
have the cognitive capadty to dissodate the past similarities of being fed with a ringing 
bell. Pavlov's dogs could assodate but not dissodate similarities. The present could 
not be dissodated from the past. In the past, there had been approaches of white- 
coated people with dog food while a bell rang.
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The mind-body-environment, however, does not automatically stay in a 
state of false equilibrium, as Pavlov's dogs next demonstrated. When a ringing bell 
continued to signal "no food," a new contiguous association was formed, and 
eventually the ringing bell without food elicited no salivation response.
According to James, not all humans are intellectually or emotionally 
prepared to transcend the preorganized stimulus-response mechanism that begins to 
emotionally condition thinking in childhood (Matthews, 1993; Slipp, 1977) and which 
Pavlov's dogs demonstrated (Pavlov, 1927). The thinking and emotions of some adults 
may remain self-centered, because still conditioned by childhood experiences, and may 
continue across the lifespan to be a pawn of the past's associative, emotional 
mechanism that is innate to all learning, but is generally ignored even by the learner.
Kohlberg, Erikson, and Loevinger among other developmental theorists 
identified stages of self-development, ranking the self-centered early stages as the 
lower stages, that is, the early stages of 'self' formation that occur in childhood but can 
be mediated and transcended by future life experiences (Santrock, 1997; Pascarella and 
Terenzini, 1991). Lawrence Kohlberg believed that most adult thinking does not 
develop past the self-centered childhood stage, which is stage two of Kohlberg's seven 
stages of cognitive-emotional self-development (Kohlberg in Santrock, 1997). The 
highest stages of self-development go beyond the simplistic, self-related, contiguous 
thinking which James describes for some humans and the lower brutes (James, 1890; 
Matthews, 1993; Walsh and Vaughan, 1993; Cortright, 1997).
James wonders why only some humans, but not others, are cognitively 
able to dissociate among similarities and reach complex decisions using abstract 
reasoning. James' great theoretical contribution to psychology is parallel to the 
contributions of Pavlov's heroic laboratory dogs, who demonstrated that "association 
by similarities" is a preorganized learning mechanism in humans and animals. James 
theorized that past emotional associations function like an animal's survival instinct.
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In fact when James, like Darwin, presents an extensive number of anecdotal dog stories 
Games, 1890) to illustrate how the associative learning-reflex is demonstrated by dogs 
as well as their human owners, he refers to humans as "the talking animal" and "the 
reasoning animal"—thereby blurring the distinction between animal instinct and 
instinctive human learning that is preorganized and involuntary.
Pavlov assists James in this blurring when he defines a reflex as "a smaller 
instinct" and describes "chains of reflexes" that can group together under one umbrella 
instinct for purposes of well-being and survival. Pavlov's chance discovery of an innate 
non-rational learning mechanism—James' 'association by similarities'—is useful in 
defining why emotion is necessary in cognitive reasoning Games, 1890; Damasio, 1994).
lames' Contribution: Connecting Emotion to Reasoning
When James wonders in Principles of Psychology, "...why Darwin and 
Newton had to be waited for so long" Games, 1890, p. 360) and "Why does it need a 
Newton to notice the law of the squares, a Darwin to notice the law of the fittest?" 
Games, 1890, p. 348), he is wondering about individual differences—a pivotal factor in 
assessing the outcomes differences in higher education, and a question in emotional 
intelligence research today. Like any good educator, James is wondering why some 
people are high achievers where others fail to perform. James asks, "Why cannot 
anybody reason as well as anybody else?" Games, 1890, p. 343).
In answer to his own question, James points out that "Geniuses...differ 
from from ordinary minds by an unusual development of association by similarity" 
Games, 1890, p. 348). Abstract reasoning is so complex and rarefied, according to 
James, that not all humans can perform it. James saw that "The flash of similarity 
between an apple and the moon...was too recondite to have occurred to any but 
exceptional minds. Genius...is identical with the possession of similar association to an 
extreme degree" Games, 1890, p. 360).
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James describes an undisciplined stream of consciousness, driven by 
simple contiguous associations in which some adults, young children and some animals 
appear to 'think/ The higher level abstract thinking that is both associative and 
dissociative is a distinctly human cognitive ability, but cognition alone is not enough to 
reach a solution in the reasoning process, even after analyzing each part of the whole 
Qames, 1890). James describes "the roll out" Games, 1890, p. 347) of a conclusion or 
solution to a problem "after the flight of reason" Games, 1890) has occurred. He 
explains that "...association by similarity ...operates of itself in highly gifted minds 
without any deliberation, spontaneously collecting analogous instances, uniting in a 
moment what in nature the whole breadth of space and time keeps separate, and so 
permitting a perception of identical points in the midst of different circumstances, which 
minds governed wholly by the law of contiguity could never begin to attain" Games, 
1890, p. 360). James drew a flower-like sketch of the reasoning process, with 
intersecting petals A, B, C, D, and E and "m" intersecting all the petals in the center.
"If m, in the present representation A, calls up B, C, D, and E, which are 
similar to A in possessing it, and calls them up in rapid succession, then m, being 
associated almost simultaneously with such varying concomitants, will 'roll out' and 
attract our separate notice" Games, 1890, p. 347).
Could the James "roll out" be "the lurking presence of emotion" that has 
persisted in the history of the development of reason (Solomon, 1993, p. 3)?
Could the James 'roll out' be the Aristotelian inspiration of the affective
domain?
As contemporary case studies and neuroimaging show (Damasio, 1994), 
without intact and healthy emotion areas of the brain in the lefet frontal lobe, cognitive 
thinking cannot reach a conclusion or decide which solution best solves a problem 
(Damasio, 1994). Educational applications that academically engage emotions to 
determine an optimal cognitive mode for learning (Damasio, 1994) may also facilitate
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a "roll out" solution (James, 1890), as spelled out in Bloom's Taxonomy of Educational 
Objectives: Handbook II (see Appendix B) (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964). This 
1964 taxonomy suggests that William James' concept of the 'emotional self' (James, 
1884) should be academically engaged, because: "Feelings, along with the emotions 
they come from, are not a luxury. They serve as internal guides... (C)onceptualize the 
essence of feelings as something you and I can see through a window that opens 
directly onto a continuously updated image of the structure and state of our body....In 
the landscape of your body, the objects are the viscera (heart, lungs, gut, muscles) while 
the light and shadow and movement and sound represent a point in the range of 
operation of those organs at a certain moment. By and large, a feeling is the 
momentary 'view' of that body landscape. It has a specific content—the state of the 
body and the specific neural systems that support it—the peripheral nervous system and
the brain regions that integrate signals related to body structure and regulation the
qualifying body state, positive or negative, is accompanied and rounded up by a 
corresponding thinking mode: fast moving and idea rich, when the body state is in the 
positive and pleasant band of the (emotion) spectrum, but slow moving and repetitive 
when the body state veers toward the painful band" (Damasio, 1994, pp. xix-xv).
The case foi a role for emotions in the development of 'thought' and 'self' 
gives educational importance to the research concept of 'emotional intelligence.'
What is 'Emotional Intelligence'?
Emotional intelligence is an ability to understand and perceive emotions 
and emotional expressions in self and others, an ability that can develop naturally from 
life experience or can be taught and learned. Emotional intelligence when tested as a 
performance ability intersects the two domains (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b) 
because the test questions call for remembering and defining specific emotions and 
situations, which is the first step in Bloom's Handbook I: Cognitive Domain:
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"...the remembering either by recognition or recall, of ideas, material, or 
phenomena" (Bloom, et al., 1956, p. 62). Emotional intelligence when tested as a 
performance ability intersecting the cognitive domain begins in the simple recognition, 
recall and defining of emotional expressions, for example in photographs, and ends 
with complex problem-solving in given hypothetical situations about dilemmas 
involving emotions which require a decision or solution. Note historically, that it was 
Aristotle who connected emotions to ethical reasoning; the contemporary emotional 
intelligence research concept also involves emotions in reasoning-called 'emotional 
reasoning' or 'reasoning with emotions'—about a problem or situation involving the 
emotions of others (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b).
'Emotional reasoning' is part of a second definition of 'emotional 
intelligence' in which emotions are tested with traditional measures of intelligence, 
about the information that emotions convey, which meets the traditional standards of 
an intelligence that is separate from but related to cognitive intelligence (Mayer, Caruso 
and Salovey, 2000; Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b).
The third deinition of 'emotional intelligence' is that it is "a part of 
personality" (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000). Personality development includes ego 
and self-concept formation (Matthews, 1993; Slipp, 1977; Santrock, 1997, Pascarella and 
Terenzini, 1991; Astin, 1977,1993; Chickering and Reisser, 1993), which are directly 
related to academic achievement efforts in higher learning (Bandura, 1992). Other 
popularized definitions of, and "cure-all" claims for, the concept of emotional 
intelligence go beyond the scope of emotional intelligence as a set of abilities that 
convey information and can be tested (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000). Even the 
three limited definitions above, included in the original ability model of emotional 
intelligence (Salovey and Mayer, 1990) that first introduced the research concept a 
decade ago, cover a very large and diverse area of physiological and psychological 
research that has been examined in relation to emotion since 1900.
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Historical Development of the Emotional Intelligence Concept
From 1900 to 1969, "psychology was still a young concept" (Mayer, 
Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 20). This was a period when the research concepts of 
'intelligence' and 'emotion' were researched separately. This period defined the 
historical domain separation of cognition from emotion. During this era, the 
standardized intelligence or "IQ" test such as the Stanford-Binet (Santrock, 1997) was 
first devised. In the separate area of emotion research, the early experiments were still 
focused on confirming or disconfirming one of the concepts that James inherited from 
his predecessors in physiology, namely, whether "feelings precede physiological 
emotional responses, or vice versa" (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 20).
Darwin's work was also still having an impact on the research of this period, namely, 
"whether emotions held similar meanings across species, as Darwin had proposed, or 
whether they were culturally determined" (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 20)— 
the evolutionist nature-versus-nurture debate.
From 1970 to 1989, "the precursors to emotional intelligence were put into 
place" (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 20). Research in this period became 
"more sophisticated and inter-area" (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000, p. 20). A new 
field of study defined as "cognition and affect" integrated study of the previously two 
separated areas of research. Research was looking for "lawful rules of emotion: what 
emotions meant, and when they arose" (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 20). The 
research of Paul Erkman published in 1973 supported Darwin's idea that emotions are 
not just a human phenomenon but evolve in similar ways across species. This 
assertion helps prove the educational learning applications of Pavlov's findings. The 
psychological influence of emotions on thinking began to be studied among depressed 
individuals and in people with bipolar disorder (manic-depressive). Also, computer 
programs that simulated human intelligence were devised that could demonstrate 
understanding of the emotions of characters as told in stories (Mayer, Salovey and
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Caruso, 2000b, p. 20). Thus the scope of "emotions" was expanded from physiology 
into psychology and cyberspace. A key development was the emergent idea that 
"intelligence" is not a static entity but a composite of multiple and different kinds of 
"intelligences" (Gardner, 1993 in Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000a).
From 1990 to 1997, the concept of 'emotional intelligence' emerged. It 
drew on diverse areas of research from the previous nine decades. A journal article 
(Salovey and Mayer, 1990) formally theorized that brain research, intelligence 
measurement, artificial intelligence, clinical psychology, and other areas of related 
research, were "all addressing the same phenomenon: a heretofore overlooked 
intelligence" (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 21).
The first ability scale to measure emotional intelligence was devised in 
1990 (Mayer, DiPaolo and Salovey, 1990). The first formal definition of emotional 
intelligence was published in 1990 as: "the ability to monitor one's own and others' 
feelings and emotions, to discriminate among them and to use this information to guide 
one's thinking and actions (Salovey and Mayer, 1990).
In 1997, a more complex four-branch model was designed (Mayer and 
Salovey, 1997) to test emotional intelligence as an ability to: 1) perceive, 2) use, 3) 
understand and 4) manage emotions. The ability in each of these four branches was 
operationally defined as: 1) the ability to perceive emotions in oneself and others, as 
well as in objects, art, stories, and the like; 2) the ability to generate, use, and feel 
emotion as necessary to communicate feelings, or employ them for the emotional 
facilitation of thought; 3) the ability to understand emotional information, how 
emotions combine and progress through relationship transitions, and to reason about 
emotional meanings; and 4) the ability to be open to feelings, to modulate them in 
oneself and others so as to promote personal understanding and growth (Mayer, 
Salovey and Caruso, 2000, p. 24).
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In the year 2000, the definition was refined by its originators who stated 
that, "We believe that emotions can be intelligent and that emotions can be integrated 
with intelligence to improve the quality of our rational decisions" (Mayer, Salovey and 
Caruso, 2000, p. 23) and endorsed a definition of emotional intelligence in the year 2000 
that reiterates their 1997 definition: "Emotional intelligence involves
the ability to perceive accurately, appraise, and express emotion; 
the ability to access and /or generate feelings when they facilitate 
thought;
the ability to understand emotion and emotional knowledge; and 
the ability to regulate emotions to promote emotional and 
intellectual growth" (Mayer and Salovey, 1997, p. 10).
By the year 2000, an emotional intelligence ability test (the MSCEIT, V.2) had been 
designed based on these four abilities from the 1997 test, having a total of 15 task, area, 
overall, and branch scores for each test participant.
What Emotional Intelligence Is Not
Emotional intelligence when tested as an ability operationalizes (makes 
occur) the perception, use, understanding, and management of emotions, but the test 
cannot be a cure-all for the emotional challenges of achievement. Emotional 
intelligence as a set of abilities comprise only one mediating variable among hundreds 
of other individualized variables that mediate achievement for any one person. The 
social- and self-improvement applications of emotional intelligence "promised" by a 
popularized self-help book became a sore point for the originators of the research 
concept during 1994-1998 (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000a).
"Consider that a person's grade point average is a reflection of her or his 
behavior, over hundreds of days, over hundreds of quizzes, tests, and other
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assignments, as assessed (and influenced) by multiple independent observers" (Mayer, 
Salovey and Caruso, 2000a, p. 416). Dozens of psychological variables also influence 
grade point average and other measures of academic and social achievement in college, 
and are identified in research literature (Bandura, 1992; Krathwohl, et al., 1964; Oatley 
and Jenkins, 1996; Damasio, 1994,1999; Skaalvik, 1997; Guerreo and Miller, 1998; Ifert 
and Roloff, 1997; Lang, Bradley and Cuthbert, 1997).
In the testing and appraisal of emotional knowledge, emotional 
intelligence is not new. Test instruments that appraise and analyze the emotions that 
impact learning have been available for decades, such as the Succeed-Fail Questionnaire 
and the Adjective Rating Scale, designed to probe depression and childhood self- 
differentiation; and the Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist and Thematic Apperception 
Test which measure depression, hostility and feelings of well-being (Slipp, 1975, p. 139). 
The literature indicates that depression has received the bulk of research, making 
happiness in comparison a lesser known emotion (Francis, et al.,1998). In fact, a search 
on PSYCHLIT tagging January 1990 to December, 1995 found 18,903 dtes for 
"depression' and "only 515 dtes for "happiness"' (Frands, et al., 1998, p. 167).
The Bar-On Emotional Quotient Inventory (Bar-On EQi) does measure 
broader dimensions of emotion than depression induding independence, 
assertiveness, self-actualization, empathy, sodal responsibility, problem solving, 
flexibility, tolerance for stress, impulse control, happiness, and optimism (Schutte, et al., 
1998). The Style And Perception of Affect Scale is based on the concept "that being able 
to attend rapidly, appropriately, and effortlessly to feelings (of self and others) is the 
cornerstone of emotional intelligence" (Schutte, et al., 1998, p. 169); this test measures 
body-based, evaluation-based, and logic-based perceptions of emotion.
The educational application of emotional intelligence would be to regulate 
negative emotions based on past experience that may foster task-avoidance (Skaalvik, 
1997) and to generate instead positive emotions which engender a rich, rapid and
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creative cognitive mode for learning (Damasio, 1994,1999; Mayer and Salovey, 1990). 
This is the application of the original emotional intelligence ability model of 1990.
It was with regret, then, that between 1994 and 1998 (Mayer, Salovey and 
Caruso, 2000b, p. 20), the originators of the research concept of emotional intelligence 
saw it being proclaimed, sold in a best-selling book (Goleman in Mayer, Salovey and 
Caruso, 2000), and even appearing on the cover of Time Magazine in 1998, as a self-help 
remedy for social acceptance, a better personality, success in life—improvements 
"accessible by virtually anyone" (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 22).
The problem with that, as William James and Antonio Damasio have 
explained, is that each individual is "pretuned" during childhood with personalized 
emotional associations that function as unique and hidden variables determining 
individual achievement or avoidance of achievement (Skaalvik, 1997; Matthews, 1993; 
Slipp, 1977). These hidden psychological variables can produce serious emotion states 
such as depression that may become "a double-bind on achievement" (Slipp, 1977) for 
which knowledge of emotional intelligence is not a remedy. Emotional intelligence as a 
research concept is at this time still growing up. Emotional intelligence is primarily still 
a research measurement of individual understanding and awareness of emotions and 
cannnot be applied as therapy or remedy for hidden emotional problems that may be 
impeding greater social or economic success—a misleading promise by self-help books 
(Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000a).
During 1994-1998, the original researchers saw their concept of 1990 being 
"stretched—popularly—to include a large number of personality traits (e.g., emotional 
stability, optimism) or a set of unrelated competencies (e.g., leadership, collaboration)" 
far beyond the scope of the academic research concept of emotional intelligence as a set 
of abilities to understand and manage emotions that can be tested and measured 
(Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, pp. 20-23).
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The self-help promises and "loose description of the (emotional 
intelligence) concept created an explosion of activity"in the mid-1990s which equated 
emotional intelligence with "getting" desired personality characteristics for success such 
as empathy, motivation, persistence, warmth and generalized good social behavior 
(Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000, pp. 22-23). The reality is that emotional intelligence 
cannot guarantee self-improvement. Emotional intelligence tests can provide a mirror 
to the emotional 'self' which may lead to increased awareness that emotions convey 
information, to cue cognitive thinking and decision making (Damasio, 1994,1999).
Learning to understand how to manage emotions with 'emotional 
intelligence' may indirectly lead individuals to desire a higher level of ego-stage 
development (Weathersby, 1981; Loevinger in Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991) and the 
maturity of a self-concept that goes beyond the conceits of self-esteem (Matthews, 1993; 
Cortright, 1997; Walsh and Vaughan, 1993). The development of 'self' is a very 
complex dependent variable, but can be mediated by knowledge of emotional 
intelligence. During the undergraduate years, applications of emotional intelligence 
could become an educationally important mediating variable within Astin's model of 
higher education, because it is a learned ability to perceive, understand, use, and 
manage personal emotions to facilitate self-concept formation, rational thinking and 
achievement efforts.
The educational question is: Would the instructional inclusion of 
emotional intelligence as a set of learned abilities become an effective mediating 
variable in the undergraduate college experience, one that would assist individuals to 
achieve, in some individual way, more "satisfying" psychosocial and academic 
outcomes in the higher education experience (Bloom, et al., 1956; Krathwohl, Bloom 
and Masia, 1964; Chickering and Reisser, 1993; As tin, 1977,1993; Terenzini, 1997; 
Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991)?
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It is Plato who must have the final word on this question:
"But the release of the prisoners from chains," Plato writes, "and their 
translation from the shadows to the images and to the light, their ascent from the 
underground den to the sun...this power of elevating the highest principle in the soul to 
the contemplation of that which is best in existence, with which we may compare the 
raising of that faculty of reasoning which is the very light of the body...is not a theme to 
be treated of only in passing, but will have to be discussed again and again" (Plato in 
Jowett, 1946, p. 271).
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"What is missing is a systematic effort to collect evidence of 
growth in affective objectives which is in any way parallel to 
the very great and 
systematic efforts to evaluate cognitive achievement"
(Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964, p. 16).
The Research Problem 
This study's research problem was the continuing exclusion of the 
affective domain from the academic development of intellect in higher education today, 
a problem that may be impacting the outcomes of the undergraduate college 
experience. The purpose of this study was to look for a relation between the affective 
domain of emotions and traditional cognitive domain indicators of academic 
achievement.
Description of the Test Instrument
In this study, a standardized test instrument, the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso- 
Emotional-Intelligence-Test, Version 2 (the MSCEIT, V.2) (MHS, Inc./Mayer, Salovey 
and Caruso, 2000b) was used to test and measure the affective domain 'intelligence' of 
61 undergraduate college students who participated in this study at a top-ranked public 
university in the southeastern United States.
The MSCEIT, V.2 was designed by Professor Peter Salovey, Chair of the 
Department of Psychology at Yale University, and Professor Jack Mayer of the 
Psychology Department, University of New Hampshire, in collaboration with David 
Caruso, Ph.D, to involve emotions in simple cognitive thinking and in complex 
problem-solving. The MSCEIT, V.2 was made available on-line for research use.
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See Appendix C for the MSCEIT. V.2 Test Manual description of MSCEIT, V.2 
construct validity and reliability (MHS, Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b).
The forerunner of the MSCEIT, V.2 was the Multifactor Emotional 
Intelligence Scale (MEIS) developed by Professors Salovey and Mayer, in collaboration 
with Dr. Caruso, which was made available for research use in 1997. The MEIS tested a 
set of theoretically interrelated emotional intelligence abilities in tasks asking the test- 
taker to identify emotions in faces, music, designs, stories; in a synthesis of emotional 
situations and emotional biases; in blends or combinations of different but related 
emotions in a given hypothetical situation; and in managing emotions in self and 
others. Prior to the MEIS, early research in emotion perception and use of emotions in 
thought was published in 1990 and 1993 by Professors Mayer and Salovey (Mayer and 
Salovey, 1993; Salovey and Mayer, 1990). This early research integrated existing 
emotion-perception literature which had focused on perceiving emotions in 
photographs of faces, in colors, and in abstract designs. The finding by Professors 
Mayer and Salovey at that time (1990,1993) was that a single 'emotional' ability 
appeared to be operating in what had been previously researched as separate emotion- 
perception tasks. The research problem then became how to further define and 
measure that ability.
The next research step forward was to identify the ability. The name 
'emotional intelligence' was given to the ability to perceive, use, understand and 
manage 'intelligence' conveyed by "the language of emotions" (Mayer and Salovey, 
1990), and to test that ability with exercises designed to measure emotion-perception in 
written stories (Mayer and Geher, 1996). Further analysis of the findings of that 
research showed that scores on 'the stories task' correlated positively with the test- 
takers' SAT scores (Mayer and Salovey, 1990).
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From this earlier research, the current research concept of the MSCEIT, 
V.2 emerged that the 'intelligence' of emotions correlates positively with general 
intelligence and self-reported Grade Point Average (see Appendix C) (MHS,
Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b) and with academic achievement as measured 
and scored by the SAT (Mayer and Geher, 1996).
In this study, whose purpose was to look for a relation between the 
affective domain of emotions and the cognitive domain of academic achievement, the 
MSCEIT, V.2 was applicable because specifically designed to involve the 'intelligence' of 
emotions (emotional intelligence) in exercises of cognitive thinking and abstract 
problem-solving. This study's research questions ask if emotional intelligence scores 
on the MSCEIT, V.2 are related to traditional cognitive measures of academic 
achievement, and if age and gender are related to emotional intelligence test scores.
The MSCEIT, V.2 like the earlier MEIS instrument tests four components 
of emotional intelligence: 1) the ability to perceive emotions; 2) the ability to access, 
generate and use emotions to assist thought; 3) the ability to understand emotions and 
emotional knowledge; and 4) the ability to self-regulate emotions in relation to self and 
the emotions of others, so as to promote emotional and intellectual growth. To do 
this, the MSCEIT, V.2 presents eight tasks: the Faces Task, the Facilitation Task, the 
Changes Task, the Emotion Management Task, the Pictures Task, the Sensations Task, 
the Blends Task, and the Social Management Task. Chapter 4 provides more detail on 
each task. The MSCEIT, V.2 tests 8 tasks in four branches of emotional intelligence 
ability, and provides 3 overall index scores of emotional intelligence, for a total of 15 
scores for each test participant.
Description of the Achievement Data
The achievement data for each of the 61 test participants were collected 
and blind-coded for research use by this study:
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1) SAT/ACT scores; 2) high-school class rank; 3) current-semester GPA 
(at the time of MSCEIT, V.2 testing).
Ihg-Research-Ques.tiong
This study's research questions were:
1) Is there a relation between MSCEIT, V.2 measures of emotional 
intelligence and traditional measures of academic achievement?
2) Do MSCEIT, V.2 mean scores differ by age and gender of the test- 
taker, and if so, is the difference statistically significant, or by chance?
The Research Hypothesis
The null hypothesis is that there is a zero correlation between measures of 
academic achievement and measures of emotional intelligence.
The second null hypothesis is that MSCEIT, V.2 mean scores do not differ 
by age and gender.
The null hypothesis for determining correlations between measures of 
emotional intelligence and measures of academic achievement, and determining 
correlations between measures of emotional intelligence and test-taker age was:
Ho: r = 0
and its alternate hypothesis was:
Ha: r # 0
The null hypothesis for determining mean score differences by age and gender was:
Ho: (i =
and its alternate hypothesis was:
H a : ^  *  ***
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S e le c t io n  o f  th e .S a m p le
Undergraduates at a nationally top-ranked public university in the 
southeastern United States were identified as the target population. From this 
population, 61 undergraduates were selected in a convenience sampling for:
1) a group of high achievers, and 2) a comparison group of normal achievers.
Undergraduates in the high achiever group were members of Phi Beta 
Kappa or designated Monroe Scholars. Undergraduates in the comparison group were 
not members of Phi Beta Kappa nor designated Monroe Scholars.
To be designated a Monroe Scholar, for undergraduates on the campus 
which participated in this study, an entering freshman is academically identifed as an 
exceptionally high achiever, by a combination of high-school academic indicators 
including GPA, class rank, dual enrollment in a college course while in high school 
(Office of Admissions, 2002). To remain a Monroe Scholar as a college sophomore, 
junior, and senior, the student's Grade Point Average (GPA) must remain academically 
in the top 10% of her/her current undergraduate class. Entering Monroe Scholars live 
together in the same dormitory and receive other incentives to continue being a high 
achiever. Twenty Monroe Scholars were test participants in this study. Fourteen Phi 
Beta Kappa members, who were current inductees of Phi Beta Kappa for that academic 
year, participated in this study. Both the normal achiever group and the high achiever 
group were administered the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test, V.2 
(MSCEIT, V.2) on-line.
M S C E jT ,  V :2  D a ta  C o lle c t io n
The MSCEIT V.2 was offered to all test participants on-line, accessed by 
Microsoft WINDOWS Internet Explorer. Each test participant was asked to read and 
sign an Informed Consent Agreement before being given the MHS-assigned user-codes 
that accessed the MSCEIT V.2 on-line. All tests were administered and scored on-line,
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and the results emailed in an Excel spreadsheet to participating researchers, by Multi- 
Health Systems, Inc. (MHS, Inc.) of Toronto, Canada, in association with Professors 
Mayer and Salovey and their collaborator, Dr. David Caruso. At the time of the testing 
by this study, MHS, Inc. was compiling a normative database of MSCEIT, V.2 scores for 
future research use (see Appendix C) (MHS, Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b).
Obtaining: Research Use of the MSCEIT, V.2 and Obtaining Achievement Data
The methodology for data-gathering began with (a) obtaining permission 
for on-line research use of the MSCEIT, V.2 (the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso-Emotional 
Intelligence Test, Version 2) which was done by telephoning and emailing Professors 
Salovey and Mayer at their respective universities; (b) obtaining blind-coded measures 
of undergraduate achievement data for those students who were tested by the on-line 
MSCEIT, V.2, which was done through the Department of Institutional Research at the 
college being used for the MSCEIT, V.2 testing; and (c) obtaining access to a purposive 
sampling of undergraduate high achievers who were members of Phi Beta Kappa 
and/or designated Monroe Scholars. Permission was obtained for testing 
undergraduates in a required Introductory Geology class, mostly freshmen and 
sophomores, who were not members of Phi Beta Kappa nor designated Monroe 
Scholars.
Obtaining Use of Human Subjects Approval
Please see Appendix D for: 1) Proposal for Use of Human Subjects for 
testing with the MSCEIT, V.2, 2) Addendum Proposal, for a Protocol for conducting a 
focus group, and 3) Informed Consent Agreements for the MSCEIT, V.2 testing and for 
participation in the focus group, all submitted to the School of Education-Human 
Subjects Review Committee (the SOE-HSRC) for approval.
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Approval from the SOE-HSRC was obtained in April and October 2001 to 
conduct the MSCEIT, V.2 testing, and in January 2002 to conduct a focus group of 
purposively selected MSCEIT, V.2 participants, selected for high scores and gender.
Data Analysis
This study's research design used the correlation method to quantitatively 
analyze relationships between the MSCEIT, V.2 scores and test-takers' academic 
achievement data, the MSCEIT, V.2 scores in relation to test-taker age. The t-tests were 
also used, to analyze mean score differences by age and gender. Qualitative analysis of 
a focus group further probed for themes in student explanations of relationships 
indicated by the findings of the quantitative analysis. The following data analysis was 
used.
Descriptive Statistics
Analysis of the data began with descriptive statistics of the MSCEIT, V.2 
scores. Scatterplots and histograms of the MSCEIT, V.2 task, branch and overall index 
scores were done (see Figures 1,2 and 3 and Appendix E) to determine mean scores 
variance in relation to the achievement data.
One anticipated problem was the limited range of the achievement data, 
since all MSCEIT, V.2 participants at this college were high achievers because they had 
been admitted to an academically competitive, nationally top-ranked public university 
with high admission standards. Descriptive statistics helped determine the range of the 
academic achievement data, and scatterplots were especially helpful for determining the 
cluster of MSCEIT, V.2 scores in relation to academic achievement indicators of the 
sample. Histograms provided a quick look at the MSCEIT, V.2 scores and the 
achievement data of the sample.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
93
The Pearson r
Using the MSCEIT, V.2 mean scores on each branch and the overall index 
of emotional intelligence score, for the sample, the Pearson r determined correlations 
between:
1. measures of GPA
2. measures of SAT/  ACT
3. measures of high-school class rank
t-tests by Age and Gender
t-tests were used to determine how MSCEIT, V.2 mean scores related to 
student characteristics of age and gender, specifically:
1) do MSCEIT, V.2 mean scores differ by age of the test participant?
2) do MSCEIT, V.2 mean scores of males differ from MSCEIT, V.2 mean 
scores of females?
Qualitative Analysis: The Focus Group
In Handbook of Intelligence published by Cambridge University, the 
originators of the research concept of emotional intelligence suggested that future 
researchers explore the question, "What is an effective emotional life?" because little 
qualitative research has been done to research the human reality of the subject of 
emotional intelligence (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000a, p. 416).
Therefore, to complete this study, a focus group was conducted in order 
to explore the reality behind the MSCEIT, V.2 scores, in an unstructured format. To 
keep the discussion in focus on this research study, the open-ended discussion question 
was asked, "What is an effective emotional life for academic achievement?"
In addition, the focus group participants, who were all tested by the 
MSCEIT, V.2, were asked ad hoc sub-questions such as, "Name three emotions that best
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assist learning" and "What emotions do you do feel, and what do you do to manage 
your emotions, before you begin studying?"
The focus group participants were purposively selected, based on 
MSCEIT, V.2 scores and gender. The six highest-scoring undergraduates on the overall 
MSCEITOX index of emotional intelligence ability were invited by email to participate in 
a focus group. Of the six highest scorers, all were female; three of the six agreed to 
participate in a focus group discussion.
Three participants in the focus group scored in the enhanced-ability range 
of emotional intelligence ability, which is a score above 115—i.e., 15 points or more 
above the MSCEIT, V.2 standardized mean score of 100. One Phi Beta Kappa was 
randomly invited and participated in the focus group. Two males with good (100 to 
115) MSCEIT, V.2 scores and some enhanced (over 115) MSCEIT, V.2 scores were 
invited and participated in the focus group. A total of six undergraduates who had 
been tested by the MSCEIT, V.2 participated in the focus group: 4 females and 2 males.
The purpose of a qualitative analysis of the focus group outcomes was to 
collect and identify the MSCEIT, V.2 test participants' most frequently used words, 
concepts, attitudes, themes and ideas in expressing express what they think and feel 
about emotional intelligence and its relation to academic achievement in their 
experience as college undergraduates.
Analysing the focus group outcomes was intended to help determine 
what Professors Mayer and Salovey have called "the reality behind the concept of 
emotional intelligence" (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000a, p. 416).
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Results
The Research Questions
The MSCEIT, V.2 test scores of 61 test participants and a focus group 
discussion were analyzed to answer this study's research questions:
1) Is there a relation between measures of emotional intelligence and 
measures of academic achievement?
2) Do the mean scores differ by age and gender and, if so, is the 
difference statistically significant, or by chance?
Characteristics of the Sample
The data analyzed in this study were derived by testing a convenience 
sampling of high achieving college undergraduates (N = 61) at a nationally top-ranked 
public university in the southeastern United States with high admission standards. 
Admission is competitive, with an average 8,(XX) applications each year for 1,332 places 
in the entering freshman class (Institutional Research, 2002). For the academic year 
2002, a total of 8,129 completed applications for admission were received, plus an 
additional 650 incomplete applications, for a grand total of 8,770 applicants for 
admission to the freshman class of 2000. Of these, 1,369 were admitted. In each year's 
freshman class, approximately 200 are high school valedictorians. Academically for the 
year 2000,79% of the entering freshman class were in the top-10% of their graduating 
high-school class.
For 58 of the 61 undergraduates who participated in this study, their mean 
combined SAT score (the SATOT) was 1380, comprised by a mean SAT Math score of 
706, and a mean SAT Verbal score of 673.
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Of the 61 test participants, 3 took the ACT instead of the SAT, and 10 took 
both the SAT and the ACT. The mean ACT English score for these 13 test participants 
was 29.5, with a mean score of 29.3 on ACT Math, 29.0 on ACT Science, 29.8 on ACT 
Composition. Of the 61 test participants in this study, 14 were members of Phi Beta 
Kappa; 20 were Monroe Scholars; 27 were neither members of Phi Beta Kappa nor 
designated Monroe Scholars.
The criteria for being designated a Monroe Scholar at this college is based 
solely on high school academic-performance indicators, including high-school class 
rank, grades, Advanced Placement classes, dual enrollment in a college course while in 
high school, the complexity of the curriculum being studied in high school, and 
participation in the international baccalaureate degree program. Ten percent 
of each entering freshman class are designated Monroe Scholars. These high achieving 
freshmen are encouraged to continue being high achievers by being offered residence 
in a special dorm and the opportunity to win a grant for summer research following the 
freshman year. Note that the Monroe Scholar designation is an especially high 
achievement because a large percent (79% in the academic year 2000) of each incoming 
class are in the academic top-10% of their high school graduating class (Office of 
Admissions, 2002).
The average high-school senior-class size for 47 of the test participants in 
this study was 229. The other 14 test participants in this study came from high schools 
that did not academically rank its seniors. High-school class size ranged from a low of 
85 students to a high of 545. Class rank percentile was very high for the majority of 
the test participants, with the mean rank of 5.9 (where the 1 percentile was the highest- 
ranked student in this study, and the 30 percentile was the lowest-ranked).
More females (N = 44) than males (N = 17) took the test. The mean age 
of test participants was 19.9 years of age, with two outliers at age 17 (N = 1) and age 26 
(N = l).
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The mean current-semester GPA for the 61 test participants at the time the 
test was taken, was 3.42. Twenty-four of the 61 test participants had a current-semester 
grade point average (GPA) of 3.6 or above (2 of these test participants had a current- 
semester GPA of 4.0). Thirty of the 61 test participants had a current-semester GPA of 
3.5 to 3.0. Seven of the 61 test participants had a current-semester GPA of 2.9 or below.
A focus group of six of the test participants was composed of one Monroe 
Scholar, one member of Phi Beta Kappa, and four students who were neither Phi Beta 
Kappa members nor designated Monroe Scholars. Their ages ranged from 18 to 21. 
Two focus group participants were male and four were female.
The MSCEIT. V.2 Test Instrument: Scale Item Hierarchy and Test Constructs
The scale item tasks on the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso-Emotional-Intelligence 
Test, Version 2 (the MSCEIT, V.2) are presented in a hierarchy of ascending complexity. 
Each task is designed to test a theoretical set of interrelated emotional intelligence 
abilities. The task constructs for testing emotional intelligence ascend from simple to 
complex, in the sequential tasks that define each ability, as described below (MHS,
Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b):
Branch IX: Perceiving Emotions 
Branch 2X: Using Emotions 
Branch 3X: Understanding Emotions 
Branch 4X: Managing Emotions
These four MSCEIT, V.2 test constructs are presented to the test-taker in eight tasks of 
ascending complexity, as described below.
Following is the order in which the eight tasks are presented to the test- 
taker. The MSCEIT, V.2 begins with a simple task.
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Perceiving Emotions
Tested by Task A: The Faces Task
Task A measures the test-taker's ability to identify which emotion a 
person is feeling, for example, in a photograph of a person's face (i.e., is that person 
angry, frustrated, or happy?). (The on-line MSCEIT, V.2 opens with a photograph of a 
scowling man.)
Using Emotions
Tested by Task B: The Facilitation Task
Task B is more complex than Task A. Task B was designed as 
"transitional" (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b) to the more complex Task C. Task 
B asks the test-taker to recall personal knowledge of how moods can interact with 
thinking and assist in certain kinds of problem-solving. Task B is a recall-test of how a 
mood might support or impair thinking and reasoning in given situations.
Understanding Emotions
Tested by Task C: The Changes Task
This task measures the test-taker's ability to understand how 
emotions can change in relation to a situation or event. For example, frustration may 
change to sadness, then to fear, then to anger. This task measures an ability to 
understand the experience of multiple emotions as an emotion changes over time.
M a n a g in g  E m o tio n s
Tested by Task P: The Emotion Management Task
This task measures the test-taker's ability to choose among 
alternative courses of action, in order to achieve a certain result in relation to the 
emotions of self and others. The test-taker is asked to rate the effectiveness of optional
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courses of action that lead to making a decision in a fictional test-situation where a 
person has to self-regulate their own emotions in relation to others.
After completion of the above tasks (A through D), the following tasks 
are presented to the test-taker in an order of ascending complexity, from simple to 
most complex. Task E is a simple task.
Perceiving Emotions
Tested by Task E: The Pictures Task
This task asks the test-taker to identify which emotions are being 
expressed in typical pictures of the environment. For example, the test-taker is asked: 
What emotion is being expressed in a close-up photograph of a landscape of rocks?
Using.Emotions
Tested by Task F: The Sensations Task
This task asks the test-taker to compare different emotions to different 
sensations such as light, color and temperature. In order to do this successfully (for a 
high score), the test-taker will have to, theoretically, generate a certain mood in order 
to use the mood to reason about that mood and "let the feeling direct thinking." For 
example, the test-taker may be asked how the emotion of anger compares to the color 
yellow. The test-taker is asked to compare that mood's characteristics to the sensations 
evoked by the color. This task is simple but "transitional" (Mayer, Salovey and 
Caruso, 2000b), leading into the more complex exercise in Task G.
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Understanding Emotions
Tested by Task G: The Blends Task
This task is a complex measure of the the test-taker's ability to 
connect "emotional chains" or "families of related emotions" (Mayer, Salovey and 
Caruso, 2000b) to situations which may cause those feelings, such as how situations of 
personal loss can cause sadness that might transition to other related emotions. For 
example, the funeral of a close friend's father may evoke personal feelings of sadness 
for the friend's loss but also a feeling of relief that one's own father is alive; then a 
feeling of guilt for feeling relief may follow.
Managing Emotions
Tested by Task H: Social Management Task
This task is the most complex of the eight tasks because it is testing the 
ability to manage emotions in relationships. This task measures the test-taker's ability 
to evaluate the effectivenss of optional courses of action, and to decide on one course of 
action that, in the judgment of the test-taker, would achieve a desired social outcome 
involving the emotions of other people.
With this progressive hierarchy of tasks in mind, note that for scoring the 
MSCEIT, V.2 each task is shuffled into one of the four branches, as shown below:
Branch IX Branch 2X Branch 3X Branch 4X
Task A B C D
Task E F G H
Each branch tests a construct of 'emotional intelligence' that is described 
for each branch below.
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Perceiving Emotions in Branch IX tests the ability to accurately identify 
feelings in self and others. Recall that the two tasks in Branch IX use pictures and ask 
the test-taker which emotion is being expressed. The test construct of Branch IX is 
Emotional Perception/ Previous research indicates that accurate perception of one's 
own emotions is related to the ability to accurately perceive emotional expressions in 
others (Zuckerman, Lipets, Koivumaki and Rosenthal, 1975 and Zuckerman, Hall, 
DeFrank and Rosenthal, 1977 in MHS, Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, 
pp. 47-48).
Using Emotions in Branch 2X tests the ability to "take feelings into 
account" and use personal feelings to think more accurately about a given situation or 
event (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000, p. 48). The test construct of Branch 2X is 
'Emotional Facilitation of Thought' (MHS, Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, 
p. 48). The tasks in Branch 2X test recall of how emotional moods can influence 
cognition. Previous research indicates that emotions can change how people think and 
what they think about (Forgas, 1995 and Mayer, Gaschke, Braverman and Evans, 1992 
and Salovey and Bimbaum, 1989 and Singer and Salovey, 1998 in (MHS, Inc./Mayer, 
Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 48). For example, positive, self-assertive thoughts are 
more likely to occur when a person is happy; self-destructive thoughts are more likely 
to occur when a person is saddened or depressed. Emotions can prioritize cognitive 
attention to pay more attention to what is emotionally important to the thinker 
(Easterbrook, 1959 and Mandler, 1975 and Simon, 1982 in MHS, Inc./Mayer, Salovey 
and Caruso, 2000b, p. 48).
Understanding Emotions in Branch 3X tests the ability to recognize how 
emotions can change and combine over time, in relationships with other people, in 
thinking about other people, and in thinking about one's self. Understanding 
Emotions is the ability to decipher the "rich and complexly interrelated symbol set" of 
emotions (MHS, Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 49). The test construct of
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Branch 3X is 'Emotional Reasoning' (MHS. Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, 
p. 48). Understanding how to decipher "the language of emotions" is one of the two 
MSCEIT, V.2 constructs that "allow emotions to participate in thinking" (MHS, Inc. 
/Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 49). The second component in the test construct 
of 'emotional reasoning' is tested in Branch 4X as the ability to Manage Emotions in self 
and others.
Managing Emotions in Branch 4X is a test of the ability to "neither 
minimize nor eliminate emotions completely" but, before acting out the emotion, to sit 
down and fully feel the emotion rather than repress it. After experiencing the feelings 
caused by the emotion, the experience can be used to make decisions about people and 
situations in relation to oneself. The test construct of Branch 4X is the second 
component of 'Emotional Reasoning' (MHS, Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, 
p. 48). Branch 4X is the most complex level of the test hierarchy. Managing Emotions 
uses the experience of the emotion to make decisions that self-regulate the behaviors of 
self in relation to the emotions of others.
The MSCEITOX score on the MSCEIT, V.2 is an overall comparative index 
of each test-taker's emotional intelligence ability, based on their test performance on all 
eight tasks. "As with any global score, the MSCEIT Total score is a handy summary of 
a person's performance on this test...The Total score compares an individual's 
performance on the MSCEIT (V.2) to those in (the) normative sample" (MHS,
Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 47).
Scores on the four branches described above, and the total MSCEITOX 
score, were analyzed by this study in relation to indicators of academic achievement, 
and by age and gender of the test-takers. Table 1 shows the results: that the highest 
scores by the sample are in the higher levels of the task hierarchy: in Task C and Task 
G, Branch 3X and in Task D and Task H, Branch 4X.
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Table 1. MSCEIT, V.2 Mean Scores, Standard Deviation,
and Range of Scores on MSCEITOX, Branches, and Tasks
Mean Score Standard Deviation Range of Scores
Highest Lowest
Task A 101.1 13.90 119.4 54.9
Task B 982 15.22 121.3 55.6
TaskC 108.9 10.50 122.9 802
Task D 104.6 11.20 120.8 75.4
Task E 97.9 15.61 120.0 48 3
Task F 99.6 11.31 120.6 70.9
TaskG 110.5 9.99 121.4 79.8
Task H 103.9 11.15 120.8 54.6
Branch IX 995 15.34 121.4 41.7
Branch 2X 98.6 12.96 120.7 67.0
Branch 3X 111.1 958 124.3 823
Branch 4X 104.7 10.93 120-4 65.4
MSCEITOX 103.7 11.76 123.6 69.8
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Table 2. Correlation of MSCEIT, V 2 Task and Branch Mean Scores 
with Test-Takers' GPA, Class Rank and SATOT
Pearson r Correlations 
GEA CLASS-RANK SATOT AGE
MSCEITOX
Pearson r .244 .045 -.005 -.084
Sig. (2-tailed) .058 .738 .973 .520
Branch 4X
Pearson r .314* .017 .065 -.052
Sig. (2-tailed) .014 .897 .630 .689
Branch 3X
Pearson r 
Sig. (2-tailed)
.432**
.001
-.269*
.041
.175
.190
-.056
.668
Branch 2X
Pearson r .109 .159 .027 -.032
Sig. (2-tailed) .403 .233 .840 .809
Branch IX
Pearson r -.012 .111 -.157 -.087
Sig. (2-tailed) .927 .407 .238 .507
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Figure 1. GPA and MSCEIT, V.2 Scores on Understanding Emotions in Branch 3X
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Figure 2. GPA and MSCEIT, V.2 Scores on Managing Emotions in Branch 4X
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Figure 3. High School Class Rank and MSCEIT, V.2 Scores on Understanding 
Emotions in Branch 3X
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Analysis of the Data 
Emotional Intelligence and Academic Achievement
As shown in Table 2, the MSCEIT, V.2 task, branch and overall index 
mean scores were correlated with test-takers' GPAs, class rank and SATOT scores to 
obtain a Pearson r.
The significant results of this study show that the 61 test participants' 
GPAs at the time they took the on-line MSCEIT, V.2 correlate with their emotional 
intelligence test scores on the higher level tasks of Understanding Emotions and 
Managing Emotions. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the GPA-Branch 3X and Figure 
2 shows the GPA-Branch 4X correlation.
GPAs correlated significantly with Understanding Emotions in Branch 3X 
at a Pearson r of .432, significant at p< 0.01 (2-tailed). GPAs correlated significantly 
with Managing Emotions in Branch 4X at a Pearson r of .314, significant at p< 0.05 
(2-tailed). In the lower level tasks of the MSCEIT, V.2 in Branch IX and Branch 2X, 
there was no significant correlation found between GPA and Perceiving Emotions in 
Branch IX, and no significant correlation found between GPA and Using Emotions in 
Branch 2X.
The correlation found between GPA and the overall index of emotional 
intelligence ability, the MSCEITOX score, was nearly significant at a Pearson r of .244, 
significant at .058 (at p<.05) (2-tailed). Since this is an exploratory study using a small 
sample, this result suggests a likely overall relation between the MSCEITOX ability 
index score and GPA, which a larger sample size may have shown.
As Figure 3 shows, a significant negative correlation was found between 
the high-school class rank of test participants and their MSCEIT, V.2 scores on 
Understanding Emotions in Branch 3X. A Pearson r of -.269 was found between the 
high school class-rank of test participants and their Branch 3X scores, significant at p<.05 
(2-tailed). Class-rank is inversely related to Understanding Emotions in Branch 3X
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because the highest class-rank is represented by percentile, where the highest possible 
class rank is also the lowest possible percentile rank. Hence a negative correlation 
indicates that a high class rank (lowest percentile) is inversely related to high MSCEIT, 
V.2 scores.
There was no significant correlation found between high school class-rank 
and test scores on Perceiving Emotions in Branch IX, on Using Emotions in Branch 2X., 
nor on Managing Emotions in Branch 4X. There was no significant correlation found 
between high school class-rank and test scores on the overall MSCEITOX index of 
emotional intelligence ability.
There were no significant correlations found between SATOT scores and 
the five measures of emotional intelligence from the MSCEIT, V.2 on Pereciving 
Emotions in Branch IX, on Using Emotions in Branch 2X, on Understanding Emotions 
in Branch 3X, nor on Managing Emotions in Branch 4X. There was no significant 
correlation found between high school class-rank and test scores on the overall 
MSCEITOX index of emotional intelligence ability.
Emotional Intelligence and Student Characteristics: Age and Gender
There was no significant relation found between age of test participants 
and any of the four Branches or overall MSCEITOX index of emotional intelligence 
ability, using both t-tests and the Pearson r.
A mean difference of -6.30 between male versus female scores on 
Understanding Emotions was found in the t-test results: males scored a mean of 106.56 
on Understanding Emotions with a standard deviation of 8.4; females scored a mean of 
112.87 on Understanding Emotions with a standard deviation of 9.4; the statistical 
significance of the difference was .017 at p<.05.
A mean difference of -6.41 between male versus female scores on 
Managing Emotions was found in the t-test results:
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Table 3. MSCEIT, V.2 Mean Score Differences By Age and Gender
Male Female Age 17-19 Age 20-26
N=17 N=44 N=31 N=30
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
E.I. MEAN SCORE E.I. MEAN SCORE
MSCEITOX 100.06 12.3 105.05 11.3 104.26 11.8 103.04 11.8
Mean Difference -4.98 1.21
Significance Sig. .160 Sig. .691
Branch IX 98.46 ;15.9 99.85 15.2 101.19 16.2 97.68 143
Mean Difference -1.38 3.50
Significance Sig, .762 Sig . .376
Branch 2X 97.99 13.9 98.82 12.7 99.63 12.8 9751 13.1
Mean Difference -.83 2.11
Significance Sig. .832 Sig. 528
Branch 3X 106.56 8.4 112.87 9.4 109.74 10.1 11252 8.9
Mean Difference -6.30 -2.77
Significance Sig. .017* Sig. .261
Branch 4X 100.09 10.5 106.50 10.6 105.00 11.4 104.42 10.5
Mean Difference -6.41 5786
Significance Sig. .042* Sig. .838
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
’* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Males scored a mean of 100.09 on Managing Emotions with a standard 
deviation of 10.5; females scored a mean of 106.50 on Managing Emotions with a 
standard deviation of 10.6; the statistical significance of the difference was .039 at p<.05.
There was no statistically significant mean score difference by gender 
found in Perceiving Emotions in Branch IX, in Using Emotions in Branch 2X, nor on the 
overall MSCEITOX index of emotional intellignce ability.
As discussed in Chapter 3, a focus group concluded this study. The 
purpose of including a focus group discussion in this study was to gather the 
participants' most frequently used words, concepts, attitudes, themes and ideas which 
they might use to express what they think and feel about emotional intelligence and its 
relation to academic achievement, in their own experience as college undergraduates. 
The six focus group participants were asked sub-questions within an unstructured, 
open-ended discussion format. The overall question being probed was suggested in a 
journal article (Mayer and Salovey, 1997): What is an effective emotional life, for 
academic ahdevement?
The focus group discussion was probing for what the designers of the 
MSCEIT, V.2 call "the reality behind the concept of emotional intelligence" (Mayer, 
Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 416).
Focus Group Results 
Frequently Occurring Words. Ideas. Themes
In answer to the discussion question, "What three emotions do you feel 
while you are writing a big paper or studying for a big exam?" the most frequently 
occurring responses were:
excited, ready to leant, ready to go, eagerness, anticipation, 
pleased, interested, enjoy, relieved, want to share ideas with 
others, focus, balanced, confidence, pride
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Negative emotions experienced during learning were not mentioned by 
the focus group participants. However, some responses did specify negative emotions 
and unproductive emotion states experienced before beginning to study and before 
beginning to write a paper, including:
anxious, disappointed by previous grade, dread, pain, boredom 
but these emotions were said to occur because the subject to be studied was not of 
interest (but was, for example, a required course outside the student's area of interest 
or expertise).
The most frequently occurring words and concepts, describing feelings 
experienced during the learning experience, were positive, as discussed by the six focus 
group participants, and when analyzed, the following words began to form evolving 
patterns:
1. excitement
eagerness
1. excited, eager, ready (anticipation)
2. excited
interested
2. pleased, interested (paying attention)
3. relief, pride 
confidence
3. relief (self-satisfaction)
These words and concepts, expressed above, by six academic high achievers in this 
study's focus group, are described further by statements from the participants below. 
The above words and concepts suggest an effective set of emotions for academic 
achievement, namely, a student who feels:
eager to begin 
excited, interested 
confident
In their own words, the following comments by the six focus group 
participants suggest why these feelings might be "an effective emotional life" (Mayer 
and Salovey, 1990) for academic high achievement.
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Eagerness To Begin
Comments by the focus group suggest that an undergraduate who is 
eager to begin is ready to begin. Getting emotionally ready to pay attention and learn 
has been described as the first educational objective in the affective domain (Krathwohl, 
Bloom and Masia, 1964). Being emotionally ready to begin learning directs 'controlled 
attention' to occur in the cognitive domain (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964) (see 
Step 1 of Bloom's Taxonomy, Appendix B).
This study's focus group of academic high achievers, however, described 
strategies to sidestep emotions, or to provoke the affective domain in negative ways to 
begin learning.
Procrastination was a strategy used by some participants in this focus 
group. An example of procrastination was described by a Phi Beta Kappa focus group 
participant: "If my deadline is too far in advance, I am just not motivated, and I almost 
need a little bit of frustration and pressure to get stuff done....it's easier, I think for me 
to get stuff done in a high pressure, almost stressful stituation."
This participant said she can complete a four-hour learning task in less 
than half that time when the deadline is fast approaching—but not too fast. She is 
careful to leave herself just the right amount of time to do a good job and complete the 
task: "I don't really get super stressed-out, and I think the deadline thing is part of 
that, it's that I create a certain level of stress for myself, and then I am prepared to deal 
with that amount of stress. I mean, only if some other emergency comes up and now I 
have less time than I alotted for myself, or something like than, then I would get 
stressed-out but for the most part, I am like able to manage the amount of stress that 
works best for me, and that's usually all I ever can stand..."
The Monroe Scholar in the focus group described a strategy of 
daydreaming, but said she never daydreams about her pending academic assignments. 
Like the Phi Beta Kappa member of the focus group, the Monroe Scholar described a
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heightened state of attention when she finally stops daydreaming and begins the 
learning task, induced by a fast-approaching deadline, so that optimal learning is done 
in a compressed timeframe: "I find I do my best between 11 and 12 at night, maybe 
because there's a sense of 'You can finish it up now'—maybe because I'm going to go to 
bed soon anyway, but that's when I'll just focus and the hour will fly by! and I won't be 
thinking of anything else, and I'll look up and it will be 12 o'clock and I'll say wow, I got 
so much studying done! I can spend all day staring at one page in a book (and getting 
nowhere) but at 11 o'clock, I'm just flipping the pages and I get it memorized like that!"
The Phi Beta Kappa participant added, "I've learned that you can't be a 
procrastinator and a perfectionist all in one! And I've definitely encountered people 
who put things off either for fear, you know, or in dread, or because simply they don't 
have time or they're lazy, or because they think they work better under pressure, but 
when it comes down to it, they have difficulty getting through any part of what they're 
doing because they keep re-doing it, because they're a perfectionist and they're 
worried, and they've left it to the last minute....and now it has to be really good, and so 
they spend too much time on it and it gets overwhelming....(and so they don't finish). 
(They) leave things to the last minute and then tear them up and start over at the 
eleventh hour!" When asked, "And are they high achievers?" she replied, "Well...they 
get decent grades but not nearly up to what their potential would be."
A 21-year-old male focus group participant said he delays beginning the 
learning task by first getting everything clean and orderly in his study area (including 
his personal hygiene). He cleans his room, then takes a shower and puts on clean 
clothes before he feels ready to begin the academic assignment. Like the Phi Beta 
Kappa and the Monroe Scholar participants in the focus group, he also self-reported an 
optimal emotion state when learning finally begins: "I feel a heightened sense of what 
I'm trying to say! I feel incresed attentiveness..."
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One 18-year-old female participant who had the highest MSCEITOX 
overall index score of the sample, said, "I push my emotions aside" (and just dives in to 
her learning task) because "Learning for me is emotion-less." She added that, for her, 
performing the learning task can reverse a bad mood. She begins a learning task 
without doing anything to mediate a bad or negative mood. When learning "is going 
well" she self-reports that her bad mood changes "and I end up in a great mood later 
on!"
Two of the female freshman-class participants in the focus group who 
were very high scorers on the MSCEITOX overall index of emotional intelligence, and 
the Monroe Scholar, all said they begin studying even if in a negative mood, and do 
nothing to mediate a bad mood before beginning to study or write a paper. The 
Monroe Scholar said that if she is in a depressed mood, she writes a depressing paper.
A male focus group participant said, "If I'm in an angry mood, I'd write a sarcastic 
paper. " However, unlike the female focus group participants, the two male 
participants say they try to mediate their emotions before beginning to study or write a 
big paper. One male participant said, "I try to stay balanced, but when I have to start 
studying or writing a paper, I can't focus. So I work out. I go jogging, or go to the 
gym. My emotions transcend everything! They are reflected in everything I do. But 
I like to have a dosing-in deadline. I'm best at an in-dass exerdse that has a set time 
limit."
The senior-dass male partidpant said that he delays starting the learning 
task. "I have a big exam this Thursday, but I haven't done a thing! I don't feel anxious 
until time starts running out. Proscrastination! Point of no return! I (finally) get into 
intellectual overdrive. Before I study, I dean my room because to think dearly I have 
to be away from dutter....I really don't know how to make an emotional relation to my 
studying. It seems to be an emotion-less adventure for me. But before I begin 
studying, I feel antidpation—of the pain it's going to be! Dread!"
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When asked if he feels pain and dread about studying a subject he loves, 
such as his major, he replied, "If it's a subject I'm interested in, I feel excited. I want to 
put my best foot forward!"
Excited By The Subject
"Excited" was the most frequently used word by focus group participants 
when asked, "What are three emotions you feel when learning a subject that you really 
like?"
The highest-scoring MSCEIT, V.2 participant of the sample said, "It 
depends on the assignment actually. But if it's in a subject that I enjoy....like I'm taking 
another geology class, Environmental Geology...we had a problem set that wasn't due 
like until the end of the week, but I was really excited about starting it, so I started it 
early! It's just something I'm really interested in, and it's applicable to my career, so....I 
was eager to get into it and learn stuff..."
The Phi Beta Kappa participant said that, even for her major which was 
literature, when she knew it was time to stop procrastinating and get started, she would 
try to generate some kind of excitement about learning the subject.
"I'd try to approach things with a certain amount of eagemess...a kind of 
excitement or anticipation...I'd try to put myself in a frame of mind where I was happy 
to start reading..."
A college teacher can also generate a feeling of excitement in students. A 
teacher who displays intense interest in and love of the subject being taught, and who 
tries to evoke positive emotions in students in relation to the subject, such as good 
humor and laughter, before or during the learning experience in the classroom, can 
help students become eager to go to class and ready to begin learning 
—as three focus group participants explained about their Geology teacher (who later 
that semester won a prestigious campus award as teacher of the year).
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"I was actually like, looking forward to going to that class every day! 
(laughing)...I was exdted...and, like, ready to learn."
"He was interested in what he was teaching. He bounced around a 
lot...and any time he sensed he was losing us, he'd stand on his head or something! I 
mean, you know, he'd snatch up the ruler...and one time he whipped out a rock and a 
hammer and he goes, wham! It was pretty funny!"
The Geology class of 160 undergraduates was conducted in a large 
stadium-style lecture hall that was more a shadowy amphitheatre than a classroom.
"He threw out frisbees and grapefruit on the first day of class! It got our 
attention! It was variation from the dull routine. This professor always showed us the 
excitement he felt about the subject of Geology. He was jazzed. He made it fun!"
Another focus group participant who was a student in the Geology class 
said, "I didn't go to that class that much! I just have no interest in Geology. And I also 
don't wake up in the momings...I fell asleep a couple of days in class actually ...and then 
he'd call on you! He knew everybody's name in class, and he'd say, 'Hey, so-and-so 
back there! Wake up!' I think he's a good person and a good teacher, it was just the 
subject (that I didn't like)..."
The senior-class male participant in the focus group who had earlier said 
that learning for him is emotion-less, subsequently said, "It's better to be emotionally 
attached to the subject you're studying. For example, in my Latin American History 
class, I've very interested and emotional about the subject because I feel pity for the 
situation there and their poverty and want to go work there in the Peace Corps."
The highest-scoring test participant of the sample on the MSCEITOX said, 
"I feel happiness when I'm learning things which are interesting to me, not just, 'Oh, I 
have to take this class, ugh...' "
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When asked if that feeling of interest would be intellectually interesting or 
emotionally interesting, the participant replied, "Well, probably like both. If it's 
something I have a passion about, like say for instance, like the environment for me, 
learning about it... I don't know, I'm just very passionate about it, really interested in it 
and ready to go..."
The freshman male participant said, "It makes a big difference to get 
excited about the subject. If I'm in a bad mood, the paper I write will reflect that mood. 
A positive or negative attitude is reflected in the work you do. Your work will reflect 
whateve emotion you feel."
All participants in the focus group agreed that negative emotions can "get 
in the way" (as one participant put it) of academic performance. However, as each 
focus group participant decribed their emotion management strategy, it was a 
surprising disconnent that the study strategies of these high achievers were not all that 
'emotionally intelligent' in that emotions were simply pushed aside and not mediated 
by self-reflection or self-understanding, and even used in negative ways 
(procrastination, daydreaming) to provoke anxious emotional readiness to begin the 
learning task. Several female focus group participants self-reported that they "use" a 
higher learning task to escape negative emotional situations or events. One focus 
group participant with enhanced emotional intelligence test scores said, "I put my 
emotions at the back of my head while I study" because "Emotions belong in 
relationships."
A female freshman participant in the focus group with enhanced-range 
MSCEIT, V.2 scores (at least 15 points above the standardized mean score of 100) said, 
"If I'm thinking about things that are going on in...my personal life, for example, then 
I'm not really thinking about studying, until I have to sit down and do it, but then 
sometimes I have a hard time focusing on it....let's say I am upset about something, 
then studying's really hard."
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
118
When asked, "So what do you do? Do you have any techniques to get 
into a more positive mood?" the focus group participant with some of the highest 
MSCEIT, V.2 scores of the sample, said, "I wish I knew some!"
When then asked, "Do you just go in with that negative feeling?" 
she replied, "I guess...I guess I do."
When next asked, "And what about those negative feelings that you said 
you started out with? Do they just...vanish?"
She replied, "They're just like in the back of my head...if I'm really focused 
on my studies, I can't think about anything else but my studies."
In response to the question, "How do you get focused?" the Monroe 
Scholar said, "That's the hardest part! I still don't know! Sometimes I can do it and 
sometimes I can't. I tend to daydream if I'm not in a great mood. Or even if I am in a 
good mood, I daydream a lot. And that gets...oh, in the way a lot."
When asked, "Why do you think you daydream a lot?" the Monroe 
Scholar said, "It helps you figure out things about yourself."
Both of the male participants in the focus group described positive 
strategies that approach the management of emotions via the physical body. The 
freshman male participant said, "Before I study, I try to do something physical. If it's 
been raining for several days, I may feel bad and down—the weather and the 
environment are important to me. And so I do something physical to clear my mind." 
As described above, the other male participant in the focuS group routinely goes 
jogging, then cleans his room, takes a shower, puts on clean clothes, and finally sits 
down and begins the learning task.
The four females in the focus group, however—including the two highest 
scorers of the sample—described strategies not to balance emotions or get in focus, but 
to sidestep, marginalize, or repress emotions before beginning the learning task. 
Although one female focus group participant said, "I can start studying something in a
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bad mood and if it goes well, I can end up in a great mood later on," a second female 
participant said, "If it goes badly then you're obviously going to get frustrated really 
quickly, and get depressed and tired and you want to go to bed and quit..."
When this participant was then asked, "So have you ever written a good 
paper when you're depressed and upset?" she replied,
"No! But a depressing paper? I've written one or two of those."
A third female participant said, "I just try to do my work even though I 
am in a bad mood. Because I kind of see, like, my school work as kind of emotion-less. 
And then my personal life as full of emotion. I see them as two separate things. Like 
when I'm  not working, then I'm like too involved with the emotions I have about, like, 
what's going on in my life...But then I try to separate myself from that when I'm doing 
my work."
This same participant was asked, "But, then, is there another set of 
emotions involved in learning than the ones involved in your personal relationships?"
She replied, "Oh yes!"
This participant was then asked, "Do you think they are different?"
She replied, "Yeah. I mean I think there's an element of stress in both, like 
aspects. But sometimes learning can be a little more positive than a relationship!"
The Monroe Scholar participant was then asked, "So, and then, you don't 
do anything to manage yours?"
She replied, "I just try not to think about anything! Then I don't get 
attached to anything! I just daydream!"
The Monroe Scholar was asked, "Oh, and so then, you daydream instead 
of doing the work...?" and she replied, "Yes. And sometimes I talk to myself. Not a 
good study strategy!"
In contrast to the females in the focus group who seemed familiar with 
words and expressions of emotions, the senior-class male participant said, "I talk about
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emotions so little. My vocabulary is limited for emotions! But as for my (academic) 
major, I feel a passion for the subject. I feel an intense desire to put my best foot 
forward! I feel a heightened sense of what I'm  trying to say! But as for emotions and 
academics, I don't see an emotional relationship with academics."
The freshman-class male participant in the focus group who never 
procrastinates said that when writing a paper, "I feel excitement, anxious; I want it to be 
over with...If I get stuck for a good first sentence, I'll go on writing the paper and come 
back later to see how I feel about it! It's a blank-paper kind of syndrome: as you write, 
it's narrowing....emotions get focused and centered, it gets clearer and clearer."
This participant was then asked, "That's getting focused, but what is it like 
to be un-focused?"
He replied, "When you're un-focused, there's so much going through 
your head. Background noise (music, other people talking) can set limits on what's in 
your mind."
The same participant was then asked, "What emotions are best for 
learning?" He replied that, "You need to be free of stress, more than feeling any one 
emotion. And relief—I feel relief when I get the first page, then first paragraph, and I 
feel, 'Now it's going to flow.' "
"What else?" this participant was asked. "Name another emotion."
"Not happiness," he said. "Well, maybe some happiness would be good, 
but not too much! What you need to feel is confidence!"
Confidence In Ability
All participants in this focus group of high achievers dted a feeling of 
"confidence" as well as pride in ability when asked for a third feeling they experience 
during optimal performance of a higher learning task. Confidence in ability was self- 
reported when optimal performance was perceived to be well underway. As one
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focus group participant put it, a feeling of confidence comes with the perception that, 
"Now it's going to flow."
The Phi Beta Kappa participant explained, "I mean like, you're happy to 
finish a section or a page or a chapter or whatever, and you feel a certain amount 
of...success and then that bolsters you on....I mean like it's important I think for me in 
the process of reading or writing something or whatever, that I feel like I've gotten past 
certain...markers that say I'm half-done or I'm three-quarters of the way done. So (I 
feel) something about "relief" and "success" that I've finished part of it, so that I can 
keep working on the rest.
"And (when I feel) a sense of completion of a part, I'm not constantly 
going back and re-reading and re-writing it. So a good frame of mind I guess for me to 
be in, is to feel...oh, I don't know the emotion word for it, but...completion...pride in 
completing it, I guess. I'm a little bit competitive so there's a certain element of that, 
when I feel, "Yes I'm doing well and probably better than some other people" 
(laughing). It reinforces what I already think about myself and justifies any slight 
arrogance I might have...(laughing).
"Actually, if I have gotten a grade lower than I usually do, the next time 
around I am more reluctant, I am not as excited about doing the work. I mean I am 
motivated in part by wanting to get a better grade, but...(if) I am disappointed in my
previous performance, I don't have as much energy to put toward the next thing I
think that I rely on this long-term confidence that I generally have in my abilities, 
reminding myself of past achievements...can restore my confidence level which enables 
me to do well...reminding myself that "I can do this, it will be fine...."
Other focus group participants also made similar connections between 
emotions evoked by interest in the subject to be learned, and two traditionally 
important undergraduate developmental objectives that are related to emotional 
intelligence:
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1) development of interpersonal skills such as being a team player and 
having empathy for others, and 2) development of positive self-concept. The Monroe 
Scholar said:
"I like French, and I'm taking two French classes this semester, and...oh, if 
it's going well and I'm learning things and realizing, and it makes sense 
and is going right, and something will dawn on you or something like that...then it's 
really exciting! I want to tell everybody! I guess that's a sort of pride. You know,
'You did it!"'
Other focus group participants, but not all, said they experience a feeling 
of relief during performance of the learning task. One participant, however, said, "I 
don't really feel relief because I'm not doing my learning for someone else. You know, 
like I would feel relieved if someone was like, forcing me to do it. So, not, I don't feel 
relieved like that. I feel more....like, confidence."
The highest-scoring test participant summed up the developmental 
relational index of emotions to self-concept: "I mean just basically I feel happy when I 
am proud of what I have done." Comments by the senior-class male participant in this 
study's focus group conclude:
"I would say that for learning, balance of emotions is a good thing, 
but....also confidence. Believing that you can do it. Based on your past success..."
Summary of Important Focus Group Findings
All six of the focus group participants in this study showed marked 
gender differences in the behaviors and attitudes they self-reported in relation to 
emotion and learning.
All focus group participants described feelings of positive self-concept, in 
relation to performance during, and after completing, the learning task. Descriptions of 
self-concept by the high achievers in this focus group not surprisingly included
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confidence, pride, competition, self-satisfaction, but also included negative behaviors of 
procrastination and daydreaming.
All participants felt that emotions are involved in higher learning in some 
way, even if only as a hindrance to be avoided.
Four of the six participants initially expressed a traditional belief that 
emotions interfere with and have no place in higher learning.
Three of the six participants—two females and one male—said that 
emotions should be pushed aside during higher learning tasks because social 
relationships are the domain of emotions; these three participants said they leave 
their emotions in the social-relationship domain while they are studying. "Learning for 
me is emotion-less." "I put my emotions at the back of my head while I study."
Yet, those participants who intially denied the presence of emotion in 
higher learning, in further comments contradicted their previous statements. All six 
participants described emotions they said they have personally experienced during 
performance of the learning task. For example, the senior-class male participant who 
said that "Learning for me is emotion-less" was later asked, "Do you ever feel any 
emotion while writing a big paper? Say for example, when you put two and two 
together, you know, when you come up with a good idea or a great insight?"
His reply: "Yes, then I feel joy or happiness."
Hence along with the practice of pushing emotions aside, denying their 
presence in learning, and /or practicing task-avoidance techniques such as 
procrastination and daydreaming, all six focus group participants described an effective 
set of emotions for academic high achievement, based on positive emotions that they 
themselves say they have experienced during the learning task. It is their personal 
strategy, for dealing with emotions before learning begins, that varies.
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This study found two significant results.
1) that higher level 'emotional reasoning' skills of Understanding 
Emotions and Managing Emotions are significantly related to academic achievement;
2) that significant gender differences in Understanding Emotions and 
Managing Emotions were found in the data analysis and in the focus group discussion.
Further discussion in the final chapter will explore the implications of 
these results for teaching and learning in college.
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"f think that here I am kind of expected to 
push my emotions aside 
and just excell"
(College undergraduate, Focus Group, 2002)
"Wherever I go in my mind,
I meet Plato coming back"
(Greek epigram in Jowett, 1946, p. 5)
What This Study Was Looking For 
This study was looking for a relation between the traditionally separated 
domains of cognition and affect and undergraduate academic achievement.
Specifically, this study was looking for indication that both domains are 
involved in the higher level thinking that is related to academic achievement.
This study began by looking for indication of affective domain 
involvement in cognitive thinking. As discussed in Chapter 4, the MSCEIT, V.2 is a test 
instrument designed to involve emotions in higher level cognitive reasoning, as well as 
in other simpler, cognitive-like tasks. The simplest tasks ask the test-taker to name and 
define emotions; the more complex tasks ask the test-taker to reason with emotions 
(Salovey, July, 2002; Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b). Reasoning with emotions is 
defined by the MSCEIT, V.2 in a higher level test construct called 'emotional reasoning' 
(Mayer, Salovey and Causo, 2000b).
'Emotional reasoning' is a carefully defined construct tested by four tasks 
in two branches of the test. The task responses can operationalize an experience of 
'emotional reasoning' if the test participant "allows emotions to participate in 
thinking"(Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 49). As described in Chapter 4, the
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'emotional reasoning' tasks on the MSCEIT, V.2 are designed to measure the test- 
taker's ability to use emotions to solve abstract reasoning problems. Solving the task 
problem requires the test-taker to use his or her ability to understand and manage 
emotions in hypothetical situations and events. It is important to understand the 
abstract complexity of these 'emotional reasoning' exercises because it was on 
'emotional reasoning' tasks that this study's special sample of high achievers had the 
highest mean scores.
The high test scores on 'emotional reasoning' tasks by the sample in this 
study were only part of what this study was looking for, namely, for indication that 
emotions as an 'intelligence' can become involved in cognitive problem-solving. This 
study was also looking for indication of whether or not the 'intelligence' of emotions 
(emotional intelligence) is related to indicators of undergraduate academic achievement.
Indicators of academic achievement permeate the objectives of higher 
education, and are familiar landmarks on the road to college admission: GPA, SAT 
scores, high-school class rank. This study used these three traditional indicators of 
academic achievement to look for a possible relation to an emotional 'intelligence' 
whose language is expressed by emotional feelings that "convey information about 
relationships" (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 1997, p. 399). "Information about 
relationships" (other than cognitive information) may be a pivotal point of 'intelligence' 
in complex critical thinking, as suggested in Chapter 2 (Damasio, 1994,1999; James,
1884,1890), and in the complex reasoning exercises that the MSCEIT, V.2 presents.
Cognitive reasoning skills indicators (such as grades, SAT scores, class 
rank) are traditional measures of education outcomes that are systematically evaluated, 
and were used in this study to look for correlations with emotional intelligence. The 
educational concern prompting this study was that emotional intelligence may be 
related to academic achievement, but measures and evaluation of emotional intelligence 
are not included in traditional higher education.
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As discussed in Chapter 2, development of 'intellect' in the cognitive 
domain is an historical tradition in higher education. Development of cognitive 
intellect as an educational objective traces a long line back to Plato, the Aristotelian 
model of 'intellect/ and the Cartesian 'self' that was defined as a cognitive knower. 
Almost forty years ago, a group of educators at the University of Chicago formally 
recognized this as a problem (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964).
The problem, posed by a committee of college professors and published 
in 1964 as Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, Handbook II: Affective Domain. 
basically asks: Is the academic exclusion of the affective domain an instructional 
mistake? (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964).
"Basically the question posed...is whether a human being ever does 
thinking without feeling" (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964, p. 7).
Why have these questions languished for decades?
The academic exclusion of the affective domain is an embedded historical 
tradition in higher education. '"Better to be the poor servant of a poor master' and to 
endure anything, rather than think as they do..." Plato said about non-rational people 
who will not learn how to reason (Plato, 428-347 B.C. in Jowett, 1946, p. 251).
One century after Plato, his follower Aristotle made lists of extremes of 
emotions whose bad influence can cause even wisdom to be used unwisely (Aristotle, 
384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982, p. 173), and, in the Eudemian Ethics, advises his students to 
"...be aware as little as possible of the non-rational" (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 
1982, p. 46). Aristotle's definitions are part of the historical problem. The historical 
problem is that ancient definitions of emotion as a threat to cognitive development 
(Solomon, 1993; Salovey and Mayer, 1990) are embedded in the curriculum of early 
American higher education (Rudolph, 1962/1990). Throughout the 17th, 18th and 
early- to mid-19th centuries in America, a college education required reading Plato and 
Aristotle in the original Greek (Rudolph, 1962/1990).
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Recall from Chapter 2 that Aristotle theorized that there are multiple and 
counteracting parts of 'intellect' which struggle for supremacy during abstract ethical 
reasoning. For Aristotle 'intellect' is created by personal mediating variables including 
both rational and emotional 'inclinations' (toward virtue or vice), inclinations that 
struggle for supremacy but are mediated by personal socializing processes that seem 
familiar to contemporary culture (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 398). In the 
Eudemian Ethics. Aristotle links ethical decision making (choosing virtue or vice) to the 
parameters set by "feelings of pleasure or pain" (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982, 
p. 173). Aristotle thus brings in the emotions of the affective domain (whose 
expressions are personalized feelings of pleasure or pain) as the very basis for cognitive 
reasoning about an ethical problem.
Aristotle theorized that "It follows that (a person's) 'character' is virtuous 
or bad by pursuing or avoiding pleasures and pains" (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 
1982, p. 20). Using personal feelings about a problem to guide cognitive reasoning in 
solving it, is hence a very old idea, parallel to the emotional intelligence test construct of 
'emotional reasoning' (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000).
Aristotle, however, not unlike Plato before him, seems deliberately trying 
to muddy the intellectual waters, and bluntly states that reasoning has its limits because 
some rational intellects are underdeveloped, ignorant, or stupid (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. 
in Woods, 1982, p. 173). Even a desire for virtue can be used unwisely by an ignorant 
or stupid thinker (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982, p. 173). Aristotle seems to be 
building an important place for emotions in cognitive thinking when he goes on to say 
that virtue in the non-rational part of intellect can mediate ignorance or stupidity in the 
rational part, resulting in judging wisely (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982).
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Aristotle is describing a busy intersection of 'intellect' where emotions and 
reasoning are involved in a kind of rough-and-tumble of 'inclinations' in both domains 
that determines thinking and behavior: "desire does not imply the deliberative 
faculty," Aristotle writes. "But sometimes it overpowers rational wish and moves to 
action; at other times the latter, rational wish, overpowers the former, desire"
(Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Durrant, 1993, p. 70).
Aristotle's rational and non-rational 'functions' of 'intellect' are today's 
cognitive and affective domains (Bloom, et al., 1956; Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964; 
Mayer and Salovey, 1990). Emotional intelligence is understanding and managing the 
interactive 'inclinations' in the rough-and-tumble of the Aristotelian model of 'intellect.'
The idea that both domains are "beneficial" to thinking was suggested by 
Plato. Plato advised the cognitive knower not to abandon the thinker in the 
metaphorical cave (Plato, 428-347 B.C. in Jowett, 1946, p. 255) but to revisit the cave, 
because the two domains "can be beneficial one to the other" (Plato, 428-347 B.C. in 
Jowett, 1946, p. 255). This study has tried to follow all of Plato's and Aristotle's 
contraindicating, point-counterpoint leads and cues in looking for a beneficial 
interaction between the two domains in higher learning.
The construct of 'emotional intelligence' was one way to consider the 
possibility that emotions become involved in higher level cognitive thinking in a 
beneficial way, to 'arouse, sustain, and direct' achievement efforts (Mayer and Salovey, 
1990, pp. 185-186). This study was looking for involvement of the historically separated 
domains of cognition and affect, in relation to contemporary academic achievement.
This study was additionally looking for possible intervening variables that 
may mediate emotional intelligence ability-performance. Therefore test-taker age and 
gender were analyzed in relation to the MSCEIT, V.2 scores of each gender, and by age 
grouping, to find if age and gender as mediating variables might intervene in some 
way on performance in the affective domain.
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To conclude this study, and to fulfill a research suggestion by the 
designers of the MSCEIT, V.2 (Mayer and Salovey, 1997), a focus group was also 
conducted. The research suggestion was to probe the reality behind emotional 
intelligence in relation to identifying which emotions are involved in an effective 
emotional life (Mayer and Salovey, 2000a). This study's focus group was asked to 
discuss emotions for an effective emotional life in relation to their own academic 
achievement behaviors.
As Chapter 3 explained, three focus group participants were among the 
highest-scoring female test-takers in this study; these participants scored in the 
'enhanced' range of emotional intelligence (over 115, which is 15 points above the 
standardized mean of 100). One of the three high-scoring participants was a Monroe 
Scholar. Also in the focus group was a female Phi Beta Kappa test participant with 
some 'high' (100 to 115) and some 'enhanced' emotional intelligence test scores. Two 
male test participants with some 'high' and some 'enhanced' scores also participated in 
focus group discussion, for a total of six participants.
The focus group participants were asked open-ended discussion questions 
about their own affective domain involvement in academic achievement. This study 
was thus looking for statistical as well as qualitative indication of an affective domain 
relation to undergraduate academic achievement.
Why devote a dissertation study to this objective?
This study became concerned about the academic exclusion of the 
affective domain based on previous research by the designers of the MSCEIT, V. 2 
(Mayer and Salovey, 1990; Salovey and Mayer, 1997; Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 
2000a, 2000b) as well as by related research about happiness (Francis, et al., 1995), 
research suggesting that happier students have higher GPAs (Schutte, et al., 1997), and 
research indicating that positive self-concept is a crucial factor in achievement efforts 
(Skaalvik, 1997; Bandura, 1997). Higher education historians (Rudolph, 1962/1990;
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Chickering and Reisser, 1993) describe a long history of academically excluding the 
affective domain (Rudolph, 1962/1990; Chickering and Resisser, 1993) which may be an 
instructional mistake (Rudolph, 1962/1990; Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964) causing 
or exacerbating the undergraduate distress that is self-reported (Counseling Services, 
2002) and has been acted out (Rudolph, 1962; Chickering and Reisser, 1993) in the 
history of the undergraduate experience.
But even if the affective stress symptoms routinely reported by college 
undergraduates are not directly related to emotionally understanding and managing 
the personal challenges of academic achievement, the significant results of this study, 
and related research in the psychology of learning, suggest that understanding and 
managing emotions comprise a crucial learning resource. The educational concern that 
prompted this study is that higher level emotional development in relation to academic 
achievement is traditionally left to chance in the undergraduate experience.
What This Study Found 
The significant results of this study detected a tendency for those 
undergraduates who understand and manage emotions to have higher GPAs. These 
results were determined at a high level of statistical certainty, p<.01 and p<.05, 
respectively. As Chapter 4 explained, Understanding Emotions in Branch 3X 
correlated significandy with test-takers' GPA at r .432, significant at p<.01 (2-tailed). 
Managing Emotions in Branch 4X correlated significandy with test-takers' GPA at r .314, 
significant at p<.05 (2-tailed). These significant p levels mean that there is a 99% 
certainty, and a 95% certainty, respectively, that these two correlations of higher level 
emotional intelligence to GPA did not occur by chance. But what does that 'higher 
level' relation actually represent?
The MSCEIT, V.2 has combined the ability to Understand Emotions with 
the ability to Manage Emotions into the test construct called 'emotional reasoning.'
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It was only on the 'emotional reasoning' tasks that the significant relation to academic 
achievement was found. Hence it is important to understand what 'emotional 
reasoning' represents.
A look inside the 'emotional reasoning' test scores reveals a pattern of 
academic achievement linked to scores on Understanding and Managing Emotions: 
test participants with higher GPAs had higher scores on Understanding and Managing 
Emotions. Test participants with lower GPAs had lower scores on Understanding and 
Managing Emotions. For these two components of the test construct of 'emotional 
reasoning'—Understanding and Managing Emotions—test participants with higher GPAs 
of 3.6 and above had a mean score of 113 on Understanding Emotions. Test 
participants with lower GPAs of 2.9 and below, had a mean score of 100 on 
Understanding Emotions. This is a statistically significant 13-point difference. Test 
participants with 'medium' GPAs between 3.0 and 3.59, had a mean score of 111 on 
Understanding Emotions, an 11-point scores difference from the higher GPAs' scores 
on Understanding Emotions. The same pattern was true for higher GPAs and higher 
scores on Managing Emotions, which is the other more complex part of the test 
construct of 'emotional reasoning.'
Test participants with higher GPAs of 3.6 and above, had a mean score of 
106 on Managing Emotions. Test participants w ith lower GPAs of 2.9 or below, had a 
mean score of 97 on Managing Emotions. This is a statistically significant 9-point 
difference. Test participants with GPAs in between the higher and lower, that is, GPAs 
between 3.0 and 3.59, had a mean score of 104 on Managing Emotions. Note from the 
Chapter 4 summary of mean scores for each branch and overall index score of the 
MSCEIT, V.2, that all test participants scored higher on the harder, complex tasks of 
Understanding Emotions and Managing Emotions, than on the simpler tasks of the 
other two branches in the test. The central question is: Why?
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As noted in Chapter 4, the MSCEIT, V.2 was desgined to be presented in a 
hierarchy of tasks of ascending complexity. At the top of the hierarchy of test 
questions are problem-solving tasks that test Understanding and Managing Emotions. 
At the top of the task hierarchy, then, is the test construct of 'emotional reasoning.'
'Emotional reasoning' is tested by both Branch 3X and Branch 4X. Test 
questions in Branch 4X (Managing Emotions) were designed to be more complex than 
test questions in Branch 3X (Understanding Emotions), but both branches were 
designed to measure two components of the same abstract construct. That is to say, 
because the task questions about Managing Emotions and Understanding Emotions are 
testing the ability to solve complex abstract problems about an emotional situation or 
emotional event, these are the hardest and most abstract questions on the test. 
Responding to these questions requires that cognitive reasoning involve the emotions 
and emotional knowledge of the test participant. Note again that it was only on 
'emotional reasoning' tasks that a significant relation to the GPA and class rank of the 
test participants was found.
As described in Chapter 4, this study detected a tendency for class-rank to 
correlate significantly with higher test scores on Understanding Emotions, near the top 
of the MSCEIT, V.2 task hierarchy, in Branch 3X. The significant correlation between 
high school rank and GPA was found only in the abstract ability to understand 
emotions.
The correlation of high-school class rank to emotional reasoning scores, as 
explained in Chapter 4, is further corroboration of what this study was looking for: 
the correlation of class rank with higher 'emotional reasoning' test scores is a further 
indication that a relation does exist between ability in the affective domain (high scores 
on Understanding and Managing Emotions) and academic achievement (shown by 
high-school class rank).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
134
This study also found a correlation that was nearly significant ( r = .058) 
between GPA and the overall index of emotional intelligence, the MSCEITOX score. 
Although a larger sample size might have contributed to a true level of p<.05 
significance, or lower, the 'dose proximity7 of .058 to statistical significance indicates a 
likely relation between academic achievement and the overal index of emotional 
intelligence of the test partidpants in this study. This suggestion of a relation has thus 
far, in this study, been suggested by multiple indicators.
Two additional indicators—age and gender—might suggest that personal 
intervening characteristics may mediate between the 'intelligence' of the affective 
domain and the 'intelligence' of the cognitive domain, in relation to undergraduate 
achievement behaviors. Using both the t-test and the Pearson r correlation, there was 
no significant relation found between the age of the test partidpants and their test 
scores, although previous emotional intelligence research on the variable of age has 
found such a relationship (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b). Previous research 
theorizes that emotional intelligence is developmental across the lifespan, but the 
results of this study did not support that theory. Two age-groupings were used in a t- 
test of mean score differences, but the analysis was limited by the small sample size and 
restriction in range of participant ages.
Previous research on the mediating variable of gender indicates that 
females tend to score somewhat higher than males on emotional intelligence tests 
(Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000a, 2000b) and a significant gender-difference was 
found by this study in the higher test scores of females on Understanding Emotions and 
Managing Emotions. With this in mind, the following analysis of comments by the six 
focus group partidpants suggests a surprising disconnect between the higher female 
test scores on Understanding and Managing Emotions and actual achievement 
behaviors as self-reported by gender.
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What The Results of this Study Suggest 
Although the comments by this study's focus group cannot be 
generalized back to represent the achievement behaviors of the entire sample, nor to 
represent the entire U.S. population of high achieving undergraduates, this study's 
focus group comments do point out that a) undergraduate females who self-report 
more stress than males (Counseling Services, 2002; L.A. Times, 1999) may feel free to 
express emotions in social relationships, but marginalize or repress emotions instead of 
involving emotions in learning; and b) undergraduate males may feel culturally- 
expected to manage and control emotions but not to express them. One of the 
male focus group participants said that he hardly knew what words to use to answer 
the focus group questions, because he so rarely talks about emotions.
Throughout this study's focus group discussion, as described in Chapter 4, 
participants expressed beliefs and uncertainties about their academic achievement 
behaviors that seemed to contradict their tested ability to understand and manage 
emotions. Gender-differences about managing emotions were expressed. The four 
female participants in this study's focus group self-reported study strategies to side­
step, marginalize, or "push emotions aside." One top-scoring female test participant in 
the focus group said, "I put my emotions at the back of my head" to study.
After making such assertions as, "Learning for me is emotion-less" and 
the belief "that I am kind of expected to push my emotions aside here and just excell," 
the focus group listed positive emotions that they all said they have experienced before 
and during performance of a higher learning task, provided that the learning task is in a 
subject that they like, or even "feel a passion for." All focus group participants said 
they have experienced a feeling of eagerness to begin learning, a feeling of excitement 
about the subject to be learned, and a feeling of confidence in their ability to learn it.
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The contradictions expressed by the focus group about the role of their 
emotions in higher learning strongly suggest that the affective domain is untaught, 
unacknowledged, and unidentified during the undergraduate academic experience.
Even though feeling the presence of emotions in higher learning was self- 
reported by all participants in the undergraduate focus group, five of the six focus 
group participants initially said they doubted that learning includes emotions.
However, as described in Chapter 4, even the doubters contradicted their previous 
statements as the discussion continued and all participants subsequently described 
emotional feelings that they say they experience during learning. There was a 
disconnect, however, between high test scores on understanding and managing 
emotions and self-reported achievement behaviors.
The high achieving undergraduates in this study's focus group reported 
such negative achievement behaviors as daydreaming, procrastinating, pushing 
emotions aside instead of emotionally-intelligent management of emotions to facilitate 
learning. This apparent disconnect between knowledge and behavior indicates an 
educational need to teach the meaning and uses of the affective domain for 
undergraduate academic achievement, at least to this study's focus group. The 
educational irony is that all 61 test participants—including the ones who self-reported 
repressing or marginalizing their emotions in learning—scored higher on the harder, 
complex test construct of Understanding Emotions and Managing Emotions, than on 
the simpler parts of the test. What does this suggest?
The highest scores on the harder tasks that involved emotions in 
reasoning are somewhat of a very curious result. Some of the sample's highest scorers 
on 'emotional reasoning' tasks were in this study's focus group; they initially said that 
emotions are not involved in learning. This odd result may simply indicate that this 
special sample of academic high achievers was skilled at cognitive reasoning, and good 
at following test instructions, instructions asking them to involve their own emotions to
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reason about and solve emotional problems. The focus group participants may have 
simply been unfamiliar with thinking about emotions in relation to learning. The 
MSCEIT, V.2 was designed to reveal the presence of emotions, which conventional 
learning situations do not.
The significantly higher test scores on 'emotional reasoning' tasks could 
mean that allowing emotions to facilitate thinking is easily done, is readily learned in 
taking the test, or is an innate and natural function of 'intellect'-as Aristotle suggested 
in his model of an interactive intellect with multiple parts.
Further, the curious and significant result of this study—where the highest 
scores are on the harder tasks that ask participants to perform 'emotional reasoning'— 
suggests that domain separation may be a misleading educational artifice that attempts 
to exclude, but cannot prevent, the natural involvement of emotions in higher level 
abstract reasoning. The review of the literature in this study and the significant results 
of this study suggest that development of the affective domain should be included in 
the undergraduate development of 'intellect.' Including both domains in the academic 
development of 'intellect' is supported by the significant results of this study which 
show that students who are good at 'emotional reasoning' have higher GPAs.
The relation of the affective domain to cognitive thinking can be better 
understood by looking at the test scores of this study's sample of high achievers, on the 
simple, cognitive-like tasks on Peredving Emotions in Branch IX. This study's sample 
of high achievers attained a lower mean score on Perceiving Emotions in Branch IX 
than on 'emotional reasoning' in Branches 3X and 4X. Note that the simple Branch IX 
tasks did not require the test participants to use their skill at cognitive reasoning and 
involve their emotions in reasoning. The low scores on Branch IX may simply indicate 
that, as the test-taking began, this sample of academic high achievers was not all that 
familiar with names and definitions of emotions.
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The question remains, however, as to why this sample of known high 
achievers ('known' to be high achievers because admitted to a nationally top-ranked 
and academically competitive college) did not perform as well at simple identification of 
the names and definitions of specific emotions and emotional expressions, as they did 
on tasks that asked them to reason with emotions to solve an abstract problem. Why?
Looking at the simple tasks on Using Emotions in Branch 2X reveals tasks 
that also did not require abstract reasoning, a critical thinking skill at which this special 
sample of academic high achievers had to be very skilled in order to be admitted to the 
academically competitive freshman class (Office of Admissions, 2002). Branch 2X tasks 
asked the test participant to simply recall the feeling of certain moods and then decide 
how the moods interact with thinking. So, the question remains: Why did this study's 
sample of high achievers score lower on the easier tasks?
As the MSCEIT, V.2 tasks proceeded, responding to the simple, cognitive- 
like identification and recall tasks may have "taught" simple emotional intelligence to 
the test-takers. This sample of high achievers may have previously been conditioned 
to suppress emotions when learning, or when taking a test, and hence may have 
initially been reluctant or resistant to identify emotions or to think in what the MSCEIT, 
V.2 test designers call the language of emotions (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b).
As the test proceeded, the progressive "learning" of emotional intelligence skills may 
have been operationalized in this sample. As responding to the tasks proceeded, a 
task-hierarchy of ascending complexity unfolded. Taking the test may have 
operationalized innate higher level emotional skills that are naturally involved (even if 
not educationally acknowledged) in the intellectual development of cognitive 
reasoning.
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What this Study Learned about the Test Construct of 'Emotional Intelligence'
Higher Level Achievement Uses Both Domains
The results of this study indicate that emotional involvement in higher 
level cognition can be evoked during the MSCEIT, V.2 task responses, and can be 
measured as an emotional 'intelligence' ability. Further, based on focus group 
discussion, it appears that even if the thinker does not acknowledge the involvement of 
emotions in higher level thinking, or is unaware of the attention-directing and 
facilitating role that emotions can play in higher level cognition, emotions can become 
involved in higher learning anyway. The problem, however, with not being aware of 
personal emotional involvement in complex thinking, or in trying to marginalize or 
repress personal emotions during higher learning—as students may be conditioned to 
do—is that potentially harmful anxiety, stress, and other undesired learning outcomes 
may result.
Domain Separation is a Tenuous Thing
Desired educational outcomes in the cognitive domain appear to still be 
separated from the affective domain, although some cognitive objectives sound 
suspiciously like higher level 'emotional intelligence' as defined by the MSCEIT, V.2 
instrument used in this study. Previous research has already correlated emotional 
intelligence ability with general intelligence ability (see Appendix C) (Mayer, Salovey 
and Caruso, 2000b). The two 'intelligences' may be more closely related than 
suspected, as an existing taxonomy of educational objectives (Terenzini, 1997) may 
unintentionally suggest in its description of cognitive objectives as "...a set of general 
intellectual and cognitive competencies and skills. These skills constitute...complex 
mental functions...the effective processing and utilization of information and include 
such activities as critical thinking, problem-solving, the analysis and utilization of 
information, creative thinking, and both formal (i.e., Piagetian) and postformal
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reasoning (the analysis of problems for which there is no verifiably-correct answer, 
sometimes called "ill-structured" or "wicked" problems, such as crime, poverty, 
abortion). This category also includes moral reasoning, which refers to the processes 
by which judgments of right and wrong are made..." (Terenzini, 1997, Appendix C of 
his report). Separating the two domains of emotions and cognition may be an error.
As described by the strange case of Phineas Gage in Chapter 2 of this study (Damasio, 
1994), without emotions, cognitive problem-solving, utilization of information, 
Piagetian formal and postformal reasoning, judgments of right and wrong in moral 
reasoning—none of these 'cognitive domain' activities can be completed (Damasio,1994).
If there is a naturally occurring relation of emotions to higher level 
cognition, then, what happens if emotions are ng£ "allowed to participate in thinking" 
(Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000a)? This is the important educational question. 
Emotional intelligence is knowing that it is important to generate certain emotions 
before learning begins, because those emotions can facilitate complex thinking tasks. 
Understanding how to generate and manage emotions is a personal emotional 
intelligence task, that is not taught in school, but should ideally be done before learning 
begins (as Bloom's Taxonomy, Step 1, Handbook II advises) (see Appendix B) 
(Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964). But which emotions to "involve"?
Suggestions for Future Research
Research Area 1: What is 'Achievement'?
In order to better understand the relation between emotional intelligence 
and academic achievement which this study found, a future area for qualitative research 
would logically want to explore a series of achievement questions, beginning with,
What is 'achievement'?
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What are the components of different kinds of undergraduate 
'achievement' in various disciplines and areas of activity? Are there different kinds of 
'achievers' ? Are some achievement behaviors more effective in some disciplines and 
areas than others? Or, is there one set of achievement behaviors that are effective 
across academic disciplines and other areas of achievement activity such as atheletics 
and dramatic arts achievement? One way to test these research questions is to 
conduct a longitudinal study of the achievement behaviors of diverse populations of 
undergraduate high achievers and low achievers, across disciplines and areas of 
achievement.
What are the characteristics of 'high achievers'? The qualitative method 
in a longitudinal study would be an ideal way to gather new information about the 
personal characteristics of high achievers. This is an area of previous research in related 
fields (including the psychology of leadership; teaching to gifted students; Bandura's 
study of the achievement factor of self-efficacy beliefs versus actual ability; the 
motivating role of personal interest). This proposed study would look for support of 
those characteristics already identified in high achievers, including persistence, openness 
to change, interest in exploring new ideas, but would also be looking for new indication 
of whether or not high achievers display an ability to understand and manage their 
emotions before and during the achievement effort. The educational question is 
whether such characteristics can be taught to mediate the behaviors of low achievers.
What are the characteristics of Tow achievers'? Previous psychology of 
learning research on the characteristics of low achievers has identified low self-esteem, 
negative self-concept, self-inefficacy belief, lack of interest in the learning task, negative 
behavior patterns that reinforce previous low achievement and low risk, and task- 
avoidance. This would be an educationally rewarding area of future emotional
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intelligence research, if the emotional causes and characteristics of self-defeating task- 
avoidance behaviors of low achievers (Skaalvik, 1997) could be further identifed.
Diverse Populations. Future research is needed to qualitatively identify, 
and then track with longitudinal studies, the undergraduate achievement behaviors of 
diverse populations, such as sons and daughters of recently arrived immigrant families 
who learn English as a second language; high-achieving athletes; high-achieving 
dyslectics; high-achieving dramatic-arts students; high-achieving undergraduates with 
learning disabilities; high achievers with physical disabilities; high achievers who have 
suuceeded against the odds. Do understanding and managing their emotions play 
some role in their success?
Which Emotions Facilitate Learning? Part of further exploration of the 
relation this study found between emotional intelligence and academic achievement 
would ideally answer the research question, What is an effective emotional life? (as the 
designers of the MSCEIT, V.2 instrument have suggested) (Mayer and Salovey, 1997). 
The academic focus of such a study would seek to find qualitative and quantitative 
indication of which emotions best facilitate learning at all levels, and especially in 
performing complex higher level reasoning which is of particular interest to the 
objectives of higher education.
Research Area 2: Can Individual 'Emotional Intelligence' be Mediated by Intervention?
If 'emotional intelligence' is a mediating variable related to higher 
academic achievement, as the results of this study suggest, can it be taught and learned? 
What would be the effects of knowledge and application of emotional intelligence, for 
low achieving undergraduates? for diverse populations of undergraduates? across 
academic disciplines? and different areas of achievement activity?
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Ideally the research groundwork for these questions would be laid by 
work in Research Area 1, described above. Research Area 2 questions would comprise 
an ideal follow-up study with the same population groups used in studying the 
components of 'achievement/ Low achievers would be an ideal population for this 
research question.
For example, experimental studies show that self-concept is over­
sensitized in depressed learners (Slipp, 1975). They are hypersensitive to feedback 
about performance. Recall the depressed card-players, as discussed in Chapter 2.
The depressed card-players experiment indicated how depression cues attention to 
perpetuate self-defeating interpretation of events. Recall that depressed subjects 
reacted to their failure to win (in an experiment situation where the card game was 
stopped and all players were told they had failed), with pessimism and lowered 
expectations than the normal group when asked to play another round (Slipp, 1975). 
Emotion also determines the speed at which thinking is performed and the richness of 
multiple information cues that are perceived and attended. In the card sorting task, 
depression determined a cognitive mode of low risk, low achievement (Damasio, 1994).
Recall that, conversely, a feeling of elation can cause rapid generation of 
multiple mental images and cognitive associations in response to a wide variety of 
information and meaning cues (Damasio, 1994). The wealth of imagery and associative 
cues causes ease of inference and inclusive thinking, resulting in bold exploratory 
behaviors. The opposite of this rapid and expansive cognitive mode is the feeling of 
sadness and the cognitive mode that is paired with it. Sadness is characterized by 
slowness of mental image formation, less association of meaning due to perception of 
fewer mental cues, a more narrow band of inferences, and over-concentration on one 
or two images that will sustain the negative mood. The cognitive state of sadness 
exhibits psychomotor inhibition such as reduced or lost appetite, and a reduction of 
exploratory behaviors (Damasio, 1994).
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Hence such research would be educationally important, in order to 
determine if individuals can learn how to understand the emotions they are feeling, and 
learn how to manage their emotions to generate a personalized cognitive mode of 
attention and positive engagement of the learning task. The challenge for higher 
education is how to teach positive use of personal emotions in relation to higher 
learning achievement, an educational application "that can potentially lead to a 
transformation" (Salovey and Mayer, 1990, p. 186) of cultural expectations and 
achievement behaviors concering the expression, understanding, and management of 
emotions as a learning resource.
Instruments that appraise and analyze emotions have been available for 
decades, such as the Succeed-Fail Questionnaire and the Adjective Rating Scale, 
designed to probe depression and childhood self-differentiation; and the Multiple Affect 
Adjective Checklist and Thematic Apperception Test which measure depression, 
hostility and feelings of well-being (Slipp, 1975, p. 139).
The Bar-On Emotional Quotient Inventory does measure broader 
dimensions of emotion than depression including independence, assertiveness, self- 
actualization, empathy, social responsibility, problem solving, flexibility, tolerance for 
stress, impulse control, happiness, and optimism (Schutte, et al., 1998). The Style And 
Perception of Affect Scale is based on the concept "that being able to attend rapidly, 
appropriately, and effortlessly to feelings is the cornerstone of emotional intelligence" 
(Schutte, et al., 1998, p. 169), and measures body-based, evaluation-based, 
and logic-based perceptions of emotion. Positive emotions such as happiness with its 
rich, rapid and effortless cognitive mode is a worthy educational objective in the 
affective domain and generating it could be an affective target of instructional design in 
higher education.
Happiness has been identified in the literature as frequency and degree of 
positive affect (Argyle and Crossland, 1987 in Francis, et al., 1998); as resulting from a
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supportive sodal network in a setting that offers positive interpretation of most daily 
events (Francis, et al., 1998); identified as inner causation (Veenhoven, 1994 in Francis, et 
al., 1998); and as having a significant correlation with self-esteem (Lu and Argyle,1991). 
The Oxford Happiness Inventory Scale asks: "Who is a happy person?" (Francis, et al., 
1998, p. 168).
Responding to the scale items on the MSCEIT, V.2 (MHS, Inc./Mayer, 
Salovey and Caruso, 2000b) gives undergraduates the opportunity to identify how they 
subjectively express, experience, and perceive emotions in self and others, and an 
opportunity to perform emotional reasoning exercises in Tasks D and G 
(Understanding Emotions) and in Tasks E and H (Managing Emotions). Taking an 
emotional intelligence test is one way to become aware of the developmental presence 
of emotional intelligence and its relationship to higher level achievement which this 
study has reported. Responding to the MSCEIT, V.2 instrument operationalizes a 
personal experience of emotional reasoning (Salovey and Mayer, 1990).
Other instruments that operationalize emotional understanding and 
emotional management include 1) the Affect Expression Rating Scale, a self-report of 
emotional expressiveness; 2) the Affective Communication Test, a self-report Likert- 
scale; 3) the Affect Sensitivity Test which uses videotaped interactions between two 
individuals for respondents to identify the emotions being expressed; 4) the 
Communication of Affect Receiving Ability Test (CARAT) which uses a videotape of 
people watching slides of beautiful or unpleasant or unusual scenes for respondents to 
identify, from facial expressions shown on the videotape, what slide each target is 
watching; and 5) the Profile of Nonverbal Sensitivity (PONS) which presents face and 
body expressions for cognitive-emotional identification, and a similar scale presents 
faces, colors and designs for identification of emotional constructs in stimulus-receiving 
(Salovey and Mayer, 1990).
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The State and Trait Meta-Mood Scales (SMMS and TMMS) searches for 
multiple experiences of moods by asking respondents to identify which moods are 
typical, which are not; which moods are understandable, which are not; what mood is 
caused by dancing or studying or other specific situations, in order to help the 
respondent understand what situations cause or are associated with a specific emotional 
mood. The SMMS and TMMS are designed to help respondents identify situations or 
behaviors that have correlated with a desired mood, such as happiness being caused in 
the past by music and dancing (Salovey and Mayer, 1990). This knowledge can help 
individuals identify situations and behaviors to generate future moods. The Oxford 
Happiness Inventory is an instrument for identifying the cognitive mode of happiness, 
by asking for a response to such scale items as:
I am sure that the future is overflowing with hope and promise.
I feel that I am in total control of all aspects of my life.
Nowadays, I wake up feeling more rested that I used to.
I can make all decisions very easily.
I feel I have boundless energy.
My time is always perfectly organized so that I can fit in all the things I
want to do.
I am always committed and involved.
Future research to identify emotionally intelligent individuals and the 
emotional skills they employ has been suggested in the literature (Salovey and Mayer, 
1990; Schutte, et al., 1998) but to date no longitudinal research study has addressed the 
acquisition and application of the primary emotion state of happiness (Francis, et al., 
1998) or related feelings of happiness (such as eagerness to begin, excitement about 
learning, confidence-contentment) in an educational context as an optimal cognitive 
mode for achievement.
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Research Area 3: How to Design a New Taxonomy for Emotionally Intelligent 
Undergraduates in a Complex World?
The complexities of the contemporary world may require a new kind of 
thinker who has learned to be adept at complex problem-solving across the two 
domains. Ideally, existing taxonomies of educational objectives could be used to design 
a new taxonomy of educational objectives that would academically include the affective 
domain. For example, domain-inclusive educational objectives can be designed by 
looking at Astin's Cooperative Institutional Research Program (CIRP) questionnaires 
which "over the years have incorporated fifty-seven different affective-psychological 
(scale) items... (such as) student satisfaction with the college environment...." (Astin, 
1977/1983, pp. 31-32).
The variables investigated by CIRP were organized into four categories. 
Astin has documented in all four categories affective learning objectives, and it is there 
that emotional intelligence as a mediating variable might be applied: 
the CIRP questionnaire areas are 1) interpersonal self-esteem which includes social self- 
confidence; 2) intellectual self-esteem which includes intellectual self-confidence; 3) self- 
criticism which includes sensitivity to criticism and defensiveness; 4) understanding of self 
and others, which includes cheerfulness and desire to achieve (Astin, 1977/1983, p. 33).
Combining Astin's model with the first three instructional steps for 
engaging the affective domain in Bloom's Taxonomy of Educational Objectives. 
Handbook II: Affective Domain (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964), would provide a 
wealth of clues for designers of instructional strategies who want to fulfill a new 
taxonomy of academic objectives that engage the affective domain.
An ideal learning environment in which to experiment with strategies to 
engage the affective domain, is on-line distance and distributed higher education. An 
effective pedagogy for engaging the affective domain on-line, would include visual 
manipulation of the on-line learning environment, to visually generate emotions that
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facilitate learning, such as eagerness to begin, excitement about the subject to be 
learned and confidence in ability to learn it. Visual innovations to engage the affective 
domain would be presented on-line, and could be tailored to engage the attention of 
the individual learner before learning begins, per Step 1 of Bloom's Taxonomy, 
Handbook II (see Appendix B) (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964). The effectiveness 
of an innovative on-line experiment to visually evoke involvement of the affective 
domain could be determined by pretesting two groups of on-line learners on the 
subject to be learned; presenting the visual innovation to an experimental group, while 
not presenting the innovation to a control group; then posttesting to measure academic 
achievement of each group.
Conclusion
Why has this study researched the emotional intelligence of the affective 
domain and suggested engaging the affective domain as a pedagogical strategy in 
higher education? The reason is that there may be a relation between higher level 
emotional intelligence and higher academic achievement. As the literature in this study 
and the results of this study suggest, emotional intelligence may not be needed in 
simple cognitive tasks, but may become naturally involved in higher level cognition, 
because it is needed to assist complex higher level reasoning in abstract problem­
solving.
Although the statistics in this study indicate that emotions are related to 
higher learning performance, students in this study's focus group reported disengaging 
their emotions before beginning higher learning tasks. More research is needed to 
resolve this paradox and to understand more fully how emotions and cognition may 
relate during higher learning in the undergraduate experience.
This study has glimpsed the possibility of some kind of relationship 
between emotional intelligence and academic achievement, and suggests further study
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of ways in which emotional intelligence might be further researched to become more 
fully engaged in higher learning.
In conclusion, it seems that, wherever this study goes, it meets Plato 
coming back. Plato expresses a good reason for studying the relation of emotional 
intelligence to the cognitive domain:
"(the) whole soul is perfected and ennobled by the acquirement of 
...temperance and wisdom..." Plato writes in the Republic.
(and) "to this nobler purpose the man of understanding will devote the 
energies of his life" (Plato, 428-347 B.C. in Jowett, 1946, pp. 343-346).
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Client Demographics:
Students Who Completed Ongoing Therapy 
for the Academic Year 1999-2000 
and
for the Academic Year 2000-2001 
(Counseling Services, 2002)
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Client Demographics, Academic Year 1999-2000 
For Students Who Completed Treatment During This Period
GENDER ETHNIC RANK
Intemation
al AGE
Marital
Status
n valid 1 ' ’ ' "597 5SJ7 597 59/ 372 597
Missing 0 0 0 0 225 0
Frequency Table
GENDER
Of those Reporting Gender: 
Female = 72.5%
Male = 27%
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
vaiia 14 2.3 2.3
Female 423 70.9 70.9 73.2
Male 160 26.8 26.8 100.0
Total 597 100.0 100.0
ETHNIC
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
(Cumulative
Percent
vaiia 39 6.5 6.5 6.5
Asian American 32 5.4 5.4 11.9
Black / African American 31 5.2 5.2 17.1
Hispanic / Latino(a) 15 2.5 2.5 19.6
Other 17 2.8 2.8 22.4
White / Caucasian 463 77.6 77.6 100.0
Total 597 100.0 100.0
RANK
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
vauo 26 4.4 4.4 4.4
Freshman 45 7.5 7.5 11.9
Graduate 118 19.8 19.8 31.7
Junidr 136 22.8 22.8 54.4
Other 4 .7 .7 55.1
Senior 172 28.8 28.8 83.9
Sophomore 96 16.1 16.1 100.0
Total 597 100.0 100.0
International
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
valid .Ou 581 97.3 97.3 97.3
1.00 16 2.7 2.7 100.0
Total 597 100.0 100.0
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AGE
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid l/.UU i 1 .3 .3
18.00 33 5.5 8.9 9.1
19.00 61 10.2 16.4 25.5
20.00 83 13.9 22.3 47.8
21.00 77 12.9 20.7 68.5
22.00 32 5.4 8.6 112
23.00 12 2.0 3.2 80.4
24.00 9 1.5 2.4 82.8
25.00 12 2.0 3.2 86.0
26.00 10 1.7 2.7 88.7
27.00 13 2.2 3.5 92.2
28.00 7 1.2 1.9 94.1
29.00 3 .5 .8 94.9
30.00 5 .8 1.3 96.2
31.00 4 .7 1.1 97.3
32.00 3 .5 .8 98.1
33.00 1 .2 .3 98.4
34.00 2 .3 .5 98.9
37.00 1 .2 .3 99.2
42.00 1 .2 .3 99.5
51.00 1 .2 .3 99.7
53.00 1 .2 .3 100.0
Total 372 62.3 100.0
Missing System 225 37.7
Total 597 100.0
Marital Status
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
vaiia 56 9.4 §.4 9.4
Divorced 6 1.0 1.0 10.4
Married 24 4.0 4.0 14.4
Partnered 5 .8 .8 15.2
Separated 2 .3 .3 15.6
Single 504 84.4 84.4 100.0
Total 597 100.0 100.0
Note that percentages are based on the whole sample. 
Thus missing data is calculated into percentages.
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Depression
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulativ 
e Percent
Valid -1.00 336 56.3 56.3 56.3
.00 261 43.7 43.7 100.0
Total 597 100.0 100.0
Anxiety
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulativ 
e Percent
vaiia -1 uo 341 67.1 57.1 ~  ~ s n '
.00 256 42.9 42.9 100.0
Total 597 100.0 100.0
Obsessions/XCompulsions
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulativ 
e Percent
valid -l.ud >5 12.5 12.5 12.6
.00 522 87.4 87.4 100.0
Total 597 100.0 100.0
Low Self-Esteem
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulativ 
e Percent
valid -l.ud 259 43.4" 43.4 43.4
.00 338 56.6 56.6 100.0
Total 597 100.0 100.0
Academic Difficulties
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulativ 
e Percent
Valid -1 .ud "T75" 29.3 29.3 29.3
.00 422 70.7 70.7 100.0
Total 597 100.0 100.0
Peer Interpersonal Problems
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulativ 
e Percent
Valid -1 .uo 2o6 34.5 34 .'5 34.S
.00 391 65.5 65.5 100.0
Total 597 100.0 100.0
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Anorexia
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulativ 
e Percent
Valid -1 uu 11 ' ' 1.8 1.8 1.5
.00 586 98.2 98.2 100.0
Total 597 100.0 100.0
Bulimia
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulativ 
e Percent
vaiia -1 .l)u ' 13 2.2 2.2 2.2
.00 584 97.8 97.8 100.0
Total 597 100.0 100.0
Compulsive Eating
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulativ 
e Percent
valid -l.dO 13 3.2 3.2 3.2
.00 578 96.8 96.8 100.0
Total 597 100.0 100.0
Body Image Distortion
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulativ 
e Percent
valid -l.dO 42 7.(5 “ “ 7.0 7"0
.00 555 93.0 93.0 100.0
Total 597 100.0 100.0
Sub-Clinical Eating Disorder
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulativ 
e Percent
Valid -i.uli 16 2.7 2.7 2.7
.00 581 97.3 97.3 100.0
Total 597 100.0 100.0
Suicidal
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulativ 
e Percent
Valid -1 .uO 19 3.2 3.2 3.2
.00 578 96.3 96.8 100.0
Total 597 100.0 100.0
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Disorganized-Oissociative
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulativ 
e Percent
vaiia -i.uu 3 .5 .5 .b
.00 594 99.5 99.5 100.0
Total 597 100.0 100.0
Bereavement
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulativ 
e Percent
Valid -1 uu 48 8.0 8.0 8.0
.00 549 92.0 92.0 100.0
Total 597 100.0 100.0
Assertion
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulativ 
e Percent
Valid -1.00 55 9.2 9.2 9.2
.00 542 90.8 90.8 100.0
Total 597 100.0 100.0
Anger Control Problems
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulativ 
e Percent
"Valid -1.00 IS 2.7 2.7 2.7
.00 581 97.3 97.3 100.0
Total 597 100.0 100.0
Difficulty Expressing Affect
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulativ 
e Percent
Valid -l Ou 89 14.9 14.9 14.9
.00 508 85.1 85.1 100.0
Total 597 100.0 100.0
Sleep Problems
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulativ 
e Percent
Valid -1.00 76 12.7 12.7 12.7
.00 521 87.3 87.3 100.0
Total 597 100.0 100.0
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Client Demographics, Academic Year 2000-2001
For Students Who Completed Treatment During This Period
AGE
Intemation
al GENDER ETHNIC
Marital
Status RANK
N Valid 471 651 653 653 653 653
Missina _____ 1S2- _______2_ _______2_ _________£L._________£L ____JL
Frequency Table
GENDER
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid 7 1.1 1.1 1.1
Female 460 70.4 70.4 71.5
Male 186 28.5 28.5 100.0
Total 653 _____ lffl.Q. _____ m .0 ..
ETHNIC
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid 27 4.1 4.1 4.1
Asian American 36 5.5 5.5 9.6
Black / African A 28 4.3 4.3 13.9
Hispanic / Latino 14 2.1 2.1 16.1
Other 20 3.1 3.1 19.1
White / Caucasian 528 80.9 80.9 100.0
Total . ___552. 100.0 _____M 5L .
RANK
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid 19 2.9 2.9 2.9
Freshman 56 8.6 8.6 11.5
Graduate 116 17.8 17.8 29.2
Junior 142 21.7 21.7 51.0
Other 6 c .9 51.9
Senior 221 33.8 33.8 85.8
Sophomor 93 14.2 14.2 100.0
Total _____ 555- ____ m a - 100.0
International
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid .00 636 97.4 97.7 97.7
1.00 15 2.3 2.3 100.0
Total 651 99.7 100.0
Missing System 2 .3
Total 653. 100.0
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AGE
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid 17.00 1 .2 .2 .2
18.00 42 6.4 8.9 9.1
19.00 67 10.3 14.2 23.4
20.00 103 15.8 21.9 45.2
21.00 110 16.8 23.4 68.6
22.00 47 7.2 10.0 78.6
23.00 18 2.8 3.8 82.4
24.00 9 1.4 1.9 84.3
25.00 15 2.3 3.2 87.5
26.00 12 1.8 2.5 90.0
27.00 14 2.1 3.0 93.0
28.00 5 .8 1.1 94.1
29.00 5 .8 1.1 95.1
30.00 5 .8 1.1 96.2
31.00 6 .9 1.3 97.5
32.00 4 .6 .8 98.3
34.00 2 .3 .4 98.7
37.00 2 .3 .4 99.2
42.00 1 .2 .2 99.4
46.00 1 .2 .2 99.6
51.00 1 .2 .2 99.8
53.00 1 .2 .2 100.0
Total 471 72.1 100.0
Missing System 182 27.9
Total _____ S52. ____ M L
Marital Status
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid 50 7.7 7.7 7.7
Divorced 5 .8 .8 8.4
Married 30 4.6 4.6 13.0
Partnere 6 .9 .9 13.9
Separate 2 .3 .3 14.2
Single 560 85.8 85.8 100.0
Total 653 _____IQfl.Q- 100.0
Note that percentages are based on the whole sample. 
Thus missing data is calculated into percentages.
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Depression
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid -1.00 301 46.1 46.1 46.1
.00 352 53.9 53.9 100.0
Total 653 _____12Q.0- .100.0
Anxiety
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid -1.00 268 41.0 41.0 41.0
.00 385 59.0 59.0 100.0
Total 653 ____M L ____1212-
Obsessions/Compulsions
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid -1.00 74 11.3 11.3 11.3
.00 579 88.7 88.7 100.0
Total 251- . -1212- 1QQ.Q.
Low Self-Esteem
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid -1.00 226 34.6 34.6 34.6
.00 427 65.4 65.4 100.0
Total 653 1 2 1 2 - 1210.
Academic Difficulties
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid -1.00 152 23.3 23.3 23.3
.00 501 76.7 76.7 100.0
Total 653 1212- - .1 2 1 0 .
Peer Interpersonal Problems
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid -1.00 155 23.7 23.7 23.7
.00 498 76.3 76.3 100.0
Total 251- 1212- ____1212-
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Anorexia
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid -1.00 14 2.1 2.1 2.1
.00 639 97.9 97.9 100.0
Total _____ 552- 1QQ.0 100.0
Bulimia
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid -1.00 7 1.1 1.1 1.1
.00 646 98.9 98.9 100.0
Total . 653 . .100.0 _____1222-
Compulsive Eating
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid -1.00 22 3.4 3.4 3.4
.00 631 96.6 96.6 100.0
Total 653 100.0 _____102.0..
Body Image Distortion
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid -1.00 42 6.4 6.4 6.4
.00 611 93.6 93.6 100.0
Total 653 -  J22.2-. ____ iQ2.o_
Sub-Clinical Eating Disorder
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid -1.00 20 3.1 3.1 3.1
.00 633 96.9 96.9 100.0
Total 653 100.0 -102.0.
Suicidal
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid -1.00 24 3.7 3.7 3.7
.00 629 96.3 96.3 100.0
Total -  -552- -120.0 ______ 1QQ.Q
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Disorganized-Dissociative
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid -1.00 6 .9 .9 .9
.00 647 99.1 99.1 100.0
Total _ 653 _____ IflQJL____M L
Bereavement
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid -1.00 38 5.8 5.8 5.8
00 615 94.2 94.2 100.0
Total _____ SSI- ____ 12QJ2-____ M L
Assertion
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid -1.00 32 4.9 4.9 4.9
.00 621 95.1 95.1 100.0
Total 653 ____ M L -KHLflL
Anger Control Problems
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid -1.00 21 3.2 3.2 3.2
.00 632 96.8 96.8 100.0
Total _____ 252- ____ M L _____ m i,
Difficulty Expressing Affect
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid -1.00 39 6.0 6.0 6.0
.00 614 94.0 94.0 100.0
Total _____ 552- _____ m i . ____ M L
Sleep Problems
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid -1.00 77 11.8 11.8 11.8
.00 576 88.2 88.2 100.0
Total 653 _ ____12.QJL. _____m o -
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Appendix B
Synopsis of Bloom's Taxonomy of Educational Objectives. 
Handbook II. Affective Domain
(Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964)
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Appendix B
Synopsis: Bloom's Taxonomy. Handbook II: Affective Domain
"The additiotial element in the step beyond the Willingness to Respond level 
...is that the behavior is accompanied by a feeling of satisfaction, 
an emotional response, 
generally of pleasure, zest, or enjoyment"
(Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964, p. 180).
Steps 1 and 2 in Bloom's Taxonomy, Handbook II. Affective Domain 
are relevant to further exploration of this dissertation's finding of a relation between 
understanding and managing emotions and academic achievement. In "A Condensed 
Version of the Affective Domain of the Taxonomy of Educational Objectives" 
(Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964, pp. 176-193) six steps are described to address and 
engage the affective domain, first as a prelude to learning, and then during the learning 
task. Following are some highlights of this taxonomy's first two steps of learning in the 
affective domain: Receiving and Responding. These lead to a gradual intersection of 
both domains, but the first act of learning occurs in the affective domain as simple 
awareness and willingness, and ascends to emotional satisfaction (pleasure, zest, 
enjoyment) in making a learning response. Recall the comments made by this study's 
focus group; some comments confirm the concepts of this taxonomy. The first steps 
that precede learning begin with simple awareness of the presence of a learning 
stimulus. The obvious, first educational objective is that the learner 'receive' or pay 
attention to the learning stimulus.
Step 1.0 Receiving. "At this level we are concerned that the learner 
be sensitized to the existence of certain phenomena and stimuli; that is, he (or she)
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be loilling to receive or attend to them. This is clearly the first and crucial step 
if the learner is to be properly oriented to learn what the teacher intends that he (or she) 
will....The category of Receiving has been divided into three sub-categories to indicate three 
different levels of attending to phenomena....the sub-categories do represent a continuum.
From an extremely passive position or role on the part of the learner, where the sole 
responsibility for the evocation of the behavior rests with the teacher— that is, the responsibility 
rests zvith (the teacher) for 'capturing' the student's attention— the continuum extends to a 
point at which the learner directs his (or her) attention...toward the preferred stimuli" 
(Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964, p. 176). The first step, Receiving the Learning 
Stimulus, is sub-divided into a hierarchy of ascending awareness: Sim ple Awareness o f  
the Learning Stim ulus, W illingness to  Receive the Learning Stim ulus, C ontrolled  
A tten tion  to  the Learning Stim ulus.
Step 1.1 Awareness. "Awareness is almost a cognitive behavior. But unlike 
Knowledge, the lozvest level of the cognitive domain, zve are not so much concerned zvith a 
memory of, or an ability to recall.. .as zve are that. ..the learner will merely be conscious of 
something— that he (or she) take into account a situation, phenomenon, object, or stage of 
affairs...unlike Knozvledge (in the cognitive domain) (this stage) does not necessarily imply 
attention" (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964, pp. 176-177). For example, the learner 
would be guided to a simple awareness by colors, forms, arrangements o f objects or 
symbols representing people, things or situations to be studied.
Step 1.2 Willingness to Receive. "In this category zve have come a step up 
the ladder but are still dealing with what appears to be cognitive behavior. A t a minimum level, 
zve are here describing the behavior of being zvilling to tolerate a given stimulus, not to avoid it.
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A t this level of the continuum, the teacher is not concerned that the student seek it out, nor 
even, perhaps, that in an environment croivded zvith many other stimuli the learner zvill 
necessarily attend to the stimulus.... A t best, he (or she) is zvilling to take notice of the 
phenomenon..." (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964, p. 177).
Step 1.3 Controlled or Selected Attention. "At a somezvhat higher level zve 
are concerned zvith a nezv phenomenon, the differentiation of a given stimulus into figure and 
ground at a conscious or perhaps semiconscious level— the differentiation of aspects of a 
stimulus zvhich is perceived as clearly marked off from adjacent impressions. The perception is 
still zvithout tension or assessment, and the student may not knozv the technical terms or 
symbols zvith zvhich to describe it correctly or precisely to others. There is an element of the 
learner's controlling the attention here, so that the favored stimulus is selected and attended to 
despite competing and distracting stimuli" (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964, p. 178).
The second step in Bloom's Taxonomy, Handbook II is Responding. Like 
Step One, which has three components of ascending awareness, Responding is 
subdivided into three parts: Acquiescence in Responding, Willingness to Respond, and 
Satisfaction in Responding.
2.0 Responding. "At this level, zve are concerned zvith responses zvhich go 
beyond merely attending (paying attention to) the phenomenon. The student...is actively 
attending. As a first stage in a "learning by doing" process the student is committing himself 
(or herself) in some small measure to the phenomenon involved...This is the category that many 
teachers zvill find best describes their 'interest' objectives... that a (student) become sufficiently 
involved in or committed to a subject, phenomenon, or activity that he (or she) zvill seek it out 
and gain satisfaction from zvorking zvith it or engaging in it" (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 
1964, p. 178).
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2.1 Acquiescence in Responding. "We might use the word 'obedience' or 
‘compliance’ to describe this behavior....Compliance is perhaps a better term...since there is 
more of the element of reaction to a suggestion and less of the implication of resistance or yielding 
unwillingly...The student makes the response, but...has not fid ly  accepted the necessity for 
doing so" (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964, p. 179).
2.2 Willingness to Respond. "The key to this level is .. .capacity for 
voluntary activity. There is the implication that the learner is voluntarily committed to 
exhibiting the behavior... not just because of a fear of punishment, but ‘‘on his (or her) own" or 
voluntarily... the element of resistance or of yielding unwillingly... is here replaced with consent 
or proceeding from one's own choice" (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964, p. 179).
2.3 Satisfaction in Responding. "The additional element in the step beyond 
the Willingness to Respond level (the consent, the assent to responding, or the voluntary 
response) is that the behavior is accompanied by a feeling of satisfaction, an emotional response, 
generally of pleasure, zest, or enjoyment. The location of this category in the hierarchy has 
given us a great deal of difficulty, fust where in the process of internalization the attachment of 
an emotional response, kick, or thrill to a behavior occurs has been hard to determine....The 
category is arbitrarily placed at this point in the hierarchy where it seems to occur most 
frequently and where it is cited as or appears to be an important component of the objects at this 
level of the continuum. The category's inclusion at this point serves the pragmatic purpose of 
reminding us of the presence of the emotional component and its value in the building of affective 
behaviors” (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964, p. 180).
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BLOOM'S INSTRUCTIONAL STEP 1
Step 1.1 Present the Learning Stimulus*
Step 1.2 Engage Willingness to Receive It*
Step 1.3 Promote Willingness to Respond to It* 
*Resulting in: 'CONTROLLED'ATTENTION
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Appendix C
The Reliability and Validity of the MSCEIT, V.2 
Synopsis of Chapter 7 from 
The MSCEIT, V.2 Technical Manual 
(MHS, Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, pp. 77-88)
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Appendix C
The Reliability and Validity of the MSCEIT, V.2,
A Synopsis of Chapter 7,
The MSCEIT. V.2 Technical Manual 
(MHS, Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, pp. 77-88)
The MSCEIT, V.2 instrument used in this study was designed by 
John D. Mayer, Ph.D. of the University of New Hampshire, Peter Salovey, Ph.D. 
of Yale University, and David R. Caruso, Ph.D., and was scored and administered 
by Multi-Health Systems, Inc. of Toronto, Canada at www.mhs.com. The 
MSCEIT, V.2 instrument "has been designed to produce a highly reliable full 
scale score, and highly reliable branch scores" (MHS, Inc./Mayer, Salovey and 
Caruso, 2000b, p. 77). For the scale group of branch scores on the MSCEIT, V.2, 
the coefficient alpha of reliability for each branch is as follows: for Branch IX, 
Perceiving Emotions, alpha = .87, based on 1,211 test participants; for Branch 2X, 
Facilitation of Emotions, alpha = .76, based on 1,500 test participants; for Branch 
3X, Understanding Emotions, alpha = .73, based on 1,561 test participants; for 
Branch 4X, Managing Emotions, alpha = .82, based on 1,334 test participants 
(MHS, Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 78). The Technical Manual 
recommends the reliability of the MSCEIT, V.2 branch scores for interpretation 
(MHS, Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 78).
The MSCEIT, V.2 was "intended to measure one unified area of 
ability: emotional intelligence, that can be subdivided into subsidiary areas of
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skill. This will be the case only if the various subscales.. .intercorrelate 
positively ...(and) That is the case..." (MHS, Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 
2000b, p. 79). Although some data were not available for some tasks, the 
available data showing intercorrelations among the individual Tasks—the Faces, 
Pictures, Synesthesia, Facilitation, Changes, Blends, Emotional Relationships and 
Emotions Management Tasks— are all positive (MHS, Inc./Mayer, Salovey and 
Caruso, 2000b, p. 79).
Issues of validity are concerned with "face validity" which means 
"whether a test appears to measure what it is supposed to measure. As noted in 
the introduction (to The MSCEIT. V.2 Technical Manual), people mean more than 
one thing by 'Emotional Intelligence.' Some people think of it as denoting 
warmth, motivation, and persistence; others view it as a mental ability....When 
people review, or take, the MSCEIT, the face validity of the test is immediately 
apparent. The ability to perceive emotions, via the Faces Task, for instance, has a 
great deal of face validity. Asking the test taker about a mood's impact on 
thinking, such as in the Facilitation Task, or which strategies are more effective in 
emotional situations, such as in the Emotions Management Task, are readily 
identifiable by test takers as measures of emotional intelligence (MHS, 
Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 80). The only part of the test that 
some test takers have reported as "odd" or "different" than other tests they 
have taken are the Tasks that measure "the ability to employ emotions to think 
creatively and/or to solve problems" but, "Typically, it is also our experience 
that these people also score in the below average range (on these Tasks)" (MHS, 
Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 80).
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"Content, or Sampling, Validity has to do with whether a test's 
items are rationally drawn from the domains that the test is supposed to cover. 
The 1997 ability theory of emotional intelligence (Mayer and Salovey, 1997) was 
designed to capture the most important skills composing emotional intelligence. 
The MSCEIT, in turn, was designed to measure emotional intelligence according 
to that theory...and draws sufficient items from each of the four branches of the 
model to measure them comprehensively. At the same time, some pragmatic 
compromises were made. For example, Branch 1 items sample from the 
'perception'...rather than from the 'expression' portion...because it is technically 
expensive to assess the expression of emotion. Fortunately, emotionally 
expressive behavior may be highly correlated with the ability to perceive 
emotion" (MHS, Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 80). Hence the 
content validity of the MSCEIT,m V.2 scale can be "summarized as a good 
representation of the (1997) model, incorporating pragmatic compromises" 
(MHS, Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 80).
The predictive validity of the MSCEIT, V.2 has yet to be fully 
determined because "Actual completed studies with the MSCEIT are few in 
number as-of-yet)" (MHS, Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 80). 
However, the first version of the MSCEIT, the MEIS, has been used in a number 
of research studies in relation to ability, personality and behavior measures 
(MHS, Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 80). Hence "it is reasonable to 
expect that the MSCEIT will predict criteria similar to that of the MEIS" (MHS, 
Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 80). Relevant to this dissertation's
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study are the relationships already determined between emotional intelligence 
and general intellectual ability, using the MEIS which preceded the MSCEIT, V.2. 
Using 503 test participants who took the MEIS and the Army Alpha Vocabulary 
Test, a correlation of test scores found that r = .36, significant at the p<.01 level; 
two other studies using 239 participants and 208 participants to take the Army 
Alpha Vocabulary Test and the MEIS, found correlations of r = .38 and r = .37, 
respectively, significant at the pc.Ol level. For self-reported Grade Point 
Average, a correlation with the MEIS scores was .53, significant at the p<.01 level 
(MHS, Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 81).
A strong correlation between "satisfaction with life" and emotional 
intelligence has also been determined at r = .61, significant at the pc.Ol level, 
using 35 test participants, a Satisfaction with Life Scale and MEIS test scores 
(MHS, Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 84).
The construct validity of the MSCEIT, V.2 "refers to whether a test 
truly measures the concept it claims to measure. The MSCEIT was designed to 
measure an intelligence as described by the four-branch ability model...(e.g., 
Mayer and Salovey, 1997). That is, it is supposed to measure a person's ability to 
carry out valid abstract reasoning in the area of emotions, as indicated by the 
capacity to perceive, facilitate, understand, and manage emotions.
"The construct validity of a test is generally established over many 
years of research with the instrument. Each study with a test contributes, in 
effect, to the test's construct validation. If the test behaves in a theoretically 
expectable manner, then the test's construct validity is enhanced. If the test 
contradicts what scientists would expect to happen on the basis of prior theory
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and research concerning the concept, then the test's construct validity is 
undermined.
"Research with the MSCEIT is still at an early stage. Nonetheless, 
the findings discussed above (Chapter 7 of The MSCEIT. V.2 Technical Manual) 
concerning the MSCEIT's content, criterion, and structural validity, may all be 
used as evidence for the test's construct validity.
"The MSCEIT also has a beautiful subfactor pattern. Results from 
one of the two factor analyses...(show)...a clear four-factor pattern.
Remarkably, every task loaded most highly on its predicted factor. The 
other—maximum likelihood—factor analysis was about the same" (MHS, 
Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, pp. 89-90). A pattern matrix using a 
Principal Axis Factoring, forcing four factors, was one of the factor analyses cited, 
and can be found with other statistical data indicating the validity and reliability 
of the MSCEIT, V.2, in Chapter 7 of The MSCEIT. V.2 Technical Manual (MHS. 
Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b) whose distribution and use are 
administered by MHS, Inc. of Canada at www.mhs.com.
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Appendix D
Proposal for Research Use of Human Subjects 
and Informed Consent Agreement
(School of Education-Human Subjects Review Committee, 
SOE-HSRC, 2000/2001)
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Dates April 3, 2001
School of Education Human Subjects Review Committee, 
College of William and Mary
Betsy Edison, Ph.D. Candidate, Higher Education 
College of William and Mary
Review of Research Involving Human Subjects using 
a Diagnostic Psychology Test, the MSCEIT V. for 
Completion of EPPL 765 Advanced Research Course.
1. Please find attached my EPPL 765 Research Proposal 
employing the Mayer Salovey Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test 
Version 2 (MSCEIT V.2) as the research instrument. Included is the 
Informed Consent Agreement for your review, in compliance with the 
Code of Federal Regulations for research involving human subjects. 
As described in detail in the attached proposal, my human subjects 
will be undergraduates at the College of William and Mary. I 
understand that each participant in my research project is 
required to read and sign the Informed Consent Agreement before 
being permitted to take the MSCEIT V.2.
2. The MSCEIT V.2 is administered by Multi-Health 
Systems of Canada for the ongoing research of Professors Jack 
Mayer of the University of New Hampshire and Peter Salovey, Chair 
of the Psychology Department at Yale University. Use of the MSCEIT 
V.2 on Internet is given to academic researchers with permission 
from Professors Mayer and Salovey, until June 1, 2001. The MSCEIT 
V.2 would be taken in April-May 2001 by selected William and Mary 
undergraduates (who have been selected but not contacted pending 
SOC-HSRC approval) .
3. The purpose of this research is to contribute to 
the existing new body of research literature, in both higher 
education and psychology of learning, by finding the correlation 
between emotional intelligence and high academic achievement in a 
selected sample of undergraduates at the College of William and 
Mary.
To:
From:
Subject:
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PROPOSAL ADDENDUM
Date:January 10, 2002
Human Subjects Review Committee-School of Education 
College of William and Mary
Betsy Edison, Ph.D. Candidate, School of Education, 
College of William and Mary
Additional Research Involving Human Subjects who were 
Tested April-October 2001 with the MSCEIT V.2
Proposed Addition of an MSCEIT, V.2 Focus Group 
for Completion of EPPL 765
1. The proposed addition of a qualitative Focus Group 
would complement the quantitative research data already collected 
by testing undergraduate students at the College of William and 
Mary during April-October 2001, using the Mayer Salovey Caruso 
Emotional Intelligence Test, Version 2 (MSCEIT, V.2) as the 
research instrument, for which testing the SOE-HSRC approval was 
given in April 2001.
2. Only students already tested and scored on the 
MSCEIT, V.2 would be invited to participate in a Focus Group.
These students signed the SOE-HSRC approved Informed Consent 
Agreement for taking the MSCEIT, V.2. The additional "Informed 
Consent Agreement - Focus Group" (please see attached) would also 
be signed by all Focus Group participants, and is hereby submitted 
for SOE-HSRC approval in compliance with the Code of Federal 
Regulations for research involving human subjects. Human subjects 
are all undergraduates at the College of William and Mary.
To:
From:
Subject:
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3. The MSCEIT V.2 is administered by Multi-Health 
Systems of Canada for the ongoing research of Professors Jack 
Mayer of the University of New Hampshire and Peter Salovey, Chair 
of the Psychology Department at Yale University. Use of the MSCEIT 
V.2 on Internet was given to academic researchers with permission 
from Professors Mayer and Salovey.
4. Precis of the Quantitative Part of this Study 
Approved in April 2001 bv SOE-HSRC: The purpose of this research 
is to contribute to an existing but relatively new body of 
research literature still emerging in educational psychology, by 
finding the quantitative correlation between emotional 
intelligence and achievement, using MSCEIT, V.2 test scores and 
achievement data for a sample of undergraduates at the College of 
William and Mary.
The Research Hypothesis 
This research is testing to see if there is a relationship between 
achievement and Emotional Intelligence (E.I.). The null hypothesis 
is that the scores of high achievers do not differ from the scores 
of normals. The other null hypothesis is that there is a zero 
correlation between achievement and E.I.
5. The Need for a Qualitative Addendum: According to 
the designers of the MSCEIT, V.2 (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso,
2000), "...There are reasons to be excited both about emotional 
intelligence and the variables that predict success....(but)...To 
some extent, the fate of emotional intelligence measures is 
connected to...better criteria of life activities (including 
success)..." (Mayer, Salovery and Caruso, 2000, p. 416).
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EPPL 765 
Advanced Research Project
Graduate School of Education at the College of William and Mary
Research Contact: Betsy Edison 
edison2OO10e a r th l in k .n e t
Informed Consent Agreement
1. By answering the scale item questions on the Mayer- 
Salovey-Caruso-Emotional-Intelligence-Test Version 2 (MSCEIT V.2), 
a standardized diagnostic psychology test accessed on Internet 
Explorer, you will be participating in a higher education research 
project at the College of William and Mary.
2. The purpose of this research project is to find the 
correlation between emotional intelligence and high achievement in 
undergraduate higher education. The research question asks if 
undergraduate high achievers are also emotionally intelligent.
The research question is two-fold: Are undergraduate 'normal' 
achievers as emotionally intelligent as undergraduate high 
achievers at the College of William and Mary?
3. Expected duration of your participation is 30 minutes.
4. There are no reasonably foreseeable risks or discomforts 
that may occur as a result of participating in this research.
5. There are no compensation or treatments available if 
injury occurs due to the non-risk status of your participation.
6. You may contact Graduate School of Education researcher, 
Betsy Edison, Ph.D. candidate in Higher Education with a Cognate 
in Psychology of Learning, College of William and Mary, at
edison2001@earthlink.net by email, or by calling (757) 565-5465, 
for answers to any pertinent questions about the research or your 
rights as a research subject.
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7. Your participation in this research project is 
voluntary: refusal to participate will not result in penalty. You 
may discontinue your participation at any time without penalty.
8. Confidentiality of test participation will be ensured 
because your computerized test will contribute to a group average 
or mean, to be used to determine the standard deviation from the 
mean, a group (not individualized) number to be quantitatively 
analyzed within a larger database of statistics, which will 
maintain participant confidentiality.
9. Appropriate alternative procedures or courses of 
treatment related to emotional intelligence development and 
research, that might be advantageous to participants in this 
research project, may be requested from Multi-Health Systems, Inc. 
which administers the MSCEIT V.2, at www.mhs.com.
10. Benefits to the participant and/or to others that may 
reasonably be expected from this research include Mayer and 
Salovey's concept that 'emotional intelligence' is a measurable 
ability that can be acquired in order to use feelings to motivate, 
plan, and achieve in one's life.
Participant Name (Print) (Date)
Participant Signature (Date)
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Graduate School of Education at the College of William and Mary
Research Contact: Betsy Edison 
ediaon20019earthlink.net
In fo rm ed  C o n s e n t  A g reem en t
1. By discussing questions presented to you in the MSCEIT, 
V.2 Focus Group (the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso-Emotional-Intelligence- 
Test, Version 2 Focus Group), you will be participating in a 
higher education research project at the College of William and 
Mary.
2. The purpose of this Focus Group is to gather qualitative 
data for the better understanding of the quantitative correlation 
sought by this study, between emotional intelligence and 
achievement in undergraduate higher education.
3. Expected duration of your participation is 45 minutes.
4. There are no reasonably foreseeable risks or discomforts 
that may occur as a result of participating in this research.
5. There are no compensations or treatments available due 
to the non-risk status of your participation.
6. You may contact Graduate School of Education researcher, 
Betsy Edison, Ph.D. candidate in Higher Education with a Cognate 
in Psychology of Learning, College of William and Mary, at 
edison2001gearthlink.net by email, or by calling (757) 565-5465, 
for answers to any pertinent questions about the research or your 
rights as a research subject.
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7. Your participation in this research project is 
voluntary: refusal to participate will not result in penalty. You 
may discontinue your participation at any time without penalty.
8. Confidentiality of test participation will be ensured 
because your comments will be qualitatively synthesized (not 
individualized) into predominant themes, expressions, and most 
frequently arising ideas in an analysis of this data that will not 
cite names of participants but only predominant themes, which will 
maintain participant confidentiality.
9. Appropriate alternative procedures or courses of 
treatment and information related to emotional intelligence 
development and research, that might be advantageous to 
participants in this research project, may be requested from 
Multi-Health Systems, Inc., which administers the MSCEIT V.2, at 
www.mhs.com.
10. Benefits to the participant and/or to others that may 
reasonably be expected from this research include Mayer and 
Salovey's concept that 'emotional intelligence' is a measurable 
ability that can be acquired in order to use feelings to motivate, 
plan, and achieve in one's life.
Participant Name (Print) (Date)
Participant Signature (Date)
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Appendix E
Histograms, Significant Correlations 
and Summary Data 
of this Study
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Branch IX  Perception of Emotions 
T ask  A: T he Faces T ask
This task measures the partidpants's ability to identify, in a picture of a 
person's face, what emotion that person is feeling (e.g., angry or happy).
Frequency
Std. Dev = 13.90 
Mean = 101.1 
N = 61.00
O ■O ■O ■O O O •O ■O •O Rq  °.q  'Tq  °.c
Task A Scores
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Branch 2X Using Emotions
T ask B: T he F acilitation  T ask
This task measures the partidpants's ability to recall personal knowledge 
of how moods can interact and assist in certain kinds of problem-solving. This is a 
recall-test of how a mood can support or impair thinking and reasoning in given 
situations.
Frequency
Std. Dev = 15.22 
Mean = 98.2 
N = 61.00
■o ■o o •o -o -o ■o •o •o Q0 °.0 y.0 °.0
Task B Scores
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Branch 3X Understanding Emotions 
TaskC: The Changes Task
This task measures the partidpants's ability to understand how  
"emotional chains" or "families of related emotions" form and transition from one to 
another, for example, how frustration can change to sadness or anger. This measures 
knowledge of experiencing possibly conflicting emotioins in certain situations.
Frequency
Std. Dev = 10.50 
Mean = 108.9 
N = 61.00
Task C Scores
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Branch 4X Managing Emotions
Task D: The Emotion Management Task
This task measures the partidpants's ability to choose alternative actions 
in achieving a cetain result. The test-taker is asked to rate the effectiveness of optional 
dedsions and actions in situations where a person has to regulate their own emotions.
Frequency
Std. Dev = 11.20 
Mean = 104.6 
N = 61.00
■o -s  -o -s- -o s  -o -o -s
Task D Scores
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Branch IX Perception of Emotions
T ask E: T he P ictures T ask
This task measures the participants's ability to determine which emotions 
are being expressed in typical pictures of the environment, such as in a landscape 
picture or in a picture of rocks.
Frequency
Std. Dev = 15.61 
Mean = 97.9 
N = 61.00
•O ‘O ■O ■O ■O -O ■O •O •O O ° . q S- q 0 . q S- q ° . q
Task E Scores
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Branch 2X Using Emotions
Task F: The Sensations Task
This task measures the participants's ability to compare different emotions 
to different sensations, such as to light, color, and temperature sensations. In order to 
do this successfully (for a high score), the test-taker must theoretically generate a 
certain mood in order to then reason with that mood and "let the feeling direct 
thinking" in comparing a mood's qualities to a sensation, such as an angry mood and 
the color yellow.
Frequency
1 0 1  ----------------------------------------------
Std. Dev = 11.31 
Mean = 99.6 
N = 61.00
Task F Scores
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Branch 3X Understanding Emotions 
Task G: The Blends Task
This task measures the participants's ability to connect situations with 
certain emotions (e.g., knowing that a situation involving a loss can make someone 
sad).
Frequency
Std. Dev = 9.99 
Mean = 110.5
Task G Scores
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Branch 4X Managing Emotions
Task H: Social Management Task (Emotions in Relationships)
This task measures the partidpants's ability to evaluate how effective 
different actions would be in achieving an outcome involving the emotions of other 
people.
Frequency
Std. Dev = 11.15 
Mean = 103.9 
N = 61.00
■o ■o ■o -o -o •o ■o ■o ■o °.Q ±0 Q0 °.0
Task H Scores
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Branch Scores
Frequency
Std. Dev = 15.34 
Mean = 99.5 
N = 61.00
BRANCH 1X
Frequency
Std. Dev = 12.96 
Mean = 98.6
65.0 75.0 85.0 95.0 105.0 115.0
70.0 80.0 90.0 100.0 110.0 120.0
BRANCH2X
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Branch Scores
Frequency
Std. Dev = 9.58 
Mean = 111.1 
N = 61.00
\ r ' - o -6■ f°o °<p0s 0> /o v  <rO O ' vT O ' vT C> vT ^o-S-O S-O-J- 'O -S--0-S-0
BRANCH3X
Frequency 
16-
14- 
1 2 - 
IQ­
S'
2
0
Std. Dev = 10.93 
Mean = 104.7 
N = 61.00
65.0 75.0 85.0 95.0 105.0 115.0
70.0 80.0 90.0 100.0 110.0 120.0
BRANCH4X
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MSCEITOX: Summary score of Branches IX, 2X, 3X, 4X
Frequency
Std. Dev = 11.76 
Mean = 103.7 
N = 61.00
70.0 80.0 90.0 100.0 110.0 120.0
75.0 85.0 95.0 105.0 115.0 125.0
MSCETTOX
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T-Test
Group Statistics
GENDER N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error 
MeanBRANCH3X Male 17 106.56447 8.42961324 2.0444815
Female 44 112.87241 9.49905974 1.4320371
Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for 
Eaualitv of Variances
F Sig.
BRANCH3X Equal variances 
assumed 
Equal variances 
not assumed
.003 .953
Independent Samples Test
t-test for Ecuafity of Means
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference
BRANCH 3X Equal variances 
assumed 
Equal variances 
not assumed
-2.395
-2.527
59
32.629
.020
.017
-6.3079385
-6.3079385
Independent Samples Test
t-test for Equality of Means
Std Error
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference
Difference Lower Upper
BRANCH3X Equal variances 
assumed 2.63333750 -11.57723 -1.038642
Equal variances 
not assumed 2.49612400 -11.38854 -1.227339
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T-Test
Group Statistics
GENDER N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean
BRANCH4X Male 17 100.09541 10.55602145 2.5602113
Female 44 jpg-apa?*. 10.65373618 1.6061112
Independent Samples Test
Levene’s Test for 
Eaualitv of Variances
F Siq.
BRANCH4X Equal variances 
assumed 
Equal variances 
not assumed
.158 .693
Independent Samples Test
t-test for Ecualitv of Means
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference
BRANCH4X Equal variances 
assumed -2.113 59 .039 -6.4139291
Equal variances 
not assumed -2.122 29.379 .042 -6.4139291
Independent Samples Test
t-test for Equalitv of Means
Std. Error 
Difference
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference
Lower Upper
BRANCH4X Equal variances 
assumed 3.03485624 -12.48666 -.34119583
Equal variances 3.02229627 -12.59176 -.23609742
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Correlations
Correlations
GPA BRANCH4X
GPA Pearson Correlation 1 .314*
Sig. (2-tailed) .014
N 61 61
BRANCH4X Pearson Correlation .314* 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .014
N 61 61
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Correlations
Correlations
GPA BRANCH3X
GPA Pearson Correlation 1 .432*'
Sig. (2-tailed) .001
N 61 61
BRANCH3X Pearson Correlation .432** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .001
N 61 61
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Correlations
Correlations
HSRANK BRANCH3X
HSRANK Pearson Correlation 1 -.269*
Sig. (2-tailed) .041
N 58 58
BRANCH3X Pearson Correlation -.269* 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .041 .
N 58 61
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
INSIDE THE PEARSON CORRELATION:
Understanding Emotions
GPA 3.6 to 4.0 Mean MSCEIT, V.2 score = 113
GPA 3.0 to 3.59 Mean MSCEIT, V.2 score = 1 1 1
GPA Below 3.0 Mean MSCEIT, V.2 score = 100
Note the  13-point scores difference in Understanding Emotions,
for higher GPAs versus lower GPAs.
Managing Emotions
GPA 3.6 to 4.0 Mean MSCEIT, V.2 score = 106
GPA 3.0 to 3.59 Mean MSCEIT, V.2 score = 104
GPA Below 3.0 Mean MSCEIT, V.2 score = 97
Note the  9-point scores-difference in Managing Emotions 
for higher GPAs versus lower GPAs.
